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ABSTRACT 
 
Most scholars have concluded that actively managed equity mutual funds as a 
whole underperform their passively managed counterparts, linked to some benchmarks. 
In other words, active equity fund managers on average do not have enough significant 
stock-picking abilities to add value for investors. However, earlier investigations may 
be flawed through failure to give adequate consideration to liquidity. Hence, this 
research pays much attention to liquidity effects on mutual fund performance and 
argues that it is a preference for holding highly liquid stocks which results in the 
perceived underperformance. 
First, we find no significant liquidity premium at fund level, no matter the holding 
period returns or risk-adjusted performance. This indicates that all or almost all active 
equity fund managers in effect pay considerable attention to liquidity. We also 
examine the effects of liquidity on fund performance among actively managed equity 
funds. In contrast with earlier research, we find that actively managed equity funds in 
the aggregate perform close to the passive strategy. That means, on average, active 
equity fund managers do at least have talent sufficient to generate returns to cover 
costs that their funds impose on investors. This we attribute to the liquidity 
requirement of mutual funds. Moreover, using bootstrap simulation, we discover that 
many more mutual funds can be classified as skilled funds rather than lucky funds, 
once a liquidity factor has been included. Thus, our research provides a new insight 
into mutual fund performance, and highlights liquidity as an important and 
non-negligible determinant in the evaluation of mutual fund performance. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Mutual funds are created and managed by professional companies which are 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S.1 Hence, 
they are also called professional collective investment schemes that pool money from 
mass investors and invest this money in capital markets to realize capital gains through 
qualified management and skillful investment strategies. For mass investors, a 
motivation for investing in mutual funds is the common belief that fund managers can 
do better than they could. Additionally, individual investors are able to enjoy the 
benefits of diversification and economies of scale through investing in mutual funds. 
Investors can participate in mutual funds by purchasing shares issued by these 
professional mutual fund companies. Subsequently, investors also are able to cash in 
fund by redemption of mutual fund shares. 
 
1.1. Research Incentives 
Over the recent decades the mutual fund industry has increased dramatically and 
now plays a significant role in global financial markets. According to the latest 2010 
Investment Company Fact Book (ICI, 2010), U.S. mutual funds had $11.1 trillion in 
assets under management at the end of 2009. They managed about $371 billion at the 
end of 1984, so this figure grew by around 30 times in 25 years. Of the $11.1 trillion, 
roughly $5 trillion was managed in equity funds at year-end 2009. As a result, equity 
mutual funds were the largest group of investors in U.S. companies, since they held 
nearly one-fourth of outstanding stocks of U.S. companies in 2009. For this 
                                                        
1
 In the U.K., mutual funds are often referred to as Unit Trusts although their correct designation is Open Ended 
Investment Companies, OEIC. They are managed by companies registered with the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA). 
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professional investment management, a typical equity fund normally charges certain 
fees and expenses to investors. Based on the ICI (2010), investors in equity funds paid 
fees and expenses of 1.98% of fund assets in 1990, and this figure had fallen by half to 
0.99% by 2009. Conservatively, let us assume that the fees and expenses of these 
actively managed equity funds average about 1% of the assets; then this suggests 
business of the order of $50 billion in equity funds in 2009. Amongst the effort 
expended in providing various services, ³more than half of the expenses of mutual 
funds arise because of their stock selection efforts´ according to Daniel et al. (1997). 
In this case, at least $25 billion in 2009 were expended by these active fund managers 
in pursuit of underpriced stocks (see Figure 1.1). Given the magnitude of these 
expenses, re-examination of the stock-picking talent of the fund managers is a highly 
worthwhile activity. Thus, it becomes our practical incentive to research mutual fund 
performance. 
 
Figure 1.1 
Stock-picking Expenses of Actively Managed Equity Funds in the U.S. (2009) 
Assets managed by
Mutual Funds
($11.1 trillion)
Assets managed by
Equity Funds
($5 trillion)
Stock-picking Expenses
($25 billion)
Total Costs
($50 billion)
  44%
      1%
    50%
Data Source: 2010 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company Institute. 
 
As far as our academic incentive is concerned, it is to test once again the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). The study of mutual fund performance is actually a 
derivative of EMH testing. If this hypothesis holds, the existence of active fund 
management will never be justified. In the 1960s, Prof. Eugene Fama introduced the 
Chapter 1                                                              Introduction 
 3 
EMH into the economics and finance literature. He argued persuasively that, in an 
efficient market that includes many well-informed and intelligent investors, stocks will 
be appropriately priced and reflects all available information. Thus, no information or 
analysis can be expected to result in outperformance if a market is efficient. However, 
some economists noted problems with the hypothesis in 1980s. Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) showed that a perfectly efficient market was impossible because, in such a 
market, nobody would have any incentive to collect the information needed to make the 
market efficient. After the market crash of 1987, Shiller (1989), one of the founders of 
behavioural finance, even called the EMH one of the most remarkable errors in the 
history of economic thought. During the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the EMH 
became a hot topic again for academics and practitioners. For investors, the issue of 
market efficiency reduces boils down to whether professional fund managers have the 
ability to outperform the market as a whole. Following Malkiel (1973)³LIPDUNHWSULFHV
were determined by irrational investors and systematically deviated from rational 
estimates of the present value of corporations, and if it was easy to spot predictable 
SDWWHUQV LQ VHFXULW\ UHWXUQV RU DQRPDORXV VHFXULW\ SULFHV´ WKHQ SURIHVVLRQDO IXQG
managers are supposed to be able to outperform the market. Thus, in academic circles, it 
has been widely accepted that direct testing of the performance of actively managed 
equity fund should provide the most convincing evidence of market efficiency. 
 
1.2. Debate Topics  
Although investors, in practice, seem to trust the selectivity ability of these 
professionals and try to select such active fund managers, academics have repetitively 
questioned this trust. So far, three key topics have been central to academic debates in 
the area. 
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The core issue is whether mutual fund managers who actively trade stocks are 
able to add value for investors; in other words, whether abnormal fund performance, 
after expenses are taken into account, is positive or negative. Thus far, most academic 
studies have concluded that, on average, actively managed mutual funds underperform 
their benchmarks, net of costs and expenses. For example, Jensen (1968), in the 
seminal paper on mutual fund performance, first reports that mutual funds cannot 
forecast stock prices well enough to recover expenses and fees, even for an individual 
fund. Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996) further emphasize that mutual funds on 
average offer a negative risk-adjusted return and so, in the aggregate, underperform 
benchmark portfolios. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) attribute underperformance on net 
returns to high expense and fees. They show that superior gross performance may exist, 
but mutual funds have higher expenses eliminating abnormal returns and, as a result, 
do not exhibit abnormal performance net of all expenses. Subsequently, Daniel et al. 
(1997) and Wermers (2000) also find that, on net returns, mutual funds underperform 
the market index, although the performance on gross returns is better than the market. 
They attribute much of fund performance to the characteristics of the stocks held by 
funds. In this thesis, we will examine the issue of performance of mutual funds via two 
approaches: (i) to conduct a simple time-series regression for each fund and (ii) to 
examine fund performance as a whole by constructing a portfolio of funds in each 
month. Moreover, we will apply regression models to examine the mutual fund 
performance. For example, we will present the results for those conventional asset 
pricing models (capital asset pricing model - CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model 
- FF3F, and Carhart four-factor model - FF+Mom) and liquidity-based asset pricing 
models (Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model - FF+PS and Liu liquidity-augmented 
two-factor model - LCAPM). We hope to find a new reason or a new angle to explain 
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the outperformance or underperformance of mutual funds. 
From a variety of press and media, mass investors may now be familiar with 
Fidelity Magellan Fund and Schroder Ultra Fund, the two brightest stars in the history 
of the mutual fund industry. They surely cannot help wondering, however, whether 
these star funds reflect unusual wisdom in identifying undervalued stocks or are simply 
endowed with luck. This has become a hot debate (the second topic in our study) in 
recent academic research. Through the bootstrap method, a kind of Monte Carlo 
simulation, it is possible to examine the difference between all funds that exhibit a 
certain alpha in value-added and those funds that exhibit the same alpha by luck alone. 
Kosowski et al. (2006) introduce bootstrap simulation analysis (residual-only 
resampling) into fund performance research to distinguish the performance of best and 
worst funds not solely due to luck, where results cannot be explained by sampling 
variability alone. More recently, Fama and French (2010) infer the existence of 
superior and inferior managers in the cross section of fund returns through a joint 
resampling method, another bootstrap simulation. Although the main inference is less 
positive than that of Kosowski et al. (2006), they conclude that few active funds 
produce sufficient returns to cover their costs and star managers are hidden by the 
mass of managers with insufficient skill. Since these two bootstrap simulation methods, 
residual-only resampling and entire cases (joint) resampling, have their respective pros 
and cons, we will apply each successively to evaluate the performance of mutual funds 
and to reveal the lucky and skilled funds in our research. Accordingly, by comparing 
any ex-post t-statistics of fund alphas, ÖÖ itD , with their appropriate luck distribution 
ÖÖ( )bif tD , we are able to reject or not reject the null hypothesis that performance is due to 
luck at some confidence level and infer that the best funds have or do not have 
selectivity skill.  
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As is well known, besides VDWLVI\LQJ LQYHVWRUV¶ ILQDQFLDO JRDOV PXWXDO IXQG
managers also meet their liquidity needs. Liquidity has been listed as one of four main 
advantages of mutual funds in the website of SEC.2 Recently, an increasing number of 
fund managers paid much attention to the liquidity management in their investment 
decisions. For instance, aggressive profit-oriented fund managers will tend to hold 
fewer liquid securities,3 while those capital safety-oriented funds will be likely to hold 
more liquid securities. However, we notice that prior academic studies on mutual funds 
give less consideration to the impact of liquidity on fund performance. Perhaps the first 
notable paper considering a liquidity factor on mutual fund performance is Edelen 
(1999). By examining IXQGV¶DEQRUPDOUHWXUQDQGIXQGLQYHVWRUIORZV, Edelen argues 
WKDW IORZ DGYHUVHO\ DIIHFWV D IXQG¶V SHUIRUPDQFH EHFDXVH WKH SRVLWLRQ DFTXLUHG LQ D
liquidity-PRWLYDWHGWUDGHKDVDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHIXQG¶VDEQRUPDOUHWXUQ+HQFH
he attributes negative return performance to the costs of liquidity-motivated trading. 
Subsequently, Massa and Phalippou (2005) construct and use a new portfolio liquidity 
ratio, based on a micro-level fund liquidity concept. After considering short-term 
divergences from the optimal level and market-wide liquidity shocks, they conclude 
that portfolio liquidity does not affect performance in a predictable way, but note that 
PXWXDO IXQGV¶EHWWHUSHUIRUPDQFH LQEDG LOOLTXLG WLPHVPLJKWEHSDUWLDOO\RU WRWDOO\
driven by liquidity. Since there is no consensus on the relationship between liquidity 
and mutual fund performance, finding an appropriate liquidity factor and investigating 
how it might affect mutual fund performance is deserving of further study. Hence, we 
finally analyze the third research topic - whether there is liquidity premium at fund 
level and to what extent it affects fund performance. In this research, we will first 
                                                        
  
2
 See the website of U.S. SEC at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm. 
  
3
 Such as Zebra Capital Management which establishes a liquid investment strategy that captures liquidity 
premium. See http://www.zebracapm.com/strategies.htm. 
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construct fund liquidity measures (FLMs) based on the value-weighted average of the 
liquidity measure of stocks held by a fund. Then, we will test fund liquidity premium 
by sorting all qualified equity funds into ten portfolios based on their FLMs and 
controlling for risk using various asset pricing models. If the least liquid portfolio 
consistently outperforms the most liquid portfolio, this is a strong evidence of the 
presence of a liquidity premium at fund level. More importantly, it is necessary to 
make clear that the analysis above only focuses on the fund liquidity level, rather than 
fund liquidity risk. When examining mutual fund performance, we will emphasize the 
effect of the fund liquidity factor on performance through observing the loading of 
liquidity factor in Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (i.e. fund liquidity risk). 
As Liu (2009) points out, liquidity level and liquidity risk are two related but different 
concepts. Thus, it is imperative to distinguish them successfully. 
 
1.3. Potential Contributions 
Nearly all earlier academic research on mutual fund performance gives little 
consideration to fund managers having to provide liquidity to investors through the 
holding of considerable quantities of liquid stocks. It makes sense, however, that fund 
managers always prefer stocks with high liquidity in readiness to response to 
unexpected and contingent fund share redemptions. To fill this gap, our research not 
only constructs new fund liquidity measures and analyzes the liquidity characteristics 
of actively managed equity funds but also examines the existence of a fund liquidity 
premium, as well as effect of the liquidity factor on fund performance. 
First of all, this thesis takes a new look at returns of 2417 diverse actively 
managed U.S. equity funds during the period of 1984 to 2008 and utilizes a new data 
sample that includes the liquidity measures of stocks held by funds in each month over 
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the 25-year period. Initially using the classification of Thomson Reuters 
CDA/Spectrum, we then apply our own standard (based on proportion of the 
stock-holdings in a mutual fund) to identify the equity funds, which effectively avoids 
the fund classification confusion. Thus, it appears that our actively managed equity 
fund sample is purer and more accurate than any in the existing literature. 
Next, through the mutual fund stock-holdings¶ data, it is possible for us to define 
and construct new fund liquidity measures (FLMs) from a micro perspective. That is, 
our fund liquidity indicates the liquidity comes from stock-holdings, rather than Edelen 
(1999)¶s macro-level fund liquidity, which is defined as fund investors¶ flow, i.e. cash 
flow including new sales and redemptions. To a large extent, (GHOHQ¶s macro-level 
fund liquidity could not be controlled directly by fund managers, while our micro-level 
fund liquidity is able to tell us exactly the liquidity preference of fund managers. Thus, 
we believe the weighted average liquidity of stocks held by funds might be more 
suitable as a factor for investigating performances of mutual funds, since 
stock-holdings can be managed effectively by fund managers.  
Then, we present the liquidity characteristics of actively managed equity funds 
over the period 1984 to 2008. By analyzing the four fund liquidity measures and two 
fund stock-holdings characteristics, we find that the equity funds now favour highly 
liquid stocks more than ever. In particular, a typical equity fund is likely to hold stocks 
with fewer no-trading days (Liu¶s LM12), higher trading turnover ratio (TO12), lower 
price-impact ratio (Amihud¶s RtoV12), and slightly lower effective cost of trading 
(Hasbrouck¶s EC). In addition, we notice that the market capitalization of 
stock-holdings (MV) increases almost ninefold during the 25-year period; meanwhile 
the book-to-market ratio of stock-holdings (B/M) falls markedly. These phenomena 
indicate that, especially in recent times, liquidity has been paid increasing attention by 
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fund managers when making investment decisions. Moreover, according to the 
micro-level fund liquidity concept, above, we can further examine liquidity premium at 
fund level and we find that fund liquidity premium does not exist, no matter the 
holding period returns or risk-adjusted performance. The absence of a fund liquidity 
premium is consistent with our expectation. As a matter of fact, almost all actively 
managed equity funds pay much attention to liquidity and hold a large volume of 
highly liquid stocks. As a result, it is impossible to find a significant liquidity premium 
within these notably liquid portfolios.  
Subsequently, we use conventional asset pricing models (CAPM, FF3F, and 
FF+Mom) and liquidity-based asset pricing models (FF+PS and LCAPM) to measure 
and examine the mutual fund performance and try to offer new outcomes and 
explanations from fund liquidity consideration. Through analyzing the performance 
(yearly alpha) of aggregate wealth invested in funds (value-weighed returns of 
portfolio of funds) relative to passive benchmarks, we discover two different stories. If 
we use CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS models, the fund performance is poor, 
because the modelV¶ annualized intercepts are negative, ranging from -0.721% to 
-1.057% per year, with t-statistics from -2.37 to -3.23. These significant negative 
alphas tell us that, on average, actively managed equity funds do not have the ability to 
generate sufficient returns to cover the costs and expenses. However, the result from 
Liu LCAPM is completely different. Not only is the model¶s annualized intercept 
negative nearly zero (-0.116% per year), but also its t-statistic is insignificant (only 
-0.34). That means the aggregate portfolio of funds is mimicking the performance of 
benchmarks. These results echo our expectations. The underperformance in the first 
story arises because the liquidity factor is not considered properly in those models. In 
contrast, in our new story, to a large extent fund performance is affected by fund 
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liquidity requirements. If the liquidity factor is taken into account, it cannot be rejected 
that actively managed equity funds as a whole perform close to the benchmarks. 
With the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality, we find that roughly half of equity 
funds have alphas that are drawn from a distinctly non-normal distribution.4 This 
finding of non-normal residuals challenges the validity of earlier research that relies on 
the normality assumptions. Accordingly, this finding strongly indicates the need to 
bootstrap, especially in the tails, to determine whether significant performance is due 
to fund manager¶s ability or to luck alone. Thus, this thesis distinguishes skill from 
luck for individual funds using two different bootstrap simulation methods, 
residual-only resampling and entire cases resampling. We find that the performance of 
these best and worst funds can not be explained solely by sampling variability, which 
indicates these fund managers¶ performance is not due to luck alone. We uncover the 
substantial effect of liquidity factor on performance again. For example, in 
residuals-only resampling bootstrap simulation, we discover that the top 20% funds 
can be called skilled funds with genuine stock-picking ability if we apply Liu LCAPM. 
In contrast, using other asset pricing models, we find only the top 5% to 10% of funds 
show genuine skills. Put another way, without considering the liquidity factor, around 
10% to 15% of funds are classified into lucky funds away from skilled. That exactly 
tells us that these funds pay a certain attention to liquidity which, in turn, weakens 
their performance. 
Basically we suppose this thesis contributes to the literature by addressing these 
aspects above. Our research offers a new insight into the mutual fund performance and 
detects the liquidity factor as an important and non-negligible determinant in asset 
                                                        
4
 In this research, if the p-value is less than 0.05 (i.e. at 5% significance level), we reject the null hypothesis that 
the residual is normally distributed. In our tests, the normality is rejected for around 43.5% to 59.3% of funds when 
using various asset pricing models. 
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pricing. Our results emphasize the importance of understanding liquidity in the 
evaluation of mutual fund performance. 
 
The remainder of this thesis continues as follows. In Chapter 2, we briefly take a 
bird¶s eye view of the evolution in mutual fund industry, as well as the motivations of 
investing in mutual funds, and then explain some essential elements in mutual fund 
investment. Besides introducing the efficient market hypothesis and models applied in 
our research, in Chapter 3 we review the literature on mutual fund performance and 
liquidity. The data sources, data processing, fund sample construction and statistics 
description are in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 details the regression models and 
methodologies in this research, explaining the necessity and advantages of using 
bootstrap simulation methods. Chapter 6 presents empirical results on the fund 
liquidity premium, after forming fund liquidity measures. Chapter 7 provides empirical 
results for mutual fund performance by examining the cross-sectional performance of 
portfolio of funds and separating skilled funds from lucky funds via bootstrap 
simulation. Additional robustness tests, such as subsample and subperiod analyses, are 
given in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 summarizes and suggests some future work in this 
research area. 
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CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1. The Evolution of Mutual Fund Industry 
Although mutual funds have been particularly popular in recent several decades, 
they have existed for more than 230 years. The origin of mutual funds dates back to 
Netherlands in the late of 18th century. According to Rouwenhorst (2004), ³In 1774, 
the Dutch merchant and broker Adriaan Van Ketwich invited subscriptions from 
investors to form a trust named Eendragt Maakt Magt - the maxim of the Dutch 
Republic. The founding of the trust followed the financial crisis of 1772-1773 and Van 
.HWZLFK¶V DLP was to provide an opportunity to diversify for small investors with 
OLPLWHGPHDQV´ Eendragt Maakt Magt, the name of the first fund, WUDQVODWHVWR³unity 
FUHDWHVVWUHQJWK´, which reflects the spirit of pooled investing. 
Thereafter, the idea of pooling resources and spreading risk using closed-end 
investment soon made its way to Great Britain and United States (McWhinney, 2005). 
In 1868, the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust was founded in London and, 
subsequently, the Boston Personal Property Trust, the first closed-end fund in the U.S., 
formed in 1893. The arrival of the modern fund (mutual fund or open-end fund) dates 
back to Boston in 1924. Massachusetts ,QYHVWRU¶V Trust, the first mutual fund, 
introduced significant innovations to the pooled investment concept, such as by 
³HVWDEOLVKLQJ a simplified capital structure, continuous offering of shares, the ability to 
redeem shares rather than hold them until dissolution of the fund, and a set of clear 
investment restrictions and policies´ (ICI, 2010). 
With the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, the 
growth of mutual funds was greatly hampered until a series of landmark government 
regulations. After creating the SEC, the U.S. legislature passed the Securities Act of 
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1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which aims to safeguard the LQYHVWRUV¶ 
interest. Later, the Investment Company Act of 1940 added regulations that ³required 
mutual funds to register with the SEC, provide disclosure in the form of a prospectus, 
and VRXJKW WR PLQLPL]H FRQIOLFWV RI LQWHUHVW´ (McWhinney, 2005). All of these 
reinvigorated investor confidence. 
With these numerous innovations and renewed investor passion, the mutual fund 
industry was able to continue to expand. The 1960s saw the rise of aggressive growth 
funds. In the 1970s, a series of index funds were established after the introduction of 
the efficient market theory. Believing in passive investment strategy, John Bogle 
founded the Vanguard Group (renowned for low-cost index funds) in 1974 and started 
the First Index Investment Trust at the end of 1975. The 1970s also saw the rise of the 
no-load fund, which had an enormous impact on the way mutual funds were sold and 
would make a major contribution to the industry's success (McWhinney, 2005). In 
recent several decades, with baby boomers marching towards retirement and the 
growth of defined contribution pensions, such as 401(k) plans, abundant money poured 
into the mutual fund industry and fund managers perhaps even became household 
superstars, for instance, Peter Lynch and his Fidelity Magellan Fund. 
The mutual funds¶ objectives and compositions are greatly disparate, both 
domestically and internationally, and range from specialty funds to index funds. As a 
main portion of the U.S. mutual funds, equity funds held 44% of total $11.1 trillion 
mutual fund assets in 2009 (domestic stock funds and international stock funds held 
33% and 11% respectively). Moreover, the money market funds reached a relatively 
high level and accounted for 30% of U.S. mutual fund assets at the end of 2009.5 For 
the remainder of the total assets in mutual fund industry, bond funds and hybrid funds 
                                                        
5
 That might be most mutual fund investors redeemed equity funds and invested into the money market funds for 
liquidity and safety during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
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held 20% and 6% respectively. Although industry scale declined somewhat during the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009, mutual funds have still been noted as the fastest 
growing investments over recent decades. At the end of 1984, they only managed 
about $371 billion in assets, but this figure had grown to $11.1 trillion at the end of 
2009; mutual fund industry scale has grown by 30 times during these 25 years. 
Moreover, with roughly $5 trillion managed in equity funds (including domestic and 
international stock funds), which has grown by 62 times over the 25 years, equity fund 
is the fastest growing category in this industry (see Appendices 1 and 2). 
 
2.2. The Motivations for Investing in Mutual Funds 
Even though mutual funds have constantly and gradually evolved over time, the 
main motivations for investors to invest in mutual funds remain unchanged. Just as an 
adage says ³'RQ
WSXWDOO\RXUHJJVLQRQHEDVNHW´, the most important motivation for 
small-scale investors to invest in mutual funds should be diversification. Theoretically, 
the highest degree of diversification for an investor is obtained by holding a market 
portfolio that includes a share of all tradable assets. However, there are several 
practical problems an individual investor is faced with when trying to hold such an 
optimally diversified portfolio. For instance, it requires a large investment budget to 
purchase a sufficiently large number of securities. Moreover, managing such a 
portfolio involves significant transaction costs. By pooling large amount of capital, 
mutual funds can offer individual investors an immediate benefit of instant 
diversification through economies of scale. 
In addition, as investment professionals, fund managers (or portfolio managers) 
are expected to be familiar with what is available, the gains and risks possible, and the 
laws and regulations in the industry. Most investors are likely to believe that fund 
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managers have the ability to select profitable investments (selection ability) and earn 
money by buying and selling securities at the right time (timing talent). As a result, 
fund managers can charge certain service fee to investor for their professional 
management. This leads to two key disputes in academia. The first is whether mutual 
funds are able to add value to investors through active trading, i.e. whether they are 
genuine professionals. The other is whether, if mutual funds with superior talent claim 
high fees, these high expenses to their investors eliminate abnormal returns and result 
in no outperformance for the investors. So far, academics have reached contradictory 
conclusions regarding these disputes. Nevertheless, in practice, the mass of investors 
seem to believe fund managers possess some professional talent, at least sufficient to 
outperform those individual investors. 
Another motivation is that investors are provided liquidity by mutual funds, 
because they are able to get in and out mutual funds easily. Liquidity has been listed as 
one of four main advantages of mutual funds by the SEC. In general, all mutual funds 
constantly offer shares to the public. That is, mutual fund shares can be bought and 
sold between the investors and the mutual funds without any difficulty on each trade 
date. However, unlike stocks transaction, in which investors know the sale price when 
they trade, mutual funds transact only at the net asset value (NAV) of each trade date, 
such that investors must wait until the following day to discover the trade price. The 
motivation of providing liquidity also involves a problem: fund managers have to hold 
a large amount of cash or highly liquid assets for dealing with possible share 
redemption, which is at the cost of performance. Therefore, fund managers face a 
tough trade-off between getting better performance and meeting the liquidity 
requirement. 
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2.3. The Essential Elements of Mutual Funds 
2.3.1. Structure and Category 
Mutual funds are created under state laws either as a corporation or as a trust in 
the U.S. On the one hand, mutual funds have officers and directors or trustees, just as 
any other companies. On the other hand, mutual funds ³W\SLFDOO\UHOy on third parties 
or service providers, either affiliated organizations or independent contractors, to 
invest fund assets and FDUU\RXWRWKHUEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHV´ (ICI, 2010). For instance, an 
Administrator operates the fund company and oversees the performance; a Custodian 
(generally a bank) holds the fund¶s assets and protects shareholder interests; an 
Investment Adviser manages the fund¶s portfolio; a Principal Underwriter, known as 
the fund¶s distribution channel, sells fund shares; an Accountant certifies the fund¶s 
financial statements, and so on (see Appendix 3). 
The categories of mutual funds are typically characterized by their investment 
goals or strategies. Usually, there are four basic categories of mutual funds: money 
market, bond, hybrid (or balanced, mix of stocks and bonds) and equity. A money 
PDUNHWIXQG¶s goal is to preserve principal while yielding a modest return by investing 
in short-term bank notes that pay a modest rate of interest and are very safe; a bond 
fund aims to generate income while preserving principal as much as possible by 
investing in medium and long term bonds issued by corporations and governments; a 
hybrid fund tries to grow the principal and generate income by investing in both stocks 
and bonds, which enables to investors reduce their market risk effectively because of 
highly diversification; an equity IXQG¶s goal is to obtain long-term growth through 
capital appreciation, meanwhile dividends and interest are also sources of revenue. 
Some specific equity funds may focus on a certain kind of corporation or sector, 
for example, growth funds, value funds, large-cap funds, mid-cap funds, small-cap 
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funds, and so on. Based on the classification of Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum 
database, an equity fund¶s investment objectives are classified as aggressive growth, 
growth, as well as growth and income, respectively. An aggressive growth fXQG¶s goal 
is to produce capital growth as much as possible and neglect the dividend income. This 
kind of fund invests in stocks that have the potential for explosive growth (these 
companies commonly never pay dividends); accordingly such stocks also have the 
potential to go bankrupt suddenly. A growth fXQG¶s target is to acquire both capital 
growth and dividend income. This type of fund buys those stocks that are growing 
rapidly but have less probability of bankruptcy. A growth and income fund aims to 
preserve the principal and generate some dividend income - hence, this style of fund 
purchases stocks that have modest growth prospect but pay fat dividend yields.  
Similarly, Investment Company Institute, MorningStar, Lipper, and other 
organizations also have their own classification standards. The standard of 
classification is generally broad enough to allow a wide range of different investment 
policies. As Brown and Goetzmann (1997) argue, ³given this broad latitude, it is not 
surprising to find widely divergent behaviour among funds pursuing the same 
objective. As a result, existing classifications do a poor job of forecasting differences 
LQIXWXUHSHUIRUPDQFH´7KHUHIRUH in this research, besides using the classification of 
the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum, we apply a new standard (based on the 
proportion of the stock-holdings in a fund) to classify the equity funds, so as to avoid 
the classification confusion as much as possible. Our new classification criterion is 
based on the SEC rule 35d-1. In 2002, the SEC adopted and proposed a requirement 
that ³DQ LQYHVWPHQW FRPSDQ\ ZLWK D QDPH WKDW VXJJHVWV WKH FRPSDQ\ IRFXVHV LWV
investments in a particular type of investment or in investments in a particular industry 
must invest at least 80% (originally 65%, later raised to 80%) of its assets in the type 
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of investment suggested by the QDPH´For example, ABC Equity Fund has to invest at 
least 80% of assets in stocks; and XYZ Bond Fund must invest at least 80% of its assets 
in bonds. Investment companies have had to comply with the rule, if they want to keep 
the investment objective and style unchanged. Thus, we propose using the proportion 
of stock-holdings as a standard to identify equity funds. 
2.3.2. Pricing, Sales, Fees & Share-classes 
Since LQYHVWRUV¶purchase and redemption is based on the net asset value (NAV) 
per share of each trade date, mutual funds must ensure the accuracy of NAV. Actually 
mutual funds release the NAV only after confirming by the Custodian. In the context 
of mutual funds, NAV is the current market value of all the holdings of the fund, 
minus liabilities, and then divided by the total number of outstanding shares: 
   
   ( )
.   
Market Value of Holdings LiabilitiesNet Asset Value NAV
No of Outstanding Shares
 . 
The value of these holdings is GHWHUPLQHG ³HLWKHU E\ D PDUNHW TXRWDWLRQ IRU WKRVH
securities in which a market quotation is readily available or, if a market quotation is 
not readily available, at fair value as determined in good faith by the IXQG´ (ICI, 2010). 
There are two methods to sell or distribute the mutual fund shares. The main sales 
method is through distribution channels such as broker-dealers, banks, and insurance 
companies. In this way, a sale load fee is often involved, which is retained by the 
distribution channels as compensation to the investment advice provided. In addition, 
mutual funds always offer a portion of their management fee as an additional 
compensation or encouragement to distribution channels. That is known as 12(b)-1 fee 
in the U.S., which was originally used to pay for advertising, marketing and other sales 
promotion activities (this fee is limited to 1% p.a. of the fund¶s asset by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.). Nevertheless, recently most of the 12(b)-1 fee 
collected by funds is used to compensate financial advisers and other financial 
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intermediaries for assisting fund investors before and after purchases of fund shares. 
As a matter of fact, the 12(b)-1 fee used for advertising implies, to some extent, that 
current shareholders bear the cost of attracting new shareholders (Cuthbertson et al., 
2006). Another sales method is direct marketing via fund supermarkets and fund 
management companies (such as online, call centre, and direct marketing department). 
Unlike the first method, direct marketing is not only convenient and easy but also has 
low costs (even no load fee). These directly marketed funds may only use the 12(b)-1 
fee to pay for advertising or shelf space at a fund supermarket. 
Since mutual funds provide professional investment service but, meanwhile, need 
to compensate third parties for investment advice at sales, a typical equity fund 
normally charges two primary kinds of fees and expenses to investors: sales loads and 
ongoing expenses. The former are one-time fees, paid by investors either at the time of 
share purchase (front-end loads), or when shares are redeemed (back-end loads). The 
latter FRYHU ³SRUWIROLR PDQDJHPHQW IXQG DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ GDLO\ fund accounting and 
pricing, shareholder services such as call centres and websites, distribution charges 
known as 12(b)-1 fee, and other miscellaneous costs of operating the fund´ (ICI, 
2010). 
Partly, no doubt, because of competition within the mutual fund industry, mutual 
fund fees and expenses that investors pay have trended downward since 1990. 
According to 2010 Investment Company Fact Book, investors in equity funds paid fees 
and expenses of 1.98% of fund assets in 1990. However, this figure had fallen by half 
to 0.99% by 2009 (see Appendix 4). Besides competition, another reason for the 
dramatic decline in the fees and expenses arises from a significant change in the 
manner of some fund sales. An increasing number of mutual funds sell shares through 
employer-sponsored retirement plans that usually are not charged sale loads for 
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purchases of fund shares. As a result, the investors pay much less in sales loads than 
previously. In 2009, no-load mutual funds obtained the bulk of net new cash, 
accounted to $323 billion of the total $388 billion in net cash, whilst load funds only 
attracted $39 billion (see Appendix 5). Additionally, the levels of fees and expenses 
are influenced by fund investment objective and fund size. In general, money market 
and bond funds tend to have lower expenses ratios than equity funds. Among equity 
funds, aggressive growth funds and international funds may choose to focus more on 
small- or mid-cap stocks and broader stocks, which cause them to be more costly to 
manage. As a result, both expense ratios are more than 1% (see Appendix 6). As to the 
fund size¶s influence, intuitively, large mutual funds are apt to have lower expense 
ratios due to economies of scale. 
Since the 1990s, mutual funds usually design different fee structures and offer 
more than one share-classes to investors with several ways to pay for the services of 
financial advisers. For example, class A shares normally have a front-end load, a sales 
charge payable when investors buy the fund share; class B shares have a back-end load, 
payable when investors redeem fund shares. If fund shares are redeemed before a 
given number of years of ownership (usually six or seven years), a contingent deferred 
sales load is triggered6; class C shares have no front-end load and a very low back-end 
load, but have relatively high 12(b)-1 marketing fees (normally 1%) and a contingent 
deferred sales load (also around 1%). As to other share-classes, they might be designed 
for institutional shares, and not available to individual investors. For instance, the 
Growth Fund of America owns 14 share-classes, the highest number of share-classes7. 
From another angle, these share-classes above are also called load share-classes. The 
                                                        
6
 Contingent deferred sales load (CDSL) decreases the longer the investor owns the shares and reaches zero 
typically after shares have been held six or more years. 
7
 The 14 share-classes include class A, class B, class C, class F, class 529-A, class 529-B, class 529-C, class 
529-E, class 529-F, class R-1, class R-2, class R-3, class R-4, and class R-5 shares, respectively. 
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no-load share-classes are originally offered by mutual fund sponsors and sold directly 
to investors. Now investors can purchase no-load share-classes through 
employer-sponsored retirement plans, mutual fund supermarkets, as well as directly 
from mutual fund sponsors. Because no-load share-classes have no front-end load, and 
only have a low 12(b)-1 fee of 0.25% or less, they are paid much more attention by 
investors and have collected much new cash flow. Although a mutual fund generally 
has a series of share-classes, these share-classes are based on same pool of securities 
and managed by same fund manager, and only differ in the fee structures. Since the net 
returns are reported at share-class level in some mutual fund databases, we must switch 
them to fund level by weighting share-class level returns by the proportion of each 
share-class total net asset at the beginning of each period. 
2.3.3. Performance Measures 
It is known that fund return alone should not be considered as the basis of 
measure of the performance of a mutual fund scheme; it should also include the risk 
taken by the fund manager because different funds have different levels of risk 
attached to them. Risk associated with a fund may commonly be defined as variability 
in the returns generated by it. The higher the fluctuations in the returns of a fund 
during a given period, the higher will be the risk associated with it (presuming future 
variability related to past). These considerations on risk-return relationship suggest that 
risk-adjusted return is a desirable way to measure the fund performance. 
Methods of risk-adjusted performance evaluation using mean-variance criteria 
came on stage simultaneously with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Development of the CAPM involved several eminent academics 8  in the 1960s. 
Treynor (1965) produces a composite measure of portfolio performance. He measures 
                                                        
8
 Especially Jack L. Treynor (1965), William F. Sharpe (1966) and Michael C. Jensen (1968, 1969). 
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portfolio risk with beta (systematic risk), and calculate portfolio¶s market risk premium 
relative to its beta: 
'  ( ) /p f pTreynor s measure R R E  , 
where pR  is portfolio¶s actual return during a specified time period, fR  is risk-free 
rate of return, pE  is the beta of the portfolio. This measure is a ratio of return 
generated by the fund over and above risk-free rate of return, during a given period and 
the systematic risk associated with it (beta). All risk-averse investors would like to 
maximize this measure. A high and positive Treynor¶s measure indicates a superior 
risk-adjusted performance of a fund. Afterward, Sharpe (1966) develops a composite 
measure which is very similar to the Treynor¶s measure, the difference being its use of 
standard deviation (total risk), instead of beta, to measure the portfolio risk: 
'  ( ) /p f pSharpe s measure R R V  , 
where pV  is the standard deviation of the portfolio. According to Sharpe¶s measure, it 
is the total risk of the fund that the investors are concerned about. For a completely 
diversified portfolio, Treynor¶s measure and Sharpe¶s measure would give identical 
results, as the total risk is reduced to systematic risk. The trouble with both measures 
for evaluating risk-adjusted returns is that they measure risk with short-term volatility. 
Hence, these measures may not be applicable in evaluating the long-term investments. 
Subsequently, Jensen (1968, 1969) proposes the following formula in terms of 
realized rates of return, assuming that CAPM is empirically valid: 
, , , , ,
( )p t f t p m t f t i tR R R RE H    . 
In this formula, we would not expect an intercept for the regression equation, if all 
stocks are in equilibrium. However, if a superior portfolio manager can persistently 
earn positive risk premiums on their portfolios, the error term 
,i tH  will always have a 
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positive value. In such a case, an intercept value which measures positive differences 
from the formula must be included in the equation as follows: 
'  [ ( )]p p f p m fJensen s measure R R R RD E     , 
where pR  is the returns that the fund has generated, ( )f p m fR R RE   is the returns 
actually expected out of the fund given the level of its systematic risk. The surplus 
between the two returns is called pD  (known as Jensen¶s measure or Jensen¶s alpha), 
which measures the performance of a fund compared with the CAPM return for the 
level of risk over the period. A superior portfolio manager would have a significant 
positive alpha because of the consistent positive residuals. Thus, if Jensen¶s measure is 
positive, then the portfolio is earning excess returns over those expected if the CAPM 
holds. In other words, a positive Jensen¶s alpha implies that a fund manager has beaten 
the market with his stock selection skills. We have to bear in mind that Jensen¶s 
measure uses systematic risk based on the premise that the unsystematic risk is 
diversifiable. It is suitable for large institutional investors, such as mutual funds, 
because they have high risk taking capacities and can readily invest across a number of 
stocks and sectors. 
In practice, the information ratio (IR) or Modigliani squared measure ( 2M ) are 
commonly used to evaluate the fund performance. The IR is defined as expected active 
return divided by tracking error, where active return is the difference between the 
return of the security and the return of a selected benchmark index, and tracking error 
is the standard deviation of the active return: 
 /  ( ) / var( )p b p bIR active return tracking error E R R R R    . 
The Modigliani squared measure ( 2M ) is a variDQWRI6KDSH¶VPHDVXUH,WIRFXVHVRQ
total volatility as a measure of risk. To compute this measure, we imagine that a 
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managed portfolio (P) is mixed with a position in T-bills so that the adjusted portfolio 
(P*) matches the volatility of a market index: 
2
*p mM r r  , 
where 
* .
(1 )m mp p T bill
p p
r r r
V V
V V   . For example, if the managed portfolio has 1.5 times 
the standard deviation of the market index, the adjusted portfolio would be 2/3 
invested in the managed portfolio and 1/3 invested in bills. 
In academic studies, applying the alpha ( pD ) as fund performance measure has 
been the mainstream approach. With the further development of asset pricing models, 
the IXQG¶V DOSKD becomes defined as the intercept term in a regressioQRI WKH IXQG¶V
excess returns on the excess returns of one or more benchmark factors (e.g. market, 
size, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity risk, liquidity factor, etc.). In the following 
chapter, we will describe specifically the progress in the development of asset pricing 
models, as well as the differences between them. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, besides introducing hypothesis and models relevant to mutual 
fund performance (such as the efficient market hypothesis and asset pricing models), 
we mainly review the literature on mutual fund performance, persistence of 
performance, and liquidity effect on mutual fund performance. 
 
3.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) asserts it is impossible to ³beat the 
market´ because market efficiency causes existing stock prices always to incorporate 
and reflect all relevant information. Our research on mutual fund performance is 
actually a derivative of EMH testing. If this hypothesis holds, the existence of active 
fund management will never be justified on the basis of returns. According to the EMH, 
stocks always trade at their fair value, making it impossible for fund managers either to 
purchase undervalued stocks or to sell overvalued stocks based on their expectations. 
As such, it is also impossible to outperform the overall market through fund managers¶ 
stock selection or market timing. 
The introduction of the term ³efficient market´ is usually attributed to Prof. 
Eugene Fama. In his earlier papers,9 Fama tests the theory of random walk in stock 
market and introduces the efficient market concept. Through study of serial 
correlations in daily price changes of 30 stocks that comprise the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index, he concludes that successive price changes are extremely close to zero, 
                                                        
9
 Fama¶s Ph.D. thesis ³The behavior of stock market prices´ was published in the Journal of Business (1965a). 
Subsequently the work was rewritten into a less technical article ³Random walks in stock-market prices´, which 
was published in the Financial Analyst Journal (1965b). 
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which supports the independence assumption of the random walk. An efficient market 
is defined by Fama (1965b) as  
³a market where there are large number of rational profit-maximizers 
actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of 
individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely 
available to all participants´. 
In an efficient market, he claims that the effects of new information on intrinsic value 
will be reflected ³instantaneously´ in actual prices because of severe competition. 
Subsequently, Fama (1970) develops the EMH, and introduces the three versions in 
which the EMH is now commonly stated: the weak, semi-strong, and strong forms of 
the hypothesis. In weak form efficiency, stock prices already reflect information that 
can be derived from the history of past prices; that is, future prices cannot be predicted 
by analyzing past prices. Hence, technical analysis will not be able consistently to 
produce excess returns; trend analysis is fruitless. The semi-strong form hypothesis 
states that stock prices reflected all publicly available information about a firm¶V
prospect (including the firm¶s product, management quality, balance sheet composition, 
earning forecasts, and etc.). This variant of the hypothesis implies that neither 
fundamental analysis nor technical analysis will be able reliably to produce excess 
returns. Last, the strong form hypothesis asserts that all information relevant to firms, 
public and private, are reflected in the stock prices. Evidently, this variant is quite 
extreme, since it assumes that company insiders cannot profit from trading on that 
information. Preventing insider trading has always been, of course, one of the core 
activities of worldwide securities authorities. 
Fama¶s work suggests that a simple policy of buying and holding the securities 
will be as good as any more complicated mechanical procedure for timing buys and 
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sales. Based on the EMH, in the 1970s Jack Bogle invented Vanguard index funds, 
tracking the performance of the stock market as a whole and keeping ordinary investors 
from wasting their money trying to beat it. At the same time, in academia, economists 
and finance scholars cleared the way for a new approach to investing and risk 
management that included risk-weighted portfolio allocation and mathematical models 
to price options and other derivatives. 
+RZHYHULWGLGQ¶WWDNHORQJWLPHbefore some economists came to reveal problems 
with the EMH. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that a perfectly efficient market is 
impossible because, in such a market, nobody would have any incentive to collect the 
information needed to make the market efficient. This line of reasoning has become 
known as Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. Additionally, Shiller (1981) tests changes in 
dividends and their effect on stock prices, and suggests that stock prices jump around a 
lot more than corporate fundamentals do. This phenomenon is known as ³excess 
volatility´. After market crash of 1987, Shiller (1989) further criticizes that the logical 
leap from observing that markets are unpredictable to concluding that prices are right is 
³RQHRIWKHPRVWUHPDUNDEOHHUURUVLQWKHKLVWRU\RIHFRQRPLFWKRXJKW´Recently, the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has brought renewed scrutiny of the EMH. In his 
book, The Myth of the Rational Market, Justin Fox (2009), an economics of columnist 
for Time, tells the story of the scholars who enabled abuses under the banner of the 
financial theory of EMH. He goes as far as to state that belief in EMH caused financial 
leaders to have an underestimation of the dangers of asset bubbles breaking and that 
the hypothesis is responsible for the current financial crisis. Thus in this area, informed 
inquiry will be likely pay more attention to the conditions that explain and improve the 
informational efficiency of markets than to whether markets are efficient.  
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For fund investors and researchers, the issue of market efficiency, to a large extent, 
reduces to whether professional fund managers have ability to outperform the market as 
a whole. As Malkiel (1973SURSRVHG³LIPDUNHWSULFHVZHUHGHWHUPLQHGE\LUUDWLRQDO
investors and systematically deviated from rational estimates of the present value of 
corporations, and if it was easy to spot predictable patterns in security returns or 
DQRPDORXVVHFXULW\SULFHV´WKHQSURIHVVLRQDOIXQGPDQDJHUVwould be supposed to be 
able to outperform the market. Thus, in academia it has been widely accepted that direct 
testing of the performance of fund managers (especially the active equity fund 
managers) should represent the most convincing evidence of market efficiency, since 
these professionals have the strongest incentives to beat the market.  
 
3.2. Asset Pricing Models 
3.2.1. Conventional Models 
In order to measure abnormal performance by mutual funds, it is necessary to 
have a benchmark for normal performance. Modern portfolio theory offers such a 
standard of comparison, that combination of the market portfolio and the riskless asset 
which is of comparable risk. The first model used to evaluate risk-adjusted fund 
performance is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (hereafter CAPM) derived 
independently by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Given a few important 
assumptions10, these authors provide the following expression for the expected one 
period return ( )iE R , on any fund i11: 
                                                        
10
 For instance, (1) all investors are averse to risk, and are single period expected utility of terminal wealth 
maximizers; (2) all investors have identical horizons and homogeneous expectations regarding investment 
opportunities; (3) all investors choose among portfolios solely based on expected returns and variance of returns; (4) 
the capital market is in equilibrium. 
11
 Actually, the asset i could be any security or any portfolio. Since this thesis studies fund performance, we just 
let the asset i be fund i. 
Chapter 3                                                         Literature Review 
 29 
( ) [ ( ) ]i f i m fE R R E R RE   , 
where fR  is the one-period risk-free rate; ( )mE R  is the expected return on market 
proxy portfolio; cov( , )
var( )
i m
i
m
R R
R
E   is the beta coefficient (also called systematic risk). 
Jensen (1968, 1969) extends the single period model to a multi-period world where 
investors are allowed to have heterogeneous horizon periods and trading takes place 
continuously through time: 
, , , ,
( ) [ ( ) ]i t f t i m t f tE R R E R RE   , 
where the t denotes an interval of time. Then Sharpe¶s (1964) market models are given: 
, , ,
( )i t i t i t i tR E R ES P   , 
, ,
( )m t m t tR E R S  , 
where 
,i tR  and ,m tR  are realized returns on fund i and market portfolio during time 
period of t; tS  is an unobservable market factor which to some extent affects the 
returns on all funds; and the 
,i tP  is the random error term, which has an expected 
value of zero. Through reorganizing the three equations above, Jensen obtains an 
equation can be used directly for empirical estimation: 
, , , , ,
( )i t f t i m t f t i tR R R RE P     or  
, , , , ,
( )i t f t i m t f t i tR R R RE P    . 
This equation says that the realized returns on any fund can be expressed as a linear 
function of its systematic risk, the realized returns on the market portfolio, the risk-free 
rate and a random error. If a fund manager is a superior forecaster, he will tend to 
select systematically securities which realize 
,
0i tP ! . Allowance for such forecasting 
ability can be made by simply not constraining the estimating regression to pass 
through the origin. Hence Jensen allows for such possible existence of a non-zero 
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constant in equation above by using following as the estimating equation: 
, , , , ,
( )i t f t i i m t f t i tR R R RD E H     , 
where 
, ,i t f tR R  is the excess return on fund i in period t, , ,m t f tR R  is the excess 
return on the market proxy portfolio in period t, 
,i tH  is a new error term, which has 
,
( ) 0i tE H  , and should be serially independent. Then Jensen (1968) argues that if the 
portfolio manager has stock selection ability, the intercept, iD  will be positive. In 
contrast, a naïve random selection buy and hold policy should be expected to yield a 
zero intercept. 
However, Roll (1977, 1978) forcefully argues that ³the use of CAPM as a 
benchmark in performance evaluation is logically inconsistent under the assumptions 
of the model since any measured abnormal performance can only occur when the 
market proxy is inefficient´. Moreover, CAPM uses a single factor, beta, to compare 
the excess returns of a fund with the excess returns of the market portfolio. It 
apparently oversimplifies the complex market. Also it cannot account for non-index 
stock-holdings, such as small-cap stocks or value stocks. The obvious inefficiency of 
the usual market proxies, coupled with concern over the testability of the CAPM, has 
led researchers to explore alternative theories of asset pricing. 
One theory which has stimulated much recent research is the Fama-French 
three-factor model (hereafter FF3F) from Fama and French (1992, 1993). The 
systematic factors in their model are firm size, book-to-market ratios (B/M), as well as 
the market portfolio. These two firm-characteristic variables are chosen due to 
long-standing observations that firm size and B/M seem to be predictive of average 
stock returns. Hence, Fama and French suggest that size or the B/M may be proxies for 
exposures to sources of systematic risk not captured by CAPM beta and, thus result in 
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the return premium associated with these factors. For instance, firms with high B/M 
are more likely to be in financial distress and small stocks may be more sensitive to 
changes in business conditions. It is reasonable to infer these variables may capture 
sensitivity to risk factors in the macro-economy. To construct portfolios to track the 
firm size and B/M factors, Fama and French (1993) sort firms into two groups on firm 
size (Small and Big groups) and three groups on B/M (Low, Median, and High groups). 
From the intersections of the two size and three B/M groups, six portfolios (S/L, S/M, 
S/H, B/L, B/M, and B/H) are constructed. The size premium, SMB (for small minus 
big), is the difference in returns of an equally weighted long position in the three 
small-stock portfolios and an equally weighted short position in the three big-stock 
portfolios: 
1 1( / / / ) ( / / / )3 3SMB S L S M S H B L B M B H      . 
Similarly, the book-to-market effect, HML (for high minus low), is calculated from the 
difference in returns between an equally weighed long position in the high B/M 
portfolios and an equally weighted short position in the low B/M portfolios: 
1 1( / / ) ( / / )2 2HML S H B H S L B L    . 
Then, they obtain FF3F as: 
, , , , ,
( )i t f t i i m t f t i t i t i tR R R R s SMB h HMLD E H      
, 
where iE , is , and ih  are the factor loadings on the three relevant risk factors. 
Subsequently, academics developed asset pricing models using diverse risk 
factors based on their different research purposes. As Fama and French (1996) also 
admit, their three-factor model cannot explain cross-sectional variation in 
momentum-sorted portfolio returns. Hence, Carhart (1997) constructs a four-factor 
model (hereafter FF+Mom) using Fama-French three-factor model plus an additional 
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factor, one-year momentum anomaly, introduce by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993): 
, , , , ,
( ) 1i t f t i i m t f t i t i t i t i tR R R R s SMB h HML p PR YRD E H       
, 
where 1 tPR YR  (momentum factor) is the difference in return between a portfolio of 
past winners and a portfolio of past losers; past winners are the firms with the highest 
30% eleven-month returns lagged one month and past losers are the firms with the 
lowest 30% eleven-month returns lagged one month. Carhart finds that four-factor 
model can explain sizeable time-series variation, and SMB, HML, and PR1YR factors 
could account for much cross-sectional variation in the return on stock portfolios. Thus 
he suggests that the momentum factor is statistically significant in explaining returns 
on mutual funds, and the four-factor model substantially improves on the average 
pricing errors of the CAPM and FF3F. 
3.2.2. Liquidity-Based Models 
Later, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) show the liquidity risk is also related to 
expected return differences that are not explained by stocks¶ sensitivities to market, 
size, B/M, and momentum factors. First, they sort stocks on the basis of values of 
liquidity beta ( LiE ) and form 10 portfolios, then they construct a traded liquidity risk 
factor (LIQ_V), which is the value-weighted return on the 10-1 portfolio (i.e. highest 
minus lowest liquidity-beta decile). By adding LIQ_V to market factor, SMB, HML, 
and PR1YR, they find LIQ_V prominently in the ex post tangency portfolio, at the cost 
of PR1YR especially. That is, the momentum factor¶s importance is reduced by their 
liquidity risk factor. Therefore, in order to include a more dramatic role for a liquidity 
risk factor, in this research we add traded liquidity factor, LIQ_V, only to the 
Fama-French factors as Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (hereafter FF+PS): 
, , , , ,
( ) _i t f t i i m t f t i t i t i t i tR R R R s SMB h HML l LIQ VD E H         
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where _ tLIQ V  (liquidity risk factor) is the difference in return between the highest 
liquidity risk decile and lowest liquidity risk decile; and the factor loading il  captures 
the asset¶s comovement with aggregate liquidity. 
Since Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) provide evidence that liquidity risk is a state 
variable, whilst the Fama-French three-factor model and Carhart four-factor model fail 
to explain the liquidity premium, Liu (2006) develops a new liquidity-augmented 
two-factor model. He argues that his liquidity-augmented model not only explains the 
size, book-to-market, and fundamental to price ratios, but also captures the liquidity 
risk, which is not properly explained by prior models.  
First of all, he defines a new liquidity measure, LM12, as the standardized 
turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months: 
1 (12-  ) 21 1212 [ .       12 ]month turnoverLM No of zero daily volumes in prior months
Deflator NoTD
u  u , 
where 12-month turnover is the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months; daily 
turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the day; NoTD is the total number of trading days over the 
prior 12 months. The number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months 
captures the discontinuity of trading, that is, the absence of trade indicates a security¶s 
degree of illiquidity. Then based on this trading discontinuity measure of liquidity 
(LM12), Liu sorts all common stocks in ascending order, and forms two portfolios 
(low-liquidity and high-liquidity portfolios). Through buying one dollar of equally 
weighted low-liquidity portfolio and selling one dollar of equally weighted 
high-liquidity portfolio, the liquidity factor (LIQ) is constructed. Adding LIQ to 
CAPM, he develops the liquidity-augmented two-factor model (hereafter LCAPM):  
, , , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t l i t i tR R R R LIQD E E H      , 
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where tLIQ  (liquidity factor) is the difference in return between the bottom liquidity 
decile and top liquidity decile; 
,l iE  is the loading of liquidity factor, i.e. fund liquidity 
risk. Then, by substituting 
, , ,i t i t f tr R R   and , , ,m t m t f tr R R  , he transforms 
equation above into the following: 
, , , , ,i t i m i m t l i t i tr r LIQD E E H   
, 
where 
,i tr  is the excess return on fund i in period t; ,m tr  is the excess return on the 
market proxy portfolio in period t. 
During the examination of mutual fund performance, we will emphasize the effect 
of fund liquidity on performance through observing this loading of liquidity factor. Liu 
(2009) asserts that it is essential to distinguish concepts, since liquidity level and 
liquidity risk are related but different. Moreover, the Liu LCAPM implies that the 
expected excess return of a fund is explained by the covariance of its return with the 
market and the liquidity factors. As Liu (2006) emphasizes, this model explains well 
the cross-section of stock returns, especially captures the liquidity risk.  
All these models above (either conventional models or liquidity-based models) 
are unconditional models, because they assume WKDW³ERWKLQYHVWRUVDQGIXQGPDQDJHUV
XVHQR LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH VWDWHRI WKH HFRQRP\ WR IRUPH[SHFWDWLRQV´ (Otten and 
Bams, 2004). However, an active fund manager may alter portfolio holdings and 
weights and, consequently, portfolio betas depending on publicly available information. 
So if a fund manager trades on this information and employs dynamic strategies, these 
unconditional models may generate unreliable results. For this reason, Ferson and 
Schadt (1996) advocate conditional performance measurement. They use time-varying 
conditional expected returns and conditional betas instead of the usual, unconditional 
betas: 
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'
, ,0 1i t i i tB ZE E   , 
where 'iB  is a vector of response coefficients of the conditional beta with respect to 
the instruments in 1tZ  ; 1tZ   is a vector of lagged predetermined instruments 
(including the 1-month T-bill rate, dividend yield on the market index, the slope of the 
term structure, and the quality spread). Moreover, Christopherson et al. (1998) and 
Christopherson et al. (1999) assert that alpha may also be dynamic since beta can be 
dynamic. Assuming that alpha may depend linearly on 1tZ  , so that: 
'
, ,0 1i t i i tAZD D   , 
where 
,0iD  measures abnormal performance after controlling for publicly available 
information ( 1tZ  ) and adjustment for the factor loadings ( 'iA ) based on this 
information. Introducing time-variation in alpha makes it possible to examine whether 
managerial performance is indeed constant, or if it varies over time as a function of 
information.  
However, what we have to emphasize here is that capturing time variation in the 
regression slopes and intercept poses thorny problems, and we leave this potentially 
important issue for future research. In addition, as documented by Barras et al. (2010), 
using unconditional or conditional modelling has no material impact on their results 
for fund performance. Therefore, in this thesis, we only employ these unconditional 
models and present results from them. 
 
3.3. Mutual Fund Performance 
The performance of actively managed equity funds is of key concern in mutual 
fund research, particularly because they try to beat the market and their passively 
managed counterparts. Do mutual fund managers add value for investors through 
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actively trading? This question has been asked for a long time. Although the number of 
studies on mutual fund performance has increased substantially with the rapid growth 
of the mutual fund industry, academics remain with contradictory conclusions 
regarding the mutual fund performance on net and gross returns, as well as whether 
certain factors have effects on fund performance. 
3.3.1. Evidences of Underperformance, on Net Return 
As the seminal paper on mutual fund performance, Jensen (1968) emphasizes, the 
DEVROXWHPHDVXUHRIIXQGSHUIRUPDQFHLVXVHGWRUHIHUWRDIXQGPDQDJHU¶VSUHGLFWLYH
ability, i.e. the skill to earn returns through successful prediction of security prices. 
Employing the CAPM as estimating equation, he suggests using the intercept in the 
CAPM, Jensen alpha, to assess performance. Thus, if a fund manager has an ability to 
forecast security prices, the alpha will be positive, and a naïve random selection buy 
and hold policy could be expected to yield a zero alpha. After evaluating 115 mutual 
IXQGV¶ SHUIRUPDQFHs relative to the S&P 500 index in the period of 1945-1964, he 
finds that the funds¶ mean value of alpha is -0.011, that is on average the funds earned 
1.1% per year less than expected given their level of systematic risk. Also, he finds 
only three funds that have performance measures which are significantly positive at the 
5% level, based on the t-statistic of alpha. Consequently, he claims that not only are 
these funds not able to forecast future security prices well enough to recover expenses 
and fees, but also there is very little evidence that an individual fund is able to do 
significantly better than that mere random chance.  
Later studies start with looking for the reasons of underperformance through 
testing returns at different levels and improving study data and methodologies. For 
example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) consider negative performance for the average 
mutual fund unsurprising from an economic perspective. If fund managers have 
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superior stock-picking talent, they may be able to claim higher fees and expenses for 
their talent. Thus, Grinblatt and Titman use gross portfolio returns as well as actual 
(net) returns in their research. Employing the data that contain quarterly equity 
holdings of mutual funds, they are able to construct hypothetical mutual fund returns, 
i.e. approximate gross returns.12 In addition, they examine the effect of investment 
objectives and fund size on performance and suggest that both are determinants of 
abnormal performance. Finally, they report that superior gross performance may exist 
among growth funds, especially aggressive growth funds and smaller funds but these 
funds have the higher expenses, eliminating abnormal returns and resulting in 
underperformance net of all expenses. In a comprehensive work, Malkiel (1995) uses 
all diversified equity mutual fund data (from Lipper Analytic Service), which allows 
him to examine more precisely performance and the extent of survivorship bias. For all 
funds in existence during the 21-year time period of 1971-1991, he calculates the 
IXQGV¶DOSKDRIH[FHVVSHUIRUPDQFHXVLQJWKH&$30, and finds the mean of alpha is 
-0.06% but the t-statistic is only -0.21, so it is indistinguishable from zero. For the 
funds in 10-year period of 1982 to 1991, he obtains similar results; the average alpha 
with net returns is negative (-0.93%) and positive (0.18%) with gross returns, but 
neither alpha is significantly different from zero. As a result, he concludes that funds in 
the aggregate have not outperformed benchmark portfolios both after management 
expenses and even before expenses. To some extent, his study does not provide any 
reason to abandon a belief that securities markets are efficient. Also, he suggests that 
investors would be considerably better off by buying an index fund, than by trying                                                                
to select an active fund manager who appears to possess selectivity skill. Subsequently, 
                                                        
12
 Specifically, their gross returns are constructed by multiplying portfolio weights (can be equally weighted or 
value weighted) by the monthly excess returns of securities and sum up. Therefore, these data have no expenses, 
fees or transaction costs subtracted from them. 
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*UXEHU  XVHV D VDPSOH RI  PXWXDO IXQGV OLVWHG LQ :LHVHQEHUJHU¶V 0XWXDO 
Funds Panorama during the period 1985-1994, and employs three different measures 
of performance (return relative to the market, excess return from CAPM, and excess 
return from a four index model). His study shows that mutual funds underperform the 
market by 1.94% per year. The risk adjusted return is estimated to be -1.56% per year 
using the CAPM model and -0.65% per year using the four index model, which leads 
to more accurate performance evaluation he thinks. Also, Gruber finds that the average 
IXQG¶V H[SHQVH LV  SHU \HDU which suggests that active management funds 
charge the investors more than the value added. 
All of the aforementioned studies assess the performance of mutual funds by 
examining the actual returns that investors realize from holding the funds. In contrast, 
a study by Daneil et al. (1997) develops a new measure of fund performance, that is, to 
use benchmarks based on the characteristics of stocks held in the portfolio to measure 
fund performance. Specifically, the benchmarks are constructed from the returns of 
125 passive portfolios that are matched with stocks held in the evaluated portfolio on 
the basis of the market capitalization, book-to-market, and prior-year returns. The 
authors apply these measures to a new database of mutual fund holdings covering over 
2500 equity funds from 1975 to 1994. Taking the characteristic-based approach, they 
decompose the overall excess return of a fund into characteristic selectivity (CS), 
characteristic timing (CT), and average style (AS) measures, which capture the 
selectivity, timing, and style aspects of performance. As a result, they suggest that the 
funds as a group possess some stock selection ability, but that funds exhibit no timing 
ability. For a closer look, they break down the performance by fund types. The 
aggressive-growth and growth funds exhibit the highest performance on hypothetical 
returns (gross returns), and also generate the largest costs. Similarly, using a new 
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widely-cited fund database13, Wermers (2000) empirically decompose performance 
into several components to analyze the value of active fund management. By a series 
of complicated matching,14 Wermers obtains the merged database which has 1788 
distinct funds that existed sometime during 1975 to 1994. With these data, he 
decomposes fund returns into several factors such as selectivity, style timing, 
long-term style-based returns, expense ratios, and transaction costs. The first three 
components correspond to CS, CT, and AS in Daniel et al. (1997). He finds that 
PXWXDOIXQGV¶ stock portfolios outperform a market index on average by 1.3% per year 
(therein 0.6% is due to the higher returns associated with the characteristics of stocks 
held by the funds; the remaining 0.7% is due to talents in picking stocks that beat their 
characteristic benchmark portfolios). However, WKHIXQGV¶QHWUHWXUQLVDERXWORZHU
than market index. Therefore, he attributes the difference of 2.3% EHWZHHQWKHIXQGV¶
stock returns and net returns to non-stock portfolio components: expense ratios and 
transaction costs. To sum up, these two studies both attribute much of fund 
performance to the characteristics of the stocks held by funds, yet, their results are 
similar to previous studies: the fund performance on funds¶ stock returns (or 
hypothetical returns, gross returns) is better than market, whereas on net returns the 
mutual funds underperform the market index. 
So far, most academic studies primarily use two approaches to assess fund 
performance: examining the actual fund returns that investors realize and using 
characteristic-based benchmarks. No matter which approach is used, a consensus has 
been reached that, on average, actively managed funds underperform their passively 
managed counterparts, net of costs, despite some evidence showing that they might be 
                                                        
13
 The new database comes from the merging of Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum mutual fund holdings 
database with Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual fund database (inc. mutual fund net returns, 
expenses, turnover levels, and other characteristics). 
14
 See Appendix A in Wermers (1999) and Appendix A in Wermers (2000). 
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able to earn positive return before expenses and fees. 
More recently, an increasing number of papers in this area have switched their 
research topic to verify whether certain subgroups of fund managers have superior 
stock-picking ability. For instance, whether the star fund managers are genuine 
stock-pickers or are simply endowed with luck. Through bootstrap simulation (a kind 
of Monte Carlo method), it is possible to examine the difference in value added 
between all funds that exhibit a certain alpha and those funds that exhibit the same 
alpha by luck alone. Kosowski et al. (2006) were first to use the bootstrap method into 
fund performance study. They propose many reasons why the bootstrap in necessary 
for proper inference. For example, individual funds exhibit non-normally distributed 
returns, and the cross section of funds represents a complex mixture of these individual 
fund distributions. Applying the bootstrap can reduce the difference between true and 
nominal probabilities of correctly rejecting a given null hypothesis. They investigate 
the performance of 1788 equity funds that survive for at least 5 years during 
1975-2002. For testing whether the estimated Carhart four-factor alphas of star fund 
managers are due only to luck or to genuine stock-picking skill, they examine the 
statistical significance of the performance of best and worst funds based on a flexible 
bootstrap procedure (residual-only resampling) applied to a variety of unconditional 
and conditional Carhart four-factor models of performance. The basic idea of their 
bootstrap procedure is, for each fund, to construct artificial return with a true alpha that 
is zero through residual-only resampling. Since the results cannot be explained by 
sampling variability alone, they conclude that the performance of these best and worst 
funds is not solely due to luck. Moreover, they also find strong evidence of superior 
performance among growth-oriented funds using bootstrap tests, but no evidence 
among income-oriented funds. Similarly, using another bootstrap simulation method, 
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joint sampling of entire cases, Fama and French (2010) aim to infer the existence of 
superior and inferior managers in the cross section of fund returns during 1984-2006. 
They first estimate monthly returns on equally weighed and value weighted portfolios 
of the funds. In terms of net returns, they find fund performance is poor. The 
Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor intercepts for equally weighed and 
value weighed on net returns are negative, ranging from -0.81% to -1.00% per year, 
with t-statistics from -2.05 to -3.02. These findings are in line with earlier studies (i.e. 
mutual funds on average underperform benchmarks on net returns). To distinguish 
between luck and skill, they then compare the distribution of t-statistics of alpha from 
actual fund returns with the distribution from bootstrap simulations in which all funds 
have zero true alphas. Their finding is that only top 3 percentile funds have enough 
skill to cover costs; that is managers of these funds do have stock-picking talent. 
Moreover, they also give hints about whether manager skill affects expected returns by 
comparing the percentiles of t-statistics of alpha for actual fund returns with the 
simulation averages. This likelihoods analysis confirms that skill sufficient to cover 
costs is rare. Even for the portfolio of funds in the top percentiles, the estimate of net 
return three-factor true alpha is about zero, which indicates that its performance is not 
better than the efficiently managed passive funds. 
With the recently introducing bootstrap simulation approach, the question of 
whether the apparent superior performance of a small group of funds is from genuine 
talent or from amazing luck is answered well. Although there are a few active funds 
(only 3% - 5%) produce sufficient returns to cover their costs, ³these star managers are 
hidden by the mass of managers with insufficient skill´ (Fama and French, 2010). 
Overall, the results of mainstream research on fund performance conclude that true 
alpha on net returns to investors is negative for most if not all actively managed equity 
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mutual funds. 
3.3.2. Other Issues 
In the mutual fund industry, another major issue is whether abnormal performance 
can persist. Persistence means that past winners or losers tend to stay winners or losers 
in the future. If persistence exists, investors could allocate additional money to winner 
funds and withdraw from loser funds.  
In early studies, Grinblatt and Titman (1992) wonder whether past performance 
provides useful information to an investor, and analyze the relationship between 
mutual fund future performance and past performance on the basis of securities 
characteristics. They follow a three-step procedure: split the 10-year (1975-1984) 
returns sample of 279 funds into two 5-year subperiods; use ordinary least squares to 
estimate the abnormal returns (alphas) for each 5-year subperiod; estimate the slope 
coefficient in a cross-sectional regression of alphas computed from the last 5 years of 
data on alphas computed from the first 5 years of data. They find that mutual funds in 
the second 5-year are expected to realize a 0.281% greater alpha for every 1% alpha 
achieved in the first 5-year. Moreover they use the same chronological sorting and 
random sorting to examine the average alpha of the top 10% and bottom 10% 
performing funds in a 5-year period. Their research indicates that there is positive 
persistence in mutual fund performance, with stronger evidence among past losers over 
5 to 10 years horizons. As to the persistence in the short-term horizon, Hendricks et al. 
(1993) examine quarterly net returns data on a sample of open-end, no-load, 
growth-oriented equity funds (listed in the Wiesenberger Mutual Funds Panorama) 
over the period of 1974-1988. They first rank funds into eight performance-ranked 
SRUWIROLRVRFWLOHVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHPRVWUHFHQWIRXUTXDUWHUV¶UHWXUQV, and then find 
that mean excess returns, ShaUSH¶VPHDVXUHDQG-HQVHQ¶VDOSKDULVHPRQRWRQLFDOO\ZLWK
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octile rank. That is, a portfolio of better recent IRXUTXDUWHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHis better in 
the next four quarters than the mean fund performance. Lastly, they suggest a strategy 
of selecting: every quarter, the top performers based on the last four quarters can 
significantly outperform the average mutual fund. Because it is a short-term 
phenomenon, roughly a one-year period, WKH\DWWULEXWHWKHSHUVLVWHQFHWR³KRWKDQGV´15. 
Subsequently, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) using data for 728 mutual funds over 
the 1976-1988 examine 2-year, 1-year, and monthly gross and risk-adjusted returns. 
They find support for the winner-repeat question for funds overall, and the top-quartile 
and lower-quartile funds experience the greatest performance persistence. Similar 
finding are also reported by Brown and Goetzmann (1995). They show evidence of 
statistical persistence for a 1-year and 3-year period, using a database free of 
survivorship bias, rather than a database including only surviving funds as prior studies. 
Meanwhile0DONLHODOVRH[DPLQHVWKHµKRWKDQG¶SKHQRPHQRQ)ROORZLQJ the 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) method, he analyzes the persistence of performance 
by constructing two-way tables showing successful performance over successive 
periods. He finds that hot hands (winning followed by winning) during the 1970s, 
occur much more often than a win followed by a loss (65.1% repeat winners); the 
relationship is considerably weaker during the 1980s (only 51.7% repeat winners).  
Perhaps, the most influential paper on fund performance persistence is Carhart¶s 
(1997). He uses a comprehensive database of 1892 diversified equity mutual funds and 
16109 fund-years covering the period 1962-1993, and employs two models to measure 
performance: the CAPM and Carhart four-factor model. After sorting funds into 
deciles based on past 1-year or past 3-year four-factor alpha, he finds some evidence of 
1-year persistence for the top and bottom deciles ranked funds using a contingency 
                                                        
15
 ³Hot hands´, comes from the argot of the sports world. In mutual fund research, it indicates that the winner 
funds could still be the winners in the future, especially in the short-term.  
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table of initial and subsequent 1-year mutual fund rankings. Then, he tracks each decile 
IXQG¶VJURVVUHWXUQVRYHUWKHIROORZLQJ-5 years and finds persistence of up to 3 years 
occurs for the lowest decile ranked fund but for all other decile there is little or no 
HYLGHQFHRISHUVLVWHQFH$FFRUGLQJWRKLVUHVHDUFKEX\LQJODVW\HDU¶VWRS-decile mutual 
IXQGVDQGVHOOLQJODVW\HDU¶VERWWRP-decile funds yields a return of 8% per year (0.67% 
per month). Finally he suggests several rules for investors, such as avoiding funds with 
persistently poor performance; funds with high returns last year have 
higher-than-average expected returns next year, but not in years thereafter. His general 
result is that persistence in superior fund performance is very weak and he attributes 
persistence to fund expenses and momentum factors.  
As to the current papers on performance persistence, using some new approaches, 
their results are to some extent different with &DUKDUW¶V ILQGLQJV. Following the 
Bayesian framework of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), a totally different approach, 
Busse and Irvine (2006) estimate the persistence of mutual fund performance. They 
claim that incorporating a long time series of passive asset returns in a Bayesian 
method estimates fund performance more precisely and find that Bayesian alphas 
based on single-factor CAPM are particularly useful for predicting future standard 
CAPM alphas. Hence, they suggest investors do not adhere to a strategy of investing in 
the lowest expense fund (index fund) but instead focus on past performance net of 
expenses. More recently, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) advocate using both active 
share (emphasizing stock selection) and tracking error volatility (emphasizing 
systematic factor risk timing) as convenient empirical proxies, to quantify portfolio 
management. They show strong evidence for performance persistence of the funds 
with the highest active share: the prior one-year winners within the highest active share 
quintile are very attractive, with a benchmark-adjusted 5.1% annual net return and a 
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3.5% annualized alpha with respect to the four-factor model. Overall, the literature 
frequently reaches conflicting conclusions regarding the persistence of mutual fund 
performance, which provides academics with a controversial question yet to be 
answered. 
Other issues of interest are the effects of characteristics such as fund scale and 
fund liquidity on fund performance. Chen et al. (2004) investigate the effect of scale 
on performance in the active mutual funds and explore the idea that fund returns 
decline with lagged fund size because of the interaction of liquidity and organization 
diseconomies. They use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual 
fund database from 1962 to 1999, giving 3439 distinct funds and a total 27431 
fund-years in their analysis. After sorting all funds into size quintile, they find that the 
gross return of all funds is 0.01% per month, which means fund managers have the 
ability to beat or stay even with market before management fees; but the net return is 
-0.08% per month (-0.96% per year), which indicates mutual fund investors are 
apparently willing to pay much in fees for limited stock-picking ability. More 
importantly, they also notice that smaller funds appear to outperform their larger 
counterparts. Adopting cross-sectional variation, they analyze the effect of past fund 
size on performance in Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, and find that fund 
performance declines with own fund size but increases with the size of the other funds 
in the family. Moreover, they attribute the fund size erosion of performance to liquidity 
(transaction costs) and organizational diseconomies (hierarchy costs). Lately, it has 
been a trend to research mutual fund investment behaviour from the characteristics of 
mutual fund and fund family. Pollet and Wilson (2008) investigate the effect of asset 
growth on aspects of fund investment behaviour, to identify the constraints acting on 
funds as they grow. Using the matched Thomson Reuters CDA-CRSP mutual fund 
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sample from 1975 to 2000, they sort all funds into quintiles by fund scale and fund 
style measure (the weighted average market capitalization of companies owned by the 
fund) for every year. They discover (i) the average number of stocks held by a fund 
increases with fund total net asset (TNA), but very slowly; (ii) the smallest-cap funds 
tend to have lower TNA and account for less market share, while the largest-cap funds 
are not always the largest funds or the largest market segment. Meanwhile, they 
examine the relationship between diversification and subsequent performance. Using 
the procedure of Fama and MacBeth (1973), they estimate cross-sectional regressions 
of risk-adjusted fund returns on a constant and fund characteristics, and then average 
the coefficients across months. They conclude that higher fund TNA is associated with 
lower returns, while higher family TNA is associated with higher returns. In addition, 
they document a positive relationship between diversification and subsequent returns 
and this relationship is stronger for small-cap funds. 
Academic studies on mutual fund have given little consideration to the impact of 
liquidity on performance, yet it could seem sensible that fund managers have to hold 
considerable volumes of liquid stocks for providing liquidity to investors and dealing 
with possible share redemptions. Perhaps the first influential paper considering a 
liquidity factor on mutual fund performance is Edelen (1999). He considers the effect 
EHWZHHQIXQGV¶DEQRUPDOUHWXUQDQGIXQGLQYHVWRUIlows. At first, he argues that fund 
managers need to provide a great deal of liquidity to investors, thus having to engage 
in a material volume of uninformed liquidity-motivated trading in which they will be 
unable to avoid below-average performance. According to informational efficient 
market theory of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), equilibrium is attained only when 
uninformed traders sustain losses to informed traders. Edelen¶s research argues that 
IORZ DGYHUVHO\ DIIHFWV D IXQG¶V SHUIRUPDQFH EHFDXVH WKH SRsition acquired in a 
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liquidity-PRWLYDWHG WUDGH KDV D QHJDWLYH LPSDFW RQ WKH IXQG¶V DEQRUPDO UHWXUQ His 
VDPSOH FRQVLVWV RI  HTXLW\ IXQGV VHOHFWHG UDQGRPO\ IURP WKH 0RUQLQJVWDU¶V
Sourcebook (1987 summer edition). Calculating from a single-factor market model, he 
exhibits the unconditional average net abnormal return (D ) equals to -1.63%, but after 
controlling for the detrimental effects of flow-related liquidity trading the conditional 
net annual abnormal return is only -0.26%. Hence, he attributes the negative return 
performance to the costs of liquidity-motivated trading. Subsequently, Massa and 
Phalippou (2005) construct and use a new portfolio liquidity ratio (PLIQ), which is 
based on the average of the individual stock illiquidity ratios of Amihud (2002) 
(ILLIQ). Using a large sample of active equity mutual funds over the period of 
1983-2001, they estimate a cross-sectional relation between portfolio liquidity and the 
fund characteristics related to the liquidity. They find out several most important 
GHWHUPLQDQWV RI OLTXLGLW\ IXQG VL]H PDQDJHU¶V WUDGLQJ IUHTXHQF\, and portfolio 
concentration. Then they consider two cases that portfolio liquidity can affect 
performance: (i) short-term divergences from the optimal level; (ii) market-wide 
liquidity shocks. In the first case, they find funds that fall in the decile that deviate 
most underperform funds that fall in the decile that deviate least by over 0.10% per 
month on average. As these deviations are uncorrelated over time, investors cannot use 
them to select funds. In the second case, they find liquid funds outperform illiquid 
funds by as much as 1.4% per month during the most illiquid months. Also investors 
cannot use this information to select funds since this would require knowing future 
liquidity shocks. As a result, they conclude that portfolio liquidity does not affect 
performance in a predictable way but note that mutual funds¶ EHWWHU performance in 
bad (illiquid) times might be partially or totally driven by liquidity. More recently, 
Shawky and Tian (2010) revisit successfully the issue of fund liquidity but in the 
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context of small-cap equity mutual funds. They consider that small-cap funds 
commonly tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell the more liquid stocks, which is 
cDOOHGDV³OLTXLGLW\FUHDWLRQ´WRWKHPDUNHW. Then they examine the role small-cap fund 
managers play as providers of liquidity and the mechanism by which they create 
liquidity in the market. Lastly, their empirical results show that small-cap mutual fund 
managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for 
providing such liquidity services to the market. Obviously, their study confirms that 
there is a strong relationship between the fund scale and the fund liquidity 
characteristics. 
Since there is no consensus on the relationship between liquidity and mutual fund 
performance, finding an appropriate liquidity factor and showing how it might affect 
mutual fund performance is deserving of further study. Accordingly, from a new 
perspective, this thesis will offer re-examination of mutual fund performance and the 
effect of liquidity on fund performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA & SAMPLE 
 
4.1. Data Sources 
Consistent with most academic papers in this field, our research data of 
U.S.-based equity mutual funds are primarily from three sources.  
(1) The return information of mutual funds comes from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices mutual fund database (hereafter CRSP-MF). Besides fund monthly net 
returns, monthly total net asset, monthly net asset value per share, it provides other 
IXQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV VXFK DV IXQG¶V QDPH LQYHVWPHQW VW\OH H[SHQVH UDWLR LQYHVWRU
flows, turnover, and so on. 16  Although the CRSP-MF provides information on 
survivor-bias-free fund data, which enables us to escape survivorship bias in 
measuring mutual fund returns, a selection bias (or incubation bias) does exist. The 
SEC has begun permitting some funds with prior returns histories as private equity 
funds to add these returns onto the beginning of their public histories. Thus, successful 
private equity fund (surviving incubated fund) histories are included in the CRSP-MF 
database.17 
(2) The information on the stock-holdings of each fund is derived from the 
Thomson Reuters mutual funds holdings database (also known as CDA/Spectrum 
database, hereafter TR-CDA). From the TR-CDA, we can collect the details on the 
stock-holdings of funds (such as stock name, share price, and shares held at end of 
some quarter).18 Additionally, this database consists of management company name, 
                                                        
16
 The fund information provided by the CRSP-MF database is based at share-class level, rather than at fund 
level. We will adjust it in later data processing. 
17
 To lessen the effects of incubation bias, we will limit the tests to mutual funds reach $25 million in total net 
assets in the chapter of Robustness Tests. 
18
 In the TR-CDA database, only the equity portion of funds is reported. Neither bond nor other types of 
securities are reported. 
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fund name, total net asset under management, and the self-declared investment 
objective for mutual funds investing in the U.S. markets. The database provides 
holdings data at quarterly intervals, although some funds report their holdings during 
these years semi-annually as required by the SEC in the early 1980s. Moreover, these 
data are collected not only from reports filed by mutual funds with the SEC but also 
from voluntary reports generated by the fund companies. Therefore, the data 
unfortunately have reporting gaps for many mutual funds. Inevitably, there is a 
selection bias VLQFHVRPHIXQGV¶UHSRUWVDUHYROXQWDU\ 
(3) Given the two databases above provide distinctly different fund identifiers 
(CRSP_FUNDNO and FUNDNO, respectively), to merge them, we have to depend on 
the third database, MFLinks file19, from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), 
since it provides a uniform and unique fund identifier (Wharton Financial Institution 
Center Number, WFICN). Also, it provides other fund information, such as fund name, 
management company abbreviation, investment objective code and country. The last 
two items are useful for us to identify U.S. equity mutual funds. More importantly, the 
MFLinks file solves some significant problems in the CRSP-MF and TR-CDA 
databases, such as re-used FUNDNO, arbitrary change in FUNDNO, and multiple 
share-classes of same fund. As Rabih Moussawi declared at a WRDS users meeting in 
2007, ³MFLinks file focuses on U.S. domestic equity funds and covers 15268 
share-classes (in the CRSP-MF) and 6037 funds (in the TR-CDA). Thus the MFLinks 
database is of a much higher quality today´0RXVVDZL.  
As far as the stock data and liquidity data are concerned, we collect them from 
two other sources. 
                                                        
19
 The MFLinks file was originally developed by Prof. Russ Wermers in 2000, and updated by WRDS. There are 
two sub-databases in the MFLinks file: MFLinks-CRSP and MFLinks-CDA, which are used to match the 
CRSP-MF and TR-CDA respectively. 
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(4) The data on the general information about stocks are derived from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stock file (hereafter 
CRSP-STK). This provides information on individual securities such as stock identity 
information (company name, permanent number, and CUSIP identifier), share type, 
share code, price, returns, trading volumes, shares outstanding, and so forth. In this 
research, we focus on all common and ordinary stocks (whose stock type code, 
SHRCD, equals to 10 or 11) traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets.  
(5) The stock liquidity information is collected from the stock liquidity database 
(hereafter LIQ-STK) provided by Prof. Weimin Liu. It includes four liquidity measures 
for each share: /LX¶V trading discontinuity measure of liquidity (LM12), turnover ratio 
(TO12), Amihud¶s price impact ratio (RtoV12), and Hasbrouck¶s effective cost (EC)20. 
Meanwhile, it also provides two firm characteristics: VWRFN¶V market capitalization 
(MV) and book-to-market-value ratio (B/M). Specifically, LM12 is defined by Liu 
(2006) as the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes 
over the prior 12 months; TO12 is the average daily turnover over the prior 12 month21; 
RtoV12 is defined by Amihud (2002) as the daily absolute-return-to-dollar-volume 
ratio averaged over the prior 12 months; and EC is defined by Hasbrouck¶s (2009) as 
Gibbs estimate of cost from Basic Market-Adjusted model. 
In this thesis, to obtain a fund¶s abnormal performance, we estimate intercepts 
from five asset pricing models (CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model - FF3F, 
Carhart four-factor model - FF+Mom, Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model - FF+PS, 
and Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model - LCAPM). Thus, we also need to 
collect these modeOV¶IDFWRUV7KHIDFWRUVRIthe first four models are derived from the 
                                                        
20
 Some of data in this database are provided by the original authors or collected from their websites. For 
example, the data of effective cost are collected from Hasbrouck¶s website at www.stern.nyu.edu/~jhasbrou. 
21
 The daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding on 
that day. 
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Fama-French portfolios and factors database from WRDS. Such factors include 
risk-free return rate (RF), excess return on the market (MKTRF), size factor (small 
minus big size return, SMB), book-to-market factor (high minus low B/M return, 
HML), momentum factor (high minus low prior 1-year return portfolio return, 
PR1YR), and traded liquidity factor (high minus low liquidity beta portfolio return, 
LIQ_V). Actually, RF is the Ibbotson one month Treasury bill rate; MKTRF, SMB, 
HML, and PR1YR are from Kenneth French¶s data library at Dartmouth22; and LIQ_V 
is the PS_VWF in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). As to the liquidity factor (LIQ) in the 
Liu LCAPM, this comes from the liquidity factor database provided by Prof. Liu. 
Similar to the construction of factors in the other asset pricing models, the LIQ is the 
illiquidity minus liquidity portfolio return. 
 
4.2. Data Processing & Sample Construction 
Although mutual fund common information in the CRSP-MF database has been 
reported since 1962, we focus on the period from 1984. As Fama and French (2010) 
claim, during 1962-1983 about 15% of funds in the CRSP-MF report only annual 
returns, and after 1983 almost all funds report monthly returns. Elton et al. (2001) also 
discuss the data problems in the CRSP-MF database for the period before 1984. They 
argue that, before the mid-1980s, differences in alpha are sufficiently large that 
conclusions might well be affected by the use of different fund databases. As to the 
data in the LIQ-STK and liquidity factor databases, they are all updated by the 
year-end of 2008. Therefore, our research time period is from January 1984 to 
December 2008, 25 years in total. 
In data processing (see Figure 4.1), we employ six identifiers to combine all 
                                                        
22
 Kenneth French¶s data website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
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databases. CRSP_FUNDNO, FUNDNO, and WFICN are used as the fund (or 
share-class) identifiers, PERMNO and CUSIP as the stock identifiers, as well as 
YYYYMM (year and month) as time identifier. 
 
Figure 4.1 
Data Sources & Data Processing 
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First of all, based on a fund identifier, CRSP_FUNDNO, we combine the 
CRSP-MF and MFLinks-CRSP databases to attain a new fund return database with 
identifier WFICN (i.e. FUND-RET database). In the CRSP-MF database, the return 
values are calculated as a change in net asset value (NAV)23. Thus the returns values 
actually are net returns category at here. Net returns are calculated as follows: 
1( ) 1t t tR NAV NAV  . 
According to the mutual fund database guide of CRSP, the t-1 may be up to 3 periods 
prior to t. This means that, if we observe a missing return, we need to remove the 
return of the following month, because CRSP-MF has filled this with the cumulated 
return since the month of last non-missing return. Similar to the method in Kosowski 
et al. (2006) and in Barras et al. (2010), we delete these cumulated returns. In fact, 
there are two aims in this step: (i) to let WFICN be fund identifier instead of 
                                                        
23
 The net asset value (NAV), including reinvested dividends, is net of all management expenses and 12(b)-1 
fees, as well as the front and rear load fees are excluded. 
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CRSP_FUNDNO; (ii) to calculate the fund monthly return (RET) and total net asset 
(TNA) at fund level, rather than at share-class level. A mutual fund could enter the 
CRSP-MF database multiple times if it has diverse share-classes. These portfolios are 
independently listed but they have both the same pool of securities and fund manager, 
and only differ in the fee structures they charge (Massa and Phalippou, 2005). Thus, 
we calculate the monthly fund-level returns through weighting share-class-level returns 
by the proportion of each share-class monthly TNA at the beginning of each period. 
Meanwhile, we also compute the monthly fund-level TNA as the fund scale, summing 
of the TNA at each share-class-level. 
Next, based on another fund identifier, FUNDNO, we merge the TR-CDA and 
MFLinks-CDA databases to achieve a new funds¶ stock-holdings database with 
identifier WFICN (i.e. FUND-HLD database). Indeed the purposes of this step are to 
let WFICN become fund identifier instead of FUNDNO in the fund holdings database; 
and to realize the data conversion from quarterly to monthly. Basically, the TR-CDA 
database provides fund holdings data quarterly, while we need monthly fund holdings 
data to match monthly fund returns data. The core idea of data conversion is that when 
observing a missing-month, we let the holdings data of this missing-month be the same 
as the last non-missing month. That is, if the datum of a month is missing, the datum of 
the prior non-missing month is carried forward. We also need to deal with some 
problems in the MFLinks-CDA database. For example, the data in the MFLinks-CDA 
were updated only to December 2006. So we have to assume that the variable 
SDATE2 (the end date) was December 2008 if it was December 2006. This might be a 
reasonable assumption, because if some fund appeared from January 2007, it would be 
at most 24 months survival-periods, which does not meet at least 36 months 
survival-period requirement in our research. Thus, it means that any new funds started 
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from January 2007 would be excluded in our sample. Another problem in the 
MFLinks-CDA is there are a couple of different FUNDNOs with overlapped time 
periods for a same fund. Thus, we have to remove these faulty FUNDNO observations. 
0DLQO\EDVHG WR IXQG¶V VXUYLYDO SHULRGV (the fund name and fund size also are used 
during the filtering process), we identify 212 fault FUNDNOs in total 1045 overlapped 
observations. Additionally, in this step we create a new variable AMT (dollar amount 
of stock-holdings, given by shares of holdings times stock price). This variable tells us 
the exact dollar amount of a stock held by a fund. As a result, we are able to calculate 
the weight of each stock in a fund. 
Then, applying a stock identifier, PERMNO, we combine the CRSP-STK and 
LIQ-STK databases to gain a new stock liquidity database with CUSIP (i.e. 
STOCK-LIQ database). The CUSIP information will be used as the stock identifier 
later when we link this new database to the fund holdings database (FUND-HLD). 
Actually, the functions of the step are to let CUSIP be stock identifier instead of 
PERMNO in stock liquidity database; and to identify whether a stock is an ordinary 
common stock by matching share code (SHRCD). To be more accurate, we utilize the 
variable CUSIP from the TR-CDA database, and the variable NCUSIP from the 
CRSP-STK database (rather than the variable CUSIP, which means Head-CUSIP in 
the CRSP-STK database), just as Schwarz (2009) declares. 
Accordingly, we move to the fourth step of generating the fund-level liquidity 
database (i.e. FUND-LIQ database), by combining the FUND-HLD and STOCK-LIQ 
databases based on another stock identifier, CUSIP. Through the value-weighted 
average of the liquidity measure of individual stock held by a fund, we acquire four 
fund liquidity measures: LM12, TO12, RtoV12, and EC, and two fund stock-holdings 
characteristics: MV and B/M, respectively. Because +DVEURXFN¶s (2009) effective cost 
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(EC) is estimated over all trading days in a year, we cannot obtain the EC until the end 
of the year. For achieving the monthly data, we assume that the values of January to 
November of a year were same as the value of last December, since the data of EC are 
given once in December of each year. Furthermore, for observing the macro-level fund 
liquidity, we produce two new variables about fund cash flow: FLOW1 (the change in 
log TNA not attributable to the portfolio return), and FLOW2 (the difference between 
current TNA and previous TNA with attributable to the portfolio return). Using these 
two variables, it is straightforward to identify the direction and quantity of fund cash 
flow. 
Lastly, we merge the FUND-RET and FUND-LIQ databases based on the unique 
fund identifier, WFICN, and then obtain a database containing the core characteristics 
of funds (i.e. FUND-CHARAC. database). It includes the monthly net return, monthly 
total net asset, diverse fund liquidity measures, and investment objectives, which are 
all at fund level. Moreover, for getting more fund characteristics, we define and 
generate new variables: STKPCT (percentage of stock-holdings in a fund) and 
STKNUM (number of stocks in a fund). Then we compute their time series averages 
for each fund and get another two new variables: STKPCTAVE (average of the 
percentage of stock-holdings) and STKNUMAVE (average of the number of stocks). 
These new variables are vital guides for identifying actively managed equity funds. 
After a series of data processing steps, our preliminary sample has been obtained. 
There are still some essentials we need to stress. Because our attention is on actively 
managed U.S. equity funds, we eliminate funds with unknown objectives, and exclude 
money market funds, bond funds, balanced funds, international funds, 
mortgage-backed funds, funds that invest in precious metals, as well as specialized 
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funds.24 In addition, we exclude index funds in various databases. A fund is identified 
DVDQLQGH[IXQGLILWVIXQGQDPHKDVWKHZRUG³LQGH[´ in the TR-CDA database. In the 
0)/LQNV GDWDEDVH ZH GHOHWH LQGH[ IXQGV WKDW KDYH ³LQGH[´ ³LQG[´ ³LQGH´ ³LG[´
³LQG´ DQG ³LQ´ LQ WKHLU QDPHV $W WKH VDPH WLPH ZH GHOHWH QRQ-U.S. funds whose 
FRXQWU\QDPHVGRQ¶WFRQWDLQ ³United States´. Moreover, as in Chen et al. (2004), we 
rule out funds with fewer than ten different stocks, i.e. we require the time series 
average of number of stock-holdings of a fund (STKNUMAVE) be not less than ten.25 
More importantly, besides using the classification of Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum, 
we apply a new standard (the proportion of the stock-holdings in a fund) to identify the 
equity funds, so as to avoid the fund classification confusion as much as possible. 
According to the SEC new rule 35d-1 in 2002³DQLQYHVWPHQWFRPSDQy with a name 
that suggests the company focuses its investments in a particular type of investment 
must invest at least 80% of its assets in the type of investPHQWVXJJHVWHGE\LWVQDPH´
Since then, investment companies have to raise the 65% threshold to 80% in order to 
comply with the rule, if they want to keep the investment objective and style 
unchanged. Thus, we require the time series average of percentage of stock-holdings of 
a fund (STKPCTAVE) be at least 70%.26 That is, only if a fund invests 70% or more 
of its assets in stocks on average, it can be called as an actively managed equity fund. 
Furthermore we select only funds having at least 36 monthly return observations in 
order to obtain precise fund performance estimates. This requirement for return 
                                                        
  
24
 We exclude funds with the following several investment objectives (IOC) in the TR-CDA database: 
international (IOC=1), municipal bonds (IOC=5), bond & preferred (IOC=6), balanced (IOC=7), and metals 
(IOC=8). 
25
 The Investment Company Act, 1940, section 5b-1 defines a fund as diversified if no more than 5% of its assets 
is invested in a company¶s securities and it holds no more than 10% of the voting shares in a company. Therefore, 
funds at least need to hold more than ten stocks, if diversified. 
26
 The SEC rule 35d-1 must be complied with by July 31, 2002. Before then, the threshold is 65%, and after then 
is 80%. Since our data cover the time period from 1984 to 2008, after weighted averaging, 70% is a sound and 
reasonable threshold for identifying equity funds in our research. 
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observations is at least 60 months in Kosowski et al. (2006) and in Barras et al. (2010). 
However, Barras et al. (2010) conclude that reducing the minimum fund return 
requirement to 36 months has no material impact on their main results, so they believe 
that any biases introduced from the 36-month requirement are minimal.27 
 
4.3. Sample Statistics Description 
Our research universe contains fund-level monthly net returns data and liquidity 
data on 2417 distinct actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds and 318378 
fund-month observations during the 25-year period (1984-2008). 
Most existing related studies obtain the equity fund sample by matching funds in 
the CRSP-MF and TR-CDA databases using WFICN in the MFLinks file. Wermers 
(2000) firstly combines the TR-CDA database with the CRSP-MF database over the 
period from 1975 to 1994, and his sample includes 1788 equity funds. Kosowski et al. 
(2006) merge same databases over the period 1975 to 2002 and extract 2118 U.S. 
equity funds. Jiang et al. (2007) manually match the funds in the CRSP-MF and 
TR-CDA databases using a matching procedure similar to Wermers (2000). Besides 
using investment objective to identify each equity fund, they also require that a fund 
has a minimum of 8 quarters of holdings data and 24 monthly return observations. 
Their final matched dataset has 2294 unique funds over the period from 1980 to 2002. 
Kacperczyk et al. (2008) exclude funds which hold less 80% or more than 105% in 
stocks, hold less than 10 stocks, and whose scale are less than $5 million. In addition, 
they use a series of investment objectives28 to identify equity funds, and finally obtain 
                                                        
27
 For robustness, we will also select funds having at least 60 monthly return observations as our research fund 
sample in chapter of Robustness Tests. Finally, we find there is no material impact on our main results no matter 
which monthly return observation requirement is applied, 60 or 36 months. 
28
 Such as ICDI objectives, strategic insight objectives, Wiesenberger fund type code, common stock policy in 
the CRSP-MF database, and investment objective codes in the TR-CDA database. 
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2543 distinct funds (including index funds, 4.53% of total sample) during the period 
1984 to2003. For identifying equity funds, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) also look at 
investment objective codes from Wiesenberg, ICDI, and TR-CDA databases. Then 
they select funds whose average of percentage of stock-holdings are at least 80%, and 
require a fund¶s equity holdings to be greater than $10 million. Consequently, their 
sample consists of 2647 funds in the period 1980-2003. Barras et al. (2010) combine 
CRSP-MF with TR-CDA and select funds only having at least 60 monthly return 
observations. Their final sample has 2076 equity mutual funds during 1975 and 2006. 
In the latest research, the fund numbers of whole sample and the equity fund 
requirements are both very similar to that in our sample. It appears that our actively 
managed U.S. equity mutual fund sample is at least as inclusive as those in the existing 
literature (see Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 
Comparison of Numbers and Requirements for Actively Managed Equity Funds 
In this table, we compare the number of equity funds, research time period, and equity fund 
requirements in the latest research with our fund sample.  
Authors # Equity Funds Time Period
Ours (2010) 2417 1984-2008
Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers 
(2010) 2076 1975-2006
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 2647 1980-2003
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng (2008) 2543 1984-2003
Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) 2294 1980-2002
Kosowski, Timmermann, 
Wermers, and White (2006) 2118 1975-2002
Wermers (2000) 1788 1975-1994
IOC
IOC
Main Requirements
IOC, % stock-holdings, # stock-holdings, # ret. obs.
IOC, # ret. obs.
IOC,  % stock-holdings, size of stock-holdings
IOC, % stock-holdings, # stock-holdings, fund scale
IOC, # quarters of holding data, # ret. obs.
Note: # equity funds - the number of equity funds;  
IOC - various investment objective codes;  
% stock-holdings - the percentage of stock-holdings;  
# stock-holdings - the number of stock-holdings;  
# ret. obs. - the number of return observations;  
# quarters of holding data - the number of quarters of stock-holdings. 
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In Table 4.2, we present summary statistics of fund characteristics of the 318378 
fund-month observations (2417 unique equity mutual funds) in our entire sample. It 
reports the mean, standard deviation, lower quarter, median and upper quarter for fund 
return, fund size, percentage of stock-holdings, number of stock-holdings, various fund 
liquidity measures, as well as fund stock-holdings characteristics. 
 
Table 4.2 
Summary Statistics of Entire Actively Managed Equity Fund Sample 
This table represents summary Statistics of the 318378 fund-month observations during the 25 year 
periods (1984-2008). It reports the mean, standard deviation, lower quarter (Q1), median, and upper 
quarter (Q3) respectively for fund return, fund size, percentage of stock-holdings, number of 
stock-holdings, diverse fund liquidity measures, and fund stock-holdings characteristics, including log 
cash flow (FLOW1), quantity of cash flow (FLOW2), Liu¶s trading discontinuity measure of liquidity 
(LM12), turnover ratio (TO12), Amihud¶s price impact ratio (RtoV12), Hasbrouck¶s effective cost (EC), 
stock-holdings¶ market capitalization (MV) and book-to-market ratio (B/M). 
Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Fund Net Return (monthly) 0.617% 5.638% -49.713% -2.141% 1.012% 3.771% 101.619%
Total Net Assets ($ million) 1037.60 4299.38 0.00 44.00 166.90 616.30 202305.80 
Pct. of Stock Holdings 85.60% 6.08% 70.00% 81.62% 86.49% 90.06% 99.81%
No. of Stock Holdings 95 129 12 48 67 100 2885 
FLOW1 0.0053 0.0612 -2.5059 -0.0114 0.0025 0.0203 3.0333 
FLOW2 ($ million) 4.40 265.52 -52629.70 -3.17 0.27 8.00 53090.21 
Liu's LM12 0.4112 1.8626 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0709 48.9437 
TO12 0.7496 0.4160 0.1151 0.4362 0.6457 0.9862 6.3016 
Amihud's RtoV12 (10^6) 0.038474 0.193725 0.000004 0.000361 0.001825 0.012913 21.044170 
Hasbrouck's EC 0.003714 0.001724 0.000572 0.002649 0.003340 0.004461 0.030514 
MV ($ million) 31612.25 36288.24 41.43 3219.91 14172.64 53956.42 305896.10 
B/M 0.3998 0.1929 0.0113 0.2681 0.3674 0.4883 7.3890 
 
As a typical equity funds, its scale is $1037.60 millions, investing 85.60% of its 
assets in stocks and holding 95 stocks on average. Because the median and upper 
quarter of total net assets (TNA) are $166.90 million and $616.30 million respectively, 
both are considerably less than the mean of TNA ($1037.60 millions), it is reasonable 
to believe that there are some huge funds in our whole sample period.29 For example, 
we find that the largest was the Growth Fund of America, whose TNA reached $202.31 
                                                        
29
 In our 2417 equity funds during the period of 1984-2008, there are two funds whose scales once were larger 
than $100 billion. They are Fidelity Magellan Fund and Growth Fund of America. 
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billion in October 2007. This reflects not just the bull capital market at that time30, but 
also results from its owning 14 share-classes. Table 4.2 also summarizes fund liquidity 
measures and fund stock-holdings characteristics. We find that the log cash flow 
(FLOW1) is positive and quantity of cash flow (FLOW2) on average is $4.40 million. 
They both indicate net cash inflow, which is consistent with the boost of equity fund 
scale in recent decades. From the micro-level fund liquidity measures, we conclude 
that the equity funds favour the highly liquid stocks. More specifically, the stocks held 
by a typical equity fund, on average, have fewer no-trading days (0.4112 for Liu¶s 
LM12), higher trading turnover ratio (0.7496 for TO12), and lower price-impact ratio 
(0.038474 for Amihud¶s RtoV12) than the means of U.S. stock markets.31 Moreover, 
this table shows that, on average, the stock-holdings¶ market capitalization (MV) is 
$31612.25 million and the book-to-market ratio (B/M) is 0.3998 only, which implies 
equity funds prefer to hold big companies and growth companies. 
Over the whole time period of 1984-2008, Table 4.3 shows key characteristics, at 
four-year intervals, for all actively managed equity funds. Panel A presents fund 
number, return, size, stock-holdings¶ proportion and stock number in a fund. In an 
average year, there are 1129 equity funds with average TNA of $820.02 million, 
average proportion of stock-holdings of 84.53%, average number of stock-holdings of 
88, and average net return of 0.821% per month (approximately 9.852% per year). 
Panel A also reports the evolution of equity mutual funds. The TNA of equity funds 
increases nearly sixfold during the 25-year period from $255.72 million in 1984 to 
$1379.26 million in 2008. At the same time, we find the equity funds invest in a 
broader spectrum of stock-holdings during the later years. The average fund held 66 
                                                        
30
 On 9th October 2007, the Dow Jones Industry Average (DJIA) closed at the record level of 14164.53. Two 
days later on 11th October 2007, the DJIA traded at its highest intra-day level ever at the 14198.10 mark. 
31
 In Liu (2009), the means of LM12, TO12, and RtoV12 for NYSE/AMEX stocks over 1963-2005 are 10.2, 
0.242, and 4.14 respectively. 
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stocks in 1984, nearly doubled to 104 stocks in 2008, but the proportion of 
stock-holdings is almost unchanged still around 85% over whole sample time period. 
Despite the rapid increase in number and size of equity funds, we do not find any 
significant evidence that active equity fund managers as a whole earned higher return 
than the aggregate market. The average net return of equity funds (0.821% per month, 
9.85% yearly) is just a little higher than the average of market returns (0.757% per 
month, 9.08% yearly) during whole sample time. On average, a typical equity fund 
would have similar performance with the aggregate market index. 
Panel B provides the diverse fund liquidity measures and fund stock-holdings 
characteristics. Since our interest lies in the impact of liquidity on fund performance, 
we take a look at the changing trends of fund liquidity measures (FLMs). From the 
viewpoint of macro-level FLMs, we find that the log cash flow (FLOW1) and quantity 
of cash flow (FLOW2) are positive during most years.32 That indicates net cash inflow 
and is consistent with the boost of equity fund scale in recent decades. As to the 
micro-level FLMs, we discover that the equity funds increasingly favour the highly 
liquid stocks. More specifically, the stocks held by a typical equity fund have 
following trends on liquidity characteristics: fewer no-trading days (from 1.0933 in 
1984 to only 0.0278 in 2008 for /LX¶V /012), higher trading turnover ratio (from 
0.2767 in 1984 to 1.2641 in 2008 for TO12), lower price-impact ratio (from 0.076992 
in 1984 to only 0.010536 in 2008 for $PLKXG¶VRtoV12), and slightly lower effective 
cost of trading (from 0.002701 in 1984 to 0.002012 in 2006 for +DVEURXFN¶V EC). 
Moreover, we notice that the MV of stock-holdings increases almost ninefold during 
the 25-year period from $4.32 billion to $37.65 billion, meanwhile the B/M falls 
                                                        
32
 Over all 25-year time period, the FLOW1 are positive for 21 years and negative for only 4 years (in 1990, 
2002, 2007 and 2008). And the FLOW2 are positive for 20 years and negative for 5 years (in 1990, 2000, 2001, 
2002 and 2008). 
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clearly from 0.7172 in 1984 to 0.5086 in 2008. The steep increase of MV and obvious 
drop of B/M indicates equity funds prefer to hold big companies and growth 
companies again. In short, a liquidity factor has been paid more and more attention by 
active equity fund managers and has become a determinant in their investment 
decisions. 
 
Table 4.3 
Characteristics of the U.S. Actively Managed Equity Funds 
This table reports some key characteristics, at four-year intervals, for U.S. actively managed equity 
fund sample over the time period of 1984-2008. By averaging over the time series for whole sample, we 
obtain the following fund characteristics. Panel A presents fund number, scale, return and stock 
holding¶s statistics for entire fund dataset. Panel B provides the diverse fund liquidity measures and fund 
stock-holdings characteristics, including log cash flow (FLOW1), quantity of cash flow (FLOW2), Liu¶s 
trading discontinuity measure of liquidity (LM12), turnover ratio (TO12), Amihud¶s price impact ratio 
(RtoV12), Hasbrouck¶s effective cost (EC), market capitalization (MV), and book-to-market ratio 
(B/M). 
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008  Yearly 
Average
No. of Equity Funds 257 402 658 1213 1749 1908 1567 1129
Fund Net Return (monthly) 0.697% 1.208% 0.824% 1.541% 0.150% 0.988% -3.756% 0.821%
Market Return (monthly) 0.260% 1.357% 0.726% 1.611% -0.973% 1.024% -3.946% 0.757%
Total Net Assets ($ million) 255.72 315.97 488.02 815.86 1549.29 1106.62 1379.26 820.02
Pct. of Stock Holdings 81.98% 81.44% 82.28% 87.22% 88.53% 88.60% 79.72% 84.53%
No. of Stock Holdings 66 74 80 95 97 102 104 88
FLOW1 0.0035 0.0029 0.0125 0.0135 0.0049 0.0070 -0.0218 0.0063
FLOW2 ($ million) 2.41 1.81 9.95 18.62 -3.08 11.68 -62.61 5.36
Liu's LM12 1.0933 1.2606 1.1882 0.7004 0.2009 0.0689 0.0278 0.6763
Turnover Ratio, TO12 0.2767 0.4019 0.4174 0.5605 0.8605 0.8450 1.2641 0.6232
Amihud's RtoV12 (10^6) 0.076992 0.127779 0.087610 0.057140 0.022217 0.011965 0.010536 0.058651
Hasbrouck's EC 0.002701 0.004192 0.004045 0.003942 0.004552 0.002494 0.002012* 0.003734
MV ($ million) 4324.40 5175.13 8644.41 13717.67 59243.70 40191.87 37650.28 22832.64
B/M 0.7172 0.5838 0.4585 0.3557 0.2894 0.3699 0.5086 0.4457
Panel A: Fund Summary Statistics
Panel B: Fund Liquidity Measures
* This figure of Hasbrouck¶s EC is for 2006, since the data are updated to 2006 only. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
 
In the chapter, we will present and detail the evolution of main evaluation 
methods of mutual fund performance: from a simple time series regression, to 
constructing a portfolio of funds (POF), then to bootstrap simulation methods.  
 
5.1. Models & Time Series Regression 
Theoretically, fund abnormal performance is measured by alpha, which is defined 
as the intercept in a regression of a IXQG¶VH[FHVVUHWXUQVRQWKHUHWXUQVRIRQHRUPRUH
benchmark assets (such as market portfolio, small-minus-big size portfolio, 
high-minus-low B/M portfolio, high-minus-low prior 1-year return portfolio, 
high-minus-low liquidity risk portfolio, and illiquid-minus-liquid portfolio). The 
general equation seems like as:  
, , , ,
1
n
i t i i j j t i t
j
r rD E H
 
  ¦ , 
where 
,i tr  is the excess return of fund i in period t, ,j tr  is the excess return of the 
benchmark assets j in period t, and iD  is just WKHIXQG¶VDEQRUPDOUHWXUQOur research 
estimates intercepts from five VXFK UHJUHVVLRQ PRGHOV WR REWDLQ IXQG¶V DEQRUPDO
performance. These five regression-based measures are base on CAPM, Fama-French 
three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), Pastor-Stambaugh 
four-factor model (FF+PS), and Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM). 
The single-factor CAPM alpha is the intercept from the regression of portfolio 
excess return on the market portfolio excess returns:  
, , , , ,
( )i t f t i i m t f t i tR R R RD E H     , (CAPM) 
where 
, ,i t f tR R  is the excess return on fund i in period t, , ,m t f tR R  is the excess 
Chapter 5                                                             Methodology 
 65 
return on the market proxy portfolio in period t. 
,i tR  is the return on fund i, ,f tR  is 
the risk-free rate (one month T-bill rate), 
,m tR is the return on market portfolio, which 
is the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, and iD  and 
iE  DUHWKHUHJUHVVLRQ¶VLQWHUFHSWDQGVORSHFRHIILFLHQW$V-HQVHQDUJXHVLIWKH
fund manager has an ability to forecast security prices and earn abnormal return, iD  
should be positive. The regression-based performance measures of other models (FF3F, 
FF+Mom, FF+PS, and LCAPM) are estimated respectively from expanded forms of 
CAPM: 
, , , , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t i tR R R R SMB HMLD E E E H       , (FF3F) 
, , , , , , , , ,
( ) 1i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t p i t i tR R R R SMB HML PR YRD E E E E H        , (FF+Mom) 
, , , , , , , , ,
( ) _i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t l i t i tR R R R SMB HML LIQ VD E E E E H        , (FF+PS) 
, , , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t l i t i tR R R R LIQD E E H      , (LCAPM) 
where tSMB , tHML , 1 tPR YR , _ tLIQ V , and tLIQ  are the small-minus-big size 
portfolio return, high-minus-low B/M portfolio return, high-minus-low prior 1-year 
return portfolio return, high-minus-low value-weighted liquidity risk portfolio return, 
and illiquid-minus-liquid portfolio return in period t, respectively.33  
Table 5.1 summarizes the properties of all factors of asset pricing models above. 
Over the whole sample period 1984 to 2008, LIQ has a mean of 0.699% per month and 
also is highly significant, which is more pronounced than for SMB, HML, and LIQ_V. 
SMB and HML have a mean of only 0.027% and 0.353% respectively, and SMB is 
insignificant (t-statistic of 0.14). This evidence suggests that explanatory power for 
asset returns using FF3F is limited. As can be seen from Panel B of Table 5.1, the 
                                                        
33
 These factors have been explained in details in the section of Asset Pricing Models in the Literature Review 
Chapter. The original papers are Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and Liu 
(2006). 
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correlation between LIQ and MKTRF is - ZKLFK LQGLFDWHV WKDW ³WKH PDUNHW LV
less liquid when it is in downturn states, and investors require higher returns to 
FRPSHQVDWH WKHP IRU WKH KLJKHU ULVNV WKH\ EHDU LQ OHVV OLTXLG VWDWHV´ /LX  ,Q
addition, the correlation between LIQ and HML is positive at 0.614, and HML is also 
negatively correlated with MKTRF at -0.451. Moreover, we also find the correlation 
coefficient between LIQ and SMB is -0.328, which means the least liquid stocks are 
not the smallest ones (or the most liquid stocks are not the largest ones). 
 
Table 5.1 
Properties of the Factors in Asset Pricing Models 
This table reports the properties of the variant factors in asset pricing models. MKTRF is the excess 
return on the market proxy portfolio; SMB is the small-minus-big size portfolio return; HML is the 
high-minus-low book-to-market portfolio return, PR1YR is the high-minus-low prior 1-year return 
portfolio return, LIQ_V is the high-minus-low value-weighted liquidity risk portfolio return, and LIQ is 
the illiquid-minus-liquid portfolio return, respectively. Panel A presents WKH IDFWRUV¶ EDVLF VWDWLVWLFV
Panel B shows the spearman correlation among these factors. All factors are monthly and available over 
the time period 1984 to 2008.  
Variable MKTRF SMB HML PR1YR LIQ_V LIQ
Mean 0.456% 0.027% 0.353% 0.853% 0.499% 0.699%
Std Dev 4.474% 3.273% 3.075% 4.351% 3.496% 3.993%
t -statistic 1.77 0.14 1.99 3.40 2.47 3.03
Q1 -2.080% -1.710% -1.345% -0.645% -1.485% -1.926%
Median 1.000% -0.190% 0.295% 0.960% 0.533% 0.909%
Q3 3.480% 1.655% 1.760% 2.890% 2.631% 3.119%
MKTRF 1
SMB 0.188 1
HML -0.451 -0.232 1
PR1YR -0.086 -0.055 -0.048 1
LIQ_V 0.032 -0.063 0.075 0.057 1
LIQ -0.792 -0.328 0.614 0.097 -0.007 1
Panel A: Statistics Description of Factors (N=300)
Panel B: Spearman Correlation Coefficients (1984-2008)
 
 
Since we concentrate on the effect of liquidity on fund performance in this study, 
we emphasize the results obtained from the liquidity-based models (FF+PS and 
LCAPM). Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) define traded liquidity factor (LIQ_V) in their 
FF+PS as the value-weighted return on the 10-1 portfolio (i.e. high-liquidity-beta 
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minus low-liquidity-beta portfolio) from a sort on historical liquidity betas. By adding 
LIQ_V into asset pricing models, they find a momentum strategy becomes less 
attractive from an investment perspective when portfolio spreads based on liquidity 
risk are also available for investment. However, their traded liquidity factor (LIQ_V) 
only grasps the liquidity risk and has less significance in our research. While, Liu 
LCAPM not only explains the size, book-to-market, and fundamental to price ratios, 
but also captures the liquidity level and liquidity risk, which are not properly explained 
by prior models. He suggests that liquidity factor (LIQ) is important for asset pricing 
and is an especially promising research direction. Additionally, his LIQ is highly 
significant in our research. Therefore, in this thesis, we attempt to reveal the relation 
between fund excess return and Liu¶s LIQ through the estimated coefficients on 
liquidity factor, 
,l iE  (liquidity risk). 
Using all sample data available for each fund, we present, in Table 5.2, an 
overview of the regression estimates of the parameters of these five regression models 
during 25-year from 1984 to 2008. For each fund, we conduct a time-series regression 
to obtain the estimated alpha and factor loadings using the various asset pricing models. 
Then we calculate the mean of these estimated alpha and factor loadings of all fund 
sample data for each model. Table 5.2 shows that the average monthly alphas are tiny, 
close to zero, negative for CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS (-0.0489%, -0.0811%, 
-0.0950%, and -0.0665% monthly) or positive for the Liu LCAPM (0.0861% per 
month).34 That indicates that, on average, the active equity fund managers are not able 
to earn abnormal returns for investors; in other words, the actively managed equity 
                                                        
34
 The proportions of t-statistic of alphas of more then 1.96 or less than -1.96 are around only 14%-23% for the 
five models in our whole equity fund sample. For calculating annual return, we just simply multiple the monthly 
return by 12. The annual alphas for CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, FF+PS, and Liu LCAPM are -0.5873%, -0.9737%, 
-1.1396%, -0.7976%, and 1.0332%, respectively. 
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funds are insignificantly from the benchmarks. Moreover, the average loadings of 
market excess return (MKTRF) for all models are between 0.949 and 1.052. Thus, 
these equity funds, on average, tend to hold stocks with level similar risk to the market 
portfolio. In Panels B, C and D, the factor loadings of SMB, HML, and PR1YR are all 
positive, indicating that fund performance is positively impacted by small 
capitalization, high book-to-market, and high prior 1-year return.  
Now we focus on the two liquidity-relative factors: LIQ_V in the FF+PS and LIQ 
in the Liu LCAPM. Panel D shows the estimated coefficient of traded liquidity factor 
(LIQ_V) is negative (-0.0263), indicating that fund managers prefer stocks with less 
liquidity risk; whilst Panel E reports that the estimated coefficient of liquidity factor 
(LIQ) is negative (-0.1373), which also means that fund managers are likely to hold 
more liquid stocks. To a large extent, these two factor loadings are consistent; the 
funds holding stocks with less liquidity risk or higher liquidity will earn lower excess 
returns. This supports one of our hypotheses, that the performances of actively 
managed equity funds are affected by their stock-holdings¶ OLTXLGLW\ and, on average, 
the effect is adverse. 
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Table 5.2 
Regression Estimates of Parameters of Asset Pricing Models  
(Average of Time Series Regression) 
This table reports an overview of the regression estimates of the parameters of various models for 
each fund during 25-year period from 1984 to 2008. ȕBPNW, ȕBsmb, ȕBhml, ȕBpr1yr, ȕBliq_v, and ȕBliq, 
stand for the regression slopes of MKTRF, SMB, HML, PR1YR, LIQ_V, and LIQ, respectively. For 
each fund, we conduct a time-series regression to obtain the estimated factor loadings using various 
asset pricing models respectively. Then we calculate the mean of these estimated factor loadings of all 
fund sample data for each model. Panel A is for CAPM, Panel B is for Fama-French three-factor model 
(FF3F), Panel C is for Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), Panel D is for Pastor-Stambaugh 
four-factor model (FF+PS), and Panel E is for Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM). 
alpha (monthly)
ȕBPNW
alpha (monthly)
ȕBPNW
ȕBVPE
ȕBKPO
alpha (monthly)
ȕBPNW
ȕBVPE
ȕBKPO
ȕBSU\U
alpha (monthly)
ȕBPNW
ȕBVPE
ȕBKPO
ȕBOLTBY
alpha (monthly)
ȕBPNW
ȕBOLT
1.0200 
0.2100 
1.0225 
0.2042 
0.9490 
-0.1373 
0.0049 
0.0193 
Panel E: Liu Liquidity-Augmented Two-Factor Model (LCAPM)
0.0861%
0.0126 
-0.0263 
Panel D: Pastor-Stambaugh Four-Factor Model (FF+PS)
-0.0665%
Panel C: Carhart Four-Factor Model (FF+Mom)
-0.0950%
Panel A: CAPM
-0.0489%
1.0517 
Panel B: Fama-French Three-Factor Model (FF3F)
-0.0811%
1.0143 
0.2075 
0.0053 
 
 
5.2. Performance of Portfolio of Funds (POF) 
In the previous sub-section, we presented a simple time-series regression for each 
fund to obtain the estimated alpha and factor loadings. However, one cannot assess the 
significance of the estimated alpha and factor loadings through averaging the 
t-statistics for all fund data. Additionally, funds have diverse survival time periods and 
different risk-taking preferences. Thus, we examine fund performance as a whole, by 
constructing a portfolio of funds (POF) in each month and run time-series regression 
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for the cross-section of the fund portfolio¶s net returns. 
Similar to the approach of Fama and French (2010), we first use two ways to 
construct portfolio of equity mutual funds. In the value-weighted portfolio of funds 
(hereafter, VWPOF), mutual funds are weighted by total net assets at the beginning of 
each month. In the equally-weighted portfolio of funds (hereafter, EWPOF), funds are 
weighted equally each month. Then we run time-series regression of asset pricing 
models above to estimate the performance (i.e. the intercepts in these models) of 
VWPOF and EWPOF, respectively. 
The alphas of VWPOF tell us about the fate of aggregate wealth invested in funds 
(Fama and French, 2010). Whereas the EWPOF performance informs us whether funds 
on average produce returns different from those implied by their exposures to common 
factors (such as market, size, value, momentum, liquidity risk, and liquidity factors) in 
returns. To mass investors, it is of most concerned whether, on average, active fund 
managers have sufficient ability to create returns to cover the costs. As a result, we will 
primarily present the results of the intercepts in various model regressions for VWPOF 
at net return level, rather than at gross return level, which tests whether fund managers 
have any skills.35 
If we assume the value-weighted aggregate of the U.S. equity portfolios of all 
investors is the market portfolio (passive investment portfolio), this is supposed to 
have a market (MKTRF) slope equal one, zero slopes on the other explanatory returns 
(such as SMB, HML, PR1YR, LIQ_V, and LIQ), and a zero intercept in these models. 
As Fama and French (2010) propose, we can simply account for these explanatory 
returns as diversified passive benchmark returns that capture patterns in average 
returns during our sample period, whatever the source of the average returns. 
                                                        
35
 The fund return values in the CRSP-MF database are based on net returns. It is known that fund gross returns 
pose more difficult measurement issues, so we leave it to the future work. 
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Abstracting from the variation in returns associated with MKTRF, SMB, HML, 
PR1YR, LIQ_V, and LIQ then allows us to focus better on the effects of active 
management (stock-picking ability), which should show up in the intercepts (alphas) of 
these models. 
From an investment standpoint, the slopes on the explanatory returns (MKTRF, 
SMB, HML, PR1YR, LIQ_V, and LIQ) in these models describe a diversified 
portfolio of passive benchmarks that replicates the exposures of the fund on the left to 
common factor in returns. The regression intercept (alpha) then measures the average 
return provided by a fund in excess of the return on a comparable passive portfolio. 
Therefore, a positive expected intercept (+alpha) is interpreted as superior performance, 
and a negative expected intercept (-alpha) signals awful performance. 
 
5.3. Bootstrap Simulation 
More recently, some papers (such as Kosowski et al., 2006, Cuthbertson et al., 
2008, Barras et al., 2010, and Fama and French, 2010) raise a new question: whether 
the superior performance of a few individual fund managers is credible evidence of 
genuine stock-picking ability, or simply comes from extraordinary luck. Earlier studies 
which use conventional statistical measures do not explicitly recognize and model the 
role of luck in fund performance. Now, through using the bootstrap method, we are 
able to separate skill from luck for individual funds and evaluate the fund performance 
from a new perspective. 
Several studies have shown that mutual fund returns do not follow the normality 
assumption inherent in earlier academic research,36 so normality may be a poor 
                                                        
36
 As Kosowski et al. (2006) describe, when they analyze the distribution of individual fund residuals, about 50% 
of the U.S. fund sample have alphas that are drawn from a distinctly non-normal distribution. And, Cuthbertson et al. 
(2008) report that around 64% of mutual funds in the U.K. reject normality in their regression residuals. 
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approximation in practice, even for a fairly large mutual fund sample. Violation of the 
normality assumption could induce a type I error (i.e. the error of rejecting a null 
hypothesis that should have been accepted), in the sense that empirical test reject 
evidence of no performance when performance patterns are actually absent. As 
Kosowski et al. (2006) assert, the cross-section of mutual fund alpha has a complex 
non-normal distribution because of heterogeneous risk-taking by funds and 
non-normalities in individual fund alpha distributions. Therefore, the bootstrap method 
provides improved inference in identifying funds with significant skills, in which most 
investors are primarily concerned. 
5.3.1. Introduction to Bootstrap 
The bootstrap method was introduced by Efron (1979) as a method to derive the 
estimate of standard error of arbitrary estimator. The use of the term ³bootstrap´ comes 
from the phrase ³to pull oneself up by one¶s bootstraps´37, which generally interpreted 
as succeeding in spite of limited resource. Because of the power of this method, Efron 
(1979) once mentioned that he considered calling it ³the shotgun´ since it can ³blow 
the head of any problem if the statistician can stand the resulting mess´. As we know, 
many conventional statistical methods of analysis make assumptions about normality, 
including correlation, regression, t tests, and analysis of variance. When these 
assumptions are violated, such methods may fail. In recent decades, with computer 
processors becoming more powerful, statistical inference based on data resampling has 
been paid a great deal of attention, and the bootstrap has become a very popular 
statistical technique.  
The main idea in bootstrap resampling is not to assume much about the 
                                                        
37
 This phrase comes from The Adventures of Baron Munchausen by Raspe (1786). In one of Baron 
Munchausen¶s adventures, he had fallen to the bottom of a lake and just as he was about to succumb to his fate he 
thought to pick himself up by his own bootstraps. 
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underlying population distribution but instead to attempt to gain the information about 
the population from the data. The method uses the relationship between the sample and 
resamples drawn from the sample, to approximate the relationship between the 
population and samples drawn from it. With the bootstrap method, the basic sample is 
treated as the population and a Monte Carlo style procedure is conducted on it. For 
instance, in the case of the sample mean, bootstrap will use the sample data as if they 
were the population and empirically build a picture of the sampling distribution of the 
sample mean. This is done by randomly drawing a large number of resamples of size B 
(e.g. B=100, 1000, or 10000) from this original sample with replacement. Relying on 
an analogy between the sample and the population from which the sample was drawn, 
Mooney and Duval (1993) claim that ³the bootstrap may sometimes be better to draw 
conclusions about the characteristics of a population strictly from the sample at hand, 
rather than by making perhaps unrealistic assumptions about the population´. When 
we turn to statistics and situations for which the sampling distribution is either 
unknown or intractable (for example an ordinary least squares, OLS, regression 
coefficient where the residuals are non-normal), bootstrap demonstrates its greatest 
practical importance. 
In a formal definition, bootstrap is defined by Chernick (2008) as follows:  
³Given a sample of n independent identically distribution (iid) random 
vectors 1 2, ,..., nX X X and a real-valued estimator ( 1 2, ,..., nX X X ) (denoted by 
ÖT ) of the parameter, a procedure to assess the accuracy of ÖT  is defined in 
terms of the empirical distribution function nF . This empirical distribution 
function assigns probability mass 1/n to each observed value of the random 
vector iX  for i=1, 2,«, n´. 
Specifically speaking, the empirical distribution function is the maximum likelihood 
estimator of the distribution for the observations when no parametric assumptions are 
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made. The bootstrap distribution for ÖT T  is the distribution obtained by generating 
ÖT ¶s by sampling independently with replacement from the empirical distribution nF . 
The bootstrap estimate of the standard error of ÖT  is then the standard deviation of the 
bootstrap distribution for ÖT T . By replicating B times bootstrap sampling, a Monte 
Carlo approximation to the distribution of *T  is obtained. The standard deviation of 
this Monte Carlo distribution of *T  is the Monte Carlo approximation to the bootstrap 
estimate of the standard error for ÖT . Often this estimate is simply referred to as the 
bootstrap estimate and for B very large (e.g. 1000) there is very little difference 
between the bootstrap estimator and this Monte Carlo approximation. As Chernick 
(2008) argues, ³what we would like to know for inference is the distribution of ÖT T , 
and what we have is a Monte Carlo approximation to the distribution of * ÖT T .´ It is 
apparent that the core thought of the bootstrap is that for n sufficiently large, we expect 
the two distributions to be nearly the identical. So the basic idea behind the bootstrap 
worth emphasizing here is that the variability of *T  (based on nF ) around ÖT  will be 
similar to (or mimic) the variability of ÖT  (based on the true population distribution F) 
around the true parameter value T . It is reasonable to believe that this will be true for 
large sample size, since as n gets larger and larger, nF  comes closer and closer to F 
and so sampling with replacement from nF  is almost like random sampling from F. In 
a word, the basic bootstrap approach is to treat the sample as if it were the population, 
and apply Monte Carlo sampling to generate an empirical estimate of the statistic¶s 
sampling distribution. The procedure is summarized in Figure 5.1 below. 
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Figure 5.1 
The Algorithm for Bootstrap Method 
1. An array of n data is considered Sample X=(X1, X2«, Xn), representing the sample of n selections 
from the target population. 
2. N random numbers are generated between 1 and n: i1, i2,«, in. These will be considered as indexes. 
3. The array bootstrapped Sample X=(Xi1, Xi2,« Xin) will be a new sample of pseudo-data obtained as 
repeated sampling with replacement from the original Sample X. 
4. To the array bootstrapped Sample X, the statistic of interest, for example the mean, is applied. 
5. The algorithm is taken over from the 2nd step. To be reliable, this algorithm must be taken over for a 
large number of times, B (e.g. 1000). 
ĂĂ ĂĂ
For large B
Population /
Unkonwn Probability
Distribution
Original Sample X,
dimention (Sample X)=n
Bootstraping Sample X,
B  times
Bootstapped Sample X1
Bootstapped Sample XB
Statistic (Bootstrapped
Sample X1) Mean
Statistic (Bootstrapped
Sample XB) Mean
Normal distribution,
the mean tending to the population mean
 
In a regression model, conventional parametric inference regarding coefficients is 
based on distribution conditions and assumptions that may or may not hold true for a 
given set of data (such as OLS estimators will be normally distributed if the model¶s 
error term is normally distributed). However, if the distribution conditions do not hold 
in a particular model and data, parametric inference about OLS estimators may be 
inaccurate. Thus it is the case such as this that a bootstrap may be useful in our 
research. Consider a standard linear regression model: 
Y XE H  , 
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where Y is an (n × 1) vector of response variables, X is an (n × k) matrix of explanatory 
variables (i.e. regressors), E  is a (k × 1) vector of regression coefficients, and H  is 
an (n × 1) vector of error terms. This regression model can be bootstrapped via two 
methods. The most straightforward method is simply to resample entire cases of data, 
that is, resample rows in the data matrix. In this way, B resamples of size n would be 
generated, and the regression model estimated for each resample. This would yield a 
(B × k) matrix of bootstrapped regression coefficients, each column of which would 
contain B *ÖkE ¶s. And these *ÖkE  can be converted into an estimate of the sampling 
distribution of ÖkE  in the usual way, by placing a probability of 1/B at each value of 
*Ö
kE . However, this approach has a problem: it ignores the error structure of the 
regression model. The classic regression model holds that the regressors are fixed 
constants and the response variable is a function of these fixed constants, plus a 
random error term. Since the only random aspect of the process is the error term, H , it 
is this quantity that should be resampled in bootstrap. In contrast to the resampling 
entire cases, the second method, bootstrapping an estimated regression coefficient by 
resampling the error terms (i.e. residuals), is somewhat more complicated. First of all, 
we estimate E  using the OLS method. Using this estimate, ÖE , and the values of the 
observed variables, we calculate the residuals: 
ÖÖi i iY YH   , 
where ÖÖY XE . Then a resample of these residuals is drawn randomly with 
replacement. So we generate a bootstrapped vector of the response variables for this 
resample, by adding the resampled vector of residuals ( *ÖbH ) to the vector of fitted 
response values from the sample: 
* *Ö Öb bY Y H  . 
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These bootstrapped responses, *bY , are then regressed casewise on the fixed 
explanatory variables to estimate a bootstrapped vector of estimated coefficients, *ÖbE , 
for this resample: 
* *Ö Öb bY XE H  . 
This procedure, from residual resample to the estimation of *ÖbE , is repeated B times. 
So far, we have noticed an interesting fact: there are two different ways of 
bootstrapping a regression model: resampling the entire cases and resampling the 
residuals. Which bootstrap method is better? Mooney and Duval (1993) claim that 
researchers need to consider the stochastic component of the model in choosing 
between these two bootstrap methods. Generally, it is theoretically most justifiable to 
resample this portion of the model. Therefore, most theoretical statisticians suggest the 
resampling of residuals. As Efron and Tibshirani (1993) argue, although the two 
approaches are asymptotically equivalent for the given model, the first method, 
resampling the entire cases, is less sensitive to model misspecification, that is, it 
provides better estimates of the variability in the regression parameters when the 
model is not correct. It also appears that if we do not bootstrap the residuals, the 
resampling the entire cases may be less sensitive to the assumptions concerning 
independence or exchangeability of the error terms. Thus, Chernick (2008) concludes 
that ³the resampling the entire cases is over resampling the residuals when (i) there is 
heteroscedasticity in the residual variance, (ii) there is correlation structure in the 
residuals, or (iii) there may be other important parameters missing from the model´. 
When using bootstrap tests for a regression model, a p-value is supposed to be 
calculated and compared with the desired significance level. There are differences in 
opinion about how the bootstrapped p-value should be calculated and two methods are 
both quite popular. The first method, described in Davison and Hinkley (1997), is 
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based on applying a Monte Carlo p-value formula to estimate the p-value of an 
observed test statistic Öt . Thus, in this method, the bootstrapped p-value of Öt  is 
computed using: 
* Ö#{ } 1
1
bt tp
B
t   , 
where the terms *bt , b=1, 2,«, B, are the bootstrap realizations of the test statistic. The 
second one, given in Efron and Tibshirani (1993), does not use the same formula as a 
Monte Carlo test and estimated bootstrapped p-values are instead obtained using: 
* Ö#{ }Ö bt tp
B
t . 
Godfrey (2009) asserts that ³in the bootstrap tests based on comparing Öt  with *bt , 
b=1, 2,«, B, an artificial bootstrap world is constructed, conditional on the observed 
data, in order to approximate the finite sample null distribution of test statistics that are 
only asymptotically pivotal´. The use of Öp  in the second method reflects the 
conditioning on the observed test statistic, with the B bootstrap statistics being used to 
obtain the classical sample proportion estimator, under the bootstrap law, which 
provides the approximation to the true p-value. Given that, in empirical applications, B 
is likely to be 1000 or 2000, and that 
1Ö0
1
p p
B
d  d  , 
it seems difficult to disagree with the second method. Therefore, it is immaterial 
whether one uses Öp  or p . 
5.3.2. Bootstrap Application in our Research 
In this research, we perform successively these two cross-section bootstrap 
simulation methods (residual-only resampling and entire cases resampling) to evaluate 
the individual fund performance and separate the skilled funds from lucky funds, even 
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when idiosyncratic risks are highly non-normal. 
In the first bootstrap method, residual-only resampling, the basic idea of our 
procedure is to construct zero true-alpha funds. Consider an estimated model of 
equilibrium returns of the form (standard model)38: 
, ,i t i i t i tr XD E H   , 
where 
,i tr  is the excess return of fund i, tX  is the matrix of explanatory factors 
returns, and 
,i tH  is the residuals. We also let iT  be the number of observations (i.e. 
time length) of fund i. Our residual-only resampling bootstrap procedure involves five 
steps as follows. (i) For each fund, we compute OLS-HVWLPDWHG IXQGV¶DOSKDV IDFWRU
loadings and residual returns using the standard model. For fund i, we save the 
coefficient estimates ^ `ÖÖ ,i iD E , the time series of estimated residuals ^ `,Öi tH , and the 
t-statistic of alpha ( ÖÖ itD ). (ii) For each fund i, we draw a random sample with 
replacement of length iT  from the residuals ^ `,Öi tH , and create a pseudo-time series of 
resampled residuals ^ `,Öbi tH . In such way, the ordering of original sample of residuals is 
adjusted, and the resampled residuals are reordered. Meanwhile, the original 
chronological ordering of the factor returns tX  is unaltered (retaining the original 
chronological ordering). (iii) We use these resampled residuals ^ `,Öbi tH  to generate a 
simulated excess return series ^ `,bi tr  for fund i, under the null hypothesis of zero true 
performance ( iD =0), 
, ,
Ö Öb bi t i t i tr XE H  . 
As the equation above indicates, this sequence of artificial returns has a true alpha that 
                                                        
38
 This standard model is the origin of various asset pricing models and to be used to explain the bootstrap 
procedure, for brevity. 
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is zero by construction. (iv) Using the simulated excess return series ^ `,bi tr , the 
standard model is estimated again and the resulting estimate of alpha, bootstrapped 
alpha Ö biD , for each fund is obtained.39 Since the bootstrap procedure may have drawn 
an abnormally high number of positive residuals, a positive bootstrapped alpha may 
result or, conversely, a negative alpha may result if an abnormally high number of 
negative residuals are drawn. The bootstrapped alpha for each fund represents 
sampling variation around a true alpha of zero, totally due to luck. (v) Repeating the 
steps above, for all bootstrap iterations B=1, 2«1000, across all funds i=1, 2,«N, 
we arrive at a draw from the cross section of bootstrapped alphas. Then we build the 
distribution of these cross-sectional draws of alphas, Ö( )bif D , that result purely from 
sampling variation while imposing the null of a true alpha equals to zero. The main 
difference between bootstrap simulation and earlier conventional studies is that, under 
the null of no outperformance, it does not assume that the distribution of alpha of each 
fund is normal and each fund¶s alpha can follow any distribution. 
So far, we are able to compare any ex-post ÖiD  with its appropriate luck 
distribution Ö( )bif D . For instance, if we are interested in whether the performance of the 
best fund (the maximum of ÖiD , i.e. maxÖD ) is due to skill or luck. If the maxÖD  is greater 
than the 10% upper tail cut off point from 
max
Ö( )bf D , we reject the null that its 
performance is due to luck at 90% confidence level and infer that the best fund has 
skill. This can be repeated for any other point in the performance distribution, right 
down to the performance of the worst fund in our fund sample. Here, we have to stress 
that the null hypothesis is different for the top performing funds and the bottom 
performing funds. For the former, the null hypothesis is 0 : 0, : 0i A iH HD Dd ! , and 
                                                        
39
 At the same time, we also get the bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha for each fund. 
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for the latter, the null hypothesis is 0 : 0, : 0i A iH HD Dt  . Except for the estimated 
alpha ÖD , we are more concerned another test statistics, the estimated t-statistics of 
alpha: 
Ö
ÖÖ it
s n
D
D , 
where s is the standard deviation of alpha, and n is observations of fund. As Kosowski 
et al. (2006) argue, ³the ÖD  measures the economic size of abnormal performance, but 
suffers from a potential lack of precision in the construction of confidence interval, 
whereas the ÖÖtD  is a pivotal statistic with better sampling properties´. For example, a 
fund that has a short life or engages in high risk-taking will have a high 
variance-estimated alpha distribution, thus alpha for this fund will tend to show as 
spurious outliers in the cross section. Nevertheless, the t-statistic provides a correction 
for these spurious outliers by normalizing the estimated alpha by the estimated 
variance of the alpha estimate. Moreover, the cross-sectional distribution of standard 
deviation has better properties than the cross section of alphas, in the presence of 
heterogeneous fund volatilities due to differing fund risk levels or life spans. Since the 
t-statistic has these attractive statistical properties, we use ÖÖtD  rather than ÖD  as 
performance statistic in our implementation. Similar to ÖD , we also can compare any 
ex-post ÖÖ itD  with its appropriate luck distribution ÖÖ( )bif tD . In practice, besides ÖÖ itD , we 
need to present the p-values of the t-statistics based on standard critical values. For 
comparison, we calculate the cross-sectional bootstrapped p-values ( bip ) of the 
t-statistics as well. According to Godfrey (2009), the bootstrapped p-value formula is  
Ö#{ }bb i i
i
t tp
B
t , 
where bit  is the bootstrapped t-statistics, Öit  is the estimated t-statistics, and B is 
Chapter 5                                                             Methodology 
 82 
number of bootstrap iterations. Let us present an example to illustrate the bootstrapped 
p-value. For example, a fund which is in top performing funds has t-statistic=2.5, but 
its bootstrapped p-value is 0.150. The bootstrapped p-value indicates that among the 
1000 bootstrap simulations, under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, 
15% of the bootstrapped t-statistic for this fund are greater than its estimate 
t-statistic=2.5. Thus using a 10% upper tail cut off point (90% confidence level), we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that this fund¶s actual t-statistic=2.5 may be explained by 
luck alone. Whilst the conventional t-statistics of this fund indicates skill, the 
non-parametric bootstrap indicates good luck. So if we observe the funds in the 
extreme tails, the conventional test statistics may give misleading inference. This 
apparent contradiction is primarily due to the highly non-normal distribution of 
idiosyncratic risk of this fund. 
Following Fama and French (2010), our second bootstrap simulation (entire cases 
resampling, or called as joint resampling) is to jointly resample fund and explanatory 
returns. Although there is some difference between joint resampling and residual-only 
resampling, the aim remains to construct zero true-alpha funds. This time, to set alpha 
to zero, we subtract a fund¶s alpha estimate from its monthly returns. For example, we 
still consider an estimated benchmark model of the form (the standard model): 
, , , ,i t f t i t i i t i tR R r XD E H     , 
where 
,i tR  is the monthly return of fund i, ,f tR  is the risk-free rate, ,i tr  is the excess 
return of fund i, tX  is the matrix of explanatory factors returns, and ,i tH  is the 
residuals. After computing OLS-HVWLPDWHGIXQGV¶DOSKDV for each fund, we subtract the 
fund¶s alpha estimate from its monthly returns: 
, , ,
Ö Öi t i f t i t i i tR R r XD D E     . 
Accordingly, we obtain the benchmark-adjusted (zero true alpha) returns for each fund. 
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Then a random sample with replacement is implemented for the calendar months of 
January 1984 to December 2008. Each simulation run has 300 months. For each fund, 
we estimate the benchmark model on the simulation draw on months of 
benchmark-adjusted returns. Each run thus produces cross-sections of estimates alpha 
ÖD  (or t-statistics of alpha, ÖÖtD ) using the same random sample of months from 
adjusted fund returns. We run 1000 simulation to produce distribution of ÖD  (or ÖÖtD ) 
for a world in which true alpha is zero. As with the residual-only resampling, we are 
also more concerned with the estimated t-statistics of alpha, ÖÖtD  than the estimated 
alpha ÖD .  
This time, we jointly resample fund and explanatory returns, whereas the first 
bootstrap simulation (residual-only resampling) performs independent simulations for 
each fund. Although residual-only resampling has the benefit that the number of 
months a fund is in a simulation run always matches the fund¶s actual number of 
months of returns, its simulation takes no account of the correlation of alpha estimates 
for different funds that arises because a benchmark model does not capture all common 
variation in fund returns. Also, it never jointly resamples fund returns and explanatory 
returns, which means it misses any effects of correlated movement in the volatilities of 
explanatory returns and residuals, as Fama and French (2010) assert. Meanwhile, the 
method of entire cases resampling has the following benefits: it captures the 
cross-correlation of fund returns and its effects on the distribution of estimated 
t-statistics of alpha, because a simulation run is the same random sample of months for 
all funds. Additional, it captures any correlated heteroscedasticity of the explanatory 
returns and disturbances of a benchmark model because of joint resampling fund and 
explanatory returns. 
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CHAPTER 6: FUND LIQUIDITY PREMIUM 
 
Liquidity premium at stock level has been widely proven by earlier research. Liu 
(2006), for example, shows that the least liquid decile stocks significantly outperform 
the most liquid decile stocks by, on average, 0.682% per month over a 12-month 
holding period, after sorting stocks into ten equally-weighted portfolios based on their 
liquidity measure (LM12). However, the liquidity premium at fund level, i.e. fund 
liquidity premium, has received little considered in academia. It appears that the 
existence of a liquidity premium at fund level deserves further study. 
 
6.1. Fund Liquidity Construction 
Before verifying whether there is liquidity premium at fund level, we need to 
introduce our basic thoughts of construction of fund liquidity measures. In addition, 
the study of the effect of liquidity on fund performance is the most essential part in our 
research. Hence it remains necessary to explain specifically the design and process of 
fund liquidity construction in this section. 
6.1.1. Individual Stock Liquidity 
Liquidity is a complex concept, and is hard to capture in a single dimension. Liu 
(2006) defines liquidity as ³the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost with 
little price impact´. In this context, liquidity includes at least four dimensions: trading 
speed, trading quantity, price impact, and trading cost. So far, in academia, there has 
been little consensus on which measures are better and little evidence that any of the 
proposed measures are related to investor experience. Thus, in this thesis, we primarily 
exploit four individual stock liquidity measures to represent these dimensions: LM12, 
RtoV12, TO12, and EC. We will next explain each of them in turn. 
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(1) LM12, trading discontinuity measure of liquidity, captures multiple 
dimensions of liquidity, especially emphasis on the trading speed (Liu, 2006). It is 
defined at the end of each month as the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero 
daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months: 
1 (12-  ) 21 1212 [ .       12 ]month turnoverLM No of zero daily volumes in prior months
Deflator NoTD
u  u , 
where 12-month turnover is the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months, daily 
turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the day; NoTD is the total number of trading days over the 
prior 12 months; and the Deflator is chosen such that 
1 (12-  )0 1month turnover
Deflator
  , 
for all sample stocks.40 The factor 21h12/NoTD standardizes the number of 12 month 
trading days in the market to 252 (i.e. 21h12). The number of zero daily trading 
volumes over the prior 12 months captures the discontinuity of trading; that is the 
absence of trade indicates a security¶s degree of illiquidity. Thus, it relates to the 
trading speed dimension. Then the turnover adjustment reflects the dimension of 
trading quantity. Furthermore, Liu¶s LM12 also captures the trading cost dimension, 
because the number of zero returns (close link to no trade) is a good proxy for 
transaction costs (Lesmond et al., 1999). 
(2) TO12, the turnover measure (in percentage), is defined at the end of each 
month as the average daily turnover over the prior 12 months, where daily turnover is 
the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding 
on that day: 
                                                        
40
 Liu (2006) uses a deflator of 11000 in constructing LM12 in his study. 
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Datar et al. (1998) apply the turnover rate as a proxy for liquidity. By examining the 
influence of liquidity as measured by the turnover rate on the cross-section of stock 
returns, they find that turnover rate is significantly negatively related to stock returns. 
Also, the TO12 captures one dimension of liquidity, the trading quantity. 
(3) RtoV12, Amihud (2002) price impact measure, is defined at the end of each 
month as the daily absolute-return-to-dollar-volume ratio averaged over the prior 12 
months: 
1
1 Diy iyd
iy
tiy iyd
R
RtoV
D VOLD 
 ¦ , 
where 
,i yD  is the number of days for stock i in year y, iydR  is the return on stock i on 
day d of year y, and iydVOLD  is daily dollar volume. Intuitively, if a stock¶s price 
moves a lot in response to little volume, the stock is illiquid, i.e. has a high value of 
RtoV12. This measure is interpreted as the price reaction to trading volume. Amihud 
(2002) tests the effect of illiquidity over time and finds that ³expected market 
illiquidity has a positive and significant effect on ex ante stock excess return and 
unexpected illiquidity has a negative and significant effect on contemporaneous stock 
return´.  
(4) EC, Hasbrouck (2009) effective cost, is defined as Gibbs estimate of cost from 
Basic Market-Adjusted model: 
t t m m tp c q r uE'  '   , 
where tp  is the log trade price, tq  is the direction indicator, which takes the value 
+1 (for a buy) or -1 (for a sale) with equal probability, c is viewed as the effective cost, 
and mr  is the excess market return on day t. As Hasbrouck (2009) emphasizes, ³when 
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c is large relative to the efficient price increments ( tp' ), the price path appears 
distinctly spikey, as a consequence of the large bid-ask bounce.´ Thus EC, as a trading 
cost measure of liquidity, implies a diversification of bid-ask spread. 
Besides these four liquidity measures, we also employ two individual stock 
characteristics: MV (the market capitalization measured in millions of dollars) and 
B/M (the book-to-market-value ratio). In Liu (2009), the MV and B/M are indicated 
high correlation with some liquidity measures (such as LM12, TO12, and RtoV12).  
6.1.2. Fund Liquidity Measures (FLMs) 
According to micro-level fund liquidity concept, we construct all our liquidity 
measures at fund level. Our fund liquidity measures ( tFLM ) is based on the 
value-weighted average of the liquidity measure (
,i tLM ) of individual stocks held by a 
fund: 
, ,
1
jtn
t i t i t
i
FLM LMZ
 
 ¦ , 
where , ,
,
i t i t
i t
t
N P
V
Z  
 is the value-weight, 
,i tN is the number of shares of stock i that 
the fund holds at time t, 
,i tP  is the price of stock i, and , ,t i t i t
i
V N P ¦  is the market 
value of the stock-holdings. 
Although the definition of fund liquidity looks natural, two remarks are in order. 
First, the equation above is in the absence of short positions. In contrast with hedge 
funds, mutual funds are subject to strict limitations on short-selling and the use of 
leverage in order to comply with the Investment Company Act of 1940. Thus, we need 
not consider the liquidity of a fund with short positions. Second, the equation above is 
a function only of a fund stock-holdings¶ weights and not of the dollar value of the 
fund, so the FLM is not a function of fund size to some degree (called as 
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scale-independence by Lo et al., 2003)41. To explain fund liquidity is scale independent, 
let us consider a case. There are two funds A and B both holding 20% of their assets in 
stock X and 80% of assets in stock Y. These two stocks¶ LM12 are 0.1 and 0.2, 
respectively. According to the fund liquidity measure equation above, the FLM of fund 
A and FLM of fund B both equal to 0.1842, no matter how much their total net assets 
are.  
With the equation above, the liquidity measure conversion from individual stock 
level to unique fund level comes true. Hence, these four stock liquidity measures have 
become FLMs. At the same time, the two individual stock characteristics (MV and 
B/M) are also converted to fund level using the same micro-level concept as FLMs (i.e. 
value-weighted average of the stock characteristics of individual stocks held by a fund). 
Hereafter, LM12, TO12, RtoV12, and EC represent fund liquidity measures; and MV 
and B/M represent fund stock-holdings characteristics. Moreover, they are all at the 
micro-level; that is, fund liquidity comes from the liquidity of stock-holdings of a fund. 
To some extent, they are able to tell us the liquidity preference of fund managers, as 
well as how easily they can be managed. However, some other factors, such as cash 
inflow (investors¶ purchase) and outflow (investors¶ redemption) of a fund due to 
market expectation, cannot be reflected by these micro-level FLMs. Thus, we also 
construct two cash flow variables to indicate fund macro-level liquidity. First, we use 
the log of the cash flow into a fund (FLOW1), which is similar to the concept of log 
flow in Pollet and Wilson (2008). It is defined as the change in log TNA not 
attributable to the portfolio return. Then, we calculate another similar cash flow 
(FLOW2), the difference between current TNA and previous TNA with current 
                                                        
41
 As a matter of fact, Lo et al. (2003) affirm that except for liquidity measure of price impact (such as Amihud¶s 
RtoV12) other fund liquidity measures all are scale independent. 
42
 Based on our fund liquidity measure equation, 20%*0.1+80%*0.2=0.18. 
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portfolio return. The equations of them are as following: 
,
, 1 ,
1 log (1 )
i t
i t i t
TNA
FLOW
TNA R
  , 
, , 1 ,2 (1 )i t i t i tFLOW TNA TNA R   , 
where 
,i tTNA  is the total net assets of fund i at the end of month t, and ,i tR  is the 
total net return of fund i during month t. If they are positive, that means net cash inflow, 
while negative represents net cash outflow. FLOW1 focuses on the direction only, 
whereas FLOW2 can tell us the quantity change of fund assets. It is easy, therefore, to 
recognize whether the fund scale increase (decrease) comes from good performance 
(bad performance) or cash inflow (outflow). 
Table 6.1 represents the Spearman rank correlation among these FLMs. As we 
know, liquidity measures might change over time. Thus we not only report the total 
correlations among FLMs for whole sample observations in Panel A, but also show the 
time-series average of yearly Spearman correlation in Panel B. Since Panel B more 
accurately displays the correlation among the FLMs, we concentrate on the results 
from there. In Panel B, the correlation between FLOW1 and FLOW2 (the two 
macro-level FLMs) is very high at 0.845, whereas they are not highly correlated with 
other micro-level FLMs. This low correlation between macro and micro-level fund 
liquidity indeed implies that fund managers control well the micro-level liquidity 
under their management and, as to investors¶ cash flow, they seem to be incompetent. 
Among these micro-level FLMs, the LM12 (the trading discontinuity) is highly 
correlated with the RtoV12 (the price impact) at 0.574, while this correlation in Liu 
(2006) is at 0.665.43 To some extent, LM12 captures some of the price impact of 
                                                        
43
 Although, our liquidity measures are at fund level, whereas the liquidity measures in Liu (2006) are at stock 
level, it remains reasonable to compare them due to our micro-level FLMs are constructed by stock-holdings¶ 
liquidity measures. . 
Chapter 6                                                    Fund Liquidity Premium 
 90 
liquidity. LM12 is inversely correlated with MV (the market capitalization of 
stock-holdings) at -0.359, also similar to -0.514 in Liu (2006). It translates as these 
funds holding small companies being less liquid. As expected, the RtoV12 is highly 
correlated with EC (the trading cost) at 0.789, which means price impact brings out the 
increase of trading cost. Moreover, the correlation is -0.820 between RtoV12 and MV, 
somewhat is constant with -0.944 of Liu (2006), which is practically negatively 
correlated. Apparently, LM12 and RtoV12, among all FLMs, are the most 
representative proxies for fund liquidity. Also, MV could be a reasonable liquidity 
proxy to a large extent. 
 
Table 6.1 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients of Fund Liquidity Measures 
This table reports the Spearman rank correlations for the fund liquidity measures and fund 
stock-holdings characteristics in our study. FLOW1 is the log cash flow; FLOW2 is the quantity of cash 
flow; LM12 is Liu¶s discontinuity measure of liquidity; TO12 (%) is the average daily turnover over the 
prior 12 months; RtoV12 (in millions) is Amihud¶s liquidity measure on price impact; EC is 
Hasbrouck¶s effective cost; MV is market capitalization measured in millions of dollars; and B/M is the 
book-to-market-value ratio. Panel A stands for the Spearman rank correlations among FLMs for all 
observations in entire sample. Since FLMs change over time, we also calculate the correlation 
coefficients among them year by year, and then average the yearly correlation coefficients. Panel B 
represents the time-series average of yearly Spearman correlation coefficient of FLMs. 
FLOW1 FLOW2 LM12 TO12 RTOV12 EC MV BM
FLOW1 1.000 
FLOW2 0.867 1.000 
LM12 0.124 0.099 1.000 
TO12 -0.080 -0.073 -0.542 1.000 
RTOV12 0.101 0.063 0.670 -0.168 1.000 
EC 0.034 -0.009 0.379 0.227 0.592 1.000 
MV -0.059 -0.032 -0.380 -0.055 -0.822 -0.475 1.000 
BM -0.067 -0.055 0.192 -0.375 0.272 -0.078 -0.298 1.000 
FLOW1 1.000 
FLOW2 0.845 1.000 
LM12 0.023 0.007 1.000 
TO12 0.014 0.004 -0.149 1.000 
RTOV12 0.031 0.001 0.574 0.282 1.000 
EC 0.025 -0.012 0.396 0.543 0.789 1.000 
MV -0.021 0.006 -0.359 -0.383 -0.820 -0.778 1.000 
BM -0.038 -0.029 0.117 -0.444 0.103 -0.103 -0.096 1.000 
Panel A. Spearman Correlation Coefficients (Total Sample)
Panel B. Spearman Correlation Coefficients (Yearly Average)
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6.2. Absence of Fund Liquidity Premium 
Here, to verify the existence of fund liquidity premium, we sort funds into ten 
portfolios based on trading discontinuity measure (Liu¶s LM12) and price impact 
measure (Amihud¶s RtoV12).44 If the least liquid portfolio consistently outperforms 
the most liquid portfolio, this is evidence of the presence of liquidity premium at fund 
level, and vice versa. 
6.2.1. LM12-Sorted Fund Portfolios 
At the beginning of each month, all eligible equity funds in our sample are sorted 
in ascending order according to their LM12. Based on this sort, funds are grouped into 
ten equally weighted portfolios (deciles). We then calculate the mean of each 
characteristic of equity funds in each decile. We report results of basic characteristics 
in Table 6.2 for all fund portfolios during the 25-year period. Decile 1 (H) contains the 
most liquid funds and the least liquid funds are in Decile 10 (L). Additionally, we form 
a zero-investment portfolio L-H consisting of long positions in the least liquid funds 
(Decile 10, L) and short positions in the most liquid funds (Decile 1, H). 
Sorting by LM123DQHO$UHSRUWVWKHIXQG¶VVL]HWKHSURSRUWLRQDQGQXPEHURI
stock-holdings in each decile. We find a salient phenomenon that the least liquid 
portfolio (Decile 10) is the smallest fund portfolio ($385.51 million)45 with the highest 
number of stock-holdings (153 stocks). It makes sense that the small funds need to 
hold many more stocks than large funds due to the illiquidity of their stock-holdings. 
Since share redemption by investors might be precipitate and unexpected sometimes, 
the small funds have to depend on increasing the number of stock-holdings to deal 
                                                        
44
 In the previous section, we have concluded that LM12 and RtoV12, among all FLMs, are the most 
representative proxies for fund liquidity. 
45
 It is consistent with the findings of previous research, such as Keim (1999), Shawky and Tian (2010). Shawky 
and Tian (2010) conclude that the better performance of small-cap equity funds is because they tend to buy less 
liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks, which provides liquidity services to the market. 
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with the redemption, so that their liquidity requirement is not threatened. Panel B 
presents the liquidity measures and stock-holdings characteristics of each decile. As 
can be seen, the fund portfolio with the least liquid stock-holdings (Decile 10) has the 
biggest log cash inflow (FLOW1), the second lowest turnover ratio (TO12), the 
KLJKHVW$PLKXG¶VSULFHLPSDFWUDWLR (RtoV12)WKHKLJKHVW+DVEURXFN¶VHIIHFWLYHFRVW 
(EC), the smallest capitalization of stock-holdings (MV), and the highest B/M ratio 
(relatively, the value companies). As to the most liquid portfolio (Decile 1), though it 
has the highest turnover (TO12), the third lowest price impact ratio (RtoV12), and the 
lowest B/M ratio, other characteristics¶ UDQNLQJV DUH QRW DV QRWDEOH DV 'ecile 10. In 
general, LM12 captures the fund liquidity well, and is able to represent fund liquidity. 
Panel C shows the holding period returns for 1 month (HPR1M) and for 12 months 
(HPR12M) of each decile, and reveals that there is no significant liquidity premium 
over the 1-month or 12-month holding periods. In moving from the most liquid decile 
(Decile 1) to the least liquid decile (Decile 10), the portfolio holding period returns for 
1 month and 12 month both increase gradually and monotonically. Although the 
portfolio L-H discloses liquidity premium 0.211% for HPR1M and 3.437% for 
HPR12M, both are not significant (their t-statistics are only 1.04 and 1.19, 
respectively). Consistent with our expectation, liquidity premium at fund level does 
not exist, because almost all mutual funds (at least actively managed equity funds) pay 
a great deal of attention to liquidity. Therefore, it is impossible to find significant 
liquidity premium within liquid portfolios. 
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Table 6.2 
Characteristics of the LM12-Sorted Fund Portfolios 
The table reports the characteristics of fund portfolios sorted by the LM12 in our sample. At the 
beginning of each month, eligible equity funds are sorted in ascending order based on their LM12. 
Based on this sort, funds are grouped into ten equally weighted portfolios. 1 (H) denotes the lowest 
LM12 decile portfolio, i.e. the most liquid decile. 10 (L) denotes the highest LM12 decile portfolio, i.e. 
the least liquid decile. L-H denotes a zero-investment portfolio consisting of long positions in the least 
liquid funds (Decile 10, L) and short positions in the most liquid funds (Decile 1, H). HPR1M shows the 
mean return of a fund portfolio over one month holding period, and similarly for HPR12M. Panel A 
shows the characteristics of fund size and stock-holdings for each fund portfolio. Panel B stands for the 
results of fund liquidity measures and fund stock-holdings characteristics. Panel C represents the 
performance of the LM12-sorted fund portfolios. 
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
TNA 541.85 713.98 799.42 1011.88 1178.79 1023.84 994.39 965.94 620.56 385.51 -156.34
STKPCT 83.99% 85.21% 85.12% 84.85% 84.86% 85.00% 84.74% 84.73% 84.11% 82.81% -1.19%
STKNUM 59 69 78 81 81 82 87 91 100 153 94
FLOW1 0.00484 0.00593 0.00645 0.00512 0.00535 0.00605 0.00606 0.00769 0.00718 0.00894 0.00413
FLOW2 3.5197 7.5855 6.2533 9.5542 6.1922 6.7892 2.4809 4.7514 3.3461 3.4135 -0.0875
LM12 0.0000 0.0007 0.0053 0.0186 0.0495 0.1159 0.2446 0.4928 1.0437 4.7204 4.7204
TO12 0.9315 0.6617 0.5815 0.5745 0.5801 0.5707 0.5581 0.5946 0.6358 0.5662 -0.3653
RTOV12 0.00436 0.00309 0.00396 0.00592 0.01032 0.01762 0.03012 0.05310 0.09192 0.36192 0.35756
EC 0.00355 0.00307 0.00297 0.00304 0.00318 0.00332 0.00355 0.00399 0.00463 0.00615 0.00260
MV 14294.2 17755.8 21931.8 25992.4 30205.0 33976.1 34585.4 29807.2 16803.1 4172.1 -10122.0
B/M 0.3941 0.4471 0.4692 0.4539 0.4310 0.4156 0.4200 0.4168 0.4409 0.5500 0.1560
HPR1M 0.708% 0.781% 0.781% 0.789% 0.793% 0.809% 0.844% 0.919% 0.924% 0.919% 0.211%
t-statistics 1.90 2.77 3.05 3.01 3.01 3.02 3.15 3.24 3.20 3.34 1.04
HPR12M 9.004% 10.182% 10.958% 10.313% 10.716% 10.992% 11.290% 11.285% 11.579% 12.440% 3.437%
t-statistics 1.85 2.60 2.96 2.79 2.93 2.98 3.04 2.93 3.02 3.26 1.19
Panel A: Fund Size and Stock Holdings
Panel B: Liquidity Measures
Panel C: Holding Period Returns
 
We also test fund liquidity premium by controlling for risk using various 
regression models mentioned before. If the risk-adjusted performance in the least 
liquid portfolio is significantly better than that in the most liquid portfolio, that still 
will be a strong evidence of the presence of fund liquidity premium. This time, we sort 
all equity funds in each month on the decile rankings of their LM12 of the previous 
month. Then we track these ten portfolios for one month and use the entire time series 
of their monthly net returns to calculate the alpha and betas to the various factors for 
each of these ten portfolios. To be specific, for each month we run a time-series 
regression of excess portfolio returns on the excess market return (MKTRF), size 
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factor (SMB), value factor (HML), momentum factor (PR1YR), liquidity risk factor 
(LIQ_V), and liquidity factor (LIQ) respectively in various models. At the same time, 
we also calculate the alpha and betas to the various factors for the zero-investment 
portfolio L-H.  
Table 6.3 reports the risk-adjusted performance in various asset pricing models 
for fund portfolios classified by LM12. Panels A to E present parameter estimates of 
the CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, FF+PS, and LCAPM, respectively. Results here all show 
that fund liquidity premium is little to none after controlling for risks. The CAPM 
performance is not enough good with respect to the less liquid portfolios (such as 
0.034% in Decile 9 and 0.063% in Decile 10), resulting in a liquidity premium of 
0.357% per month, compared to the unadjusted value of 0.211%. However, its 
t-statistic is only 1.90, which indicates the liquidity premium is not significant. There 
is a similar story (insignificant liquidity premium) with the FF3F, FF+Mom, and 
FF+PS. As to the risk-adjusted performance of Liu LCAPM, the performance of the 
least liquid portfolio (Decile 10) is even worse than the performance of the most liquid 
portfolio (Decile 1), which results in a negative liquidity premium. The absence of 
fund liquidity premium is confirmed by the risk-adjusted performance. 
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Table 6.3 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of the LM12-Sorted Fund Portfolios 
The table reports the risk-adjusted performance in various asset pricing models for fund portfolios 
classified by LM12. In each month, all eligible equity funds are sorted in ascending order based on their 
LM12 of the previous month. Based on this sort, funds are grouped into equally weighted decile 
portfolio. 1 (H) denotes the lowest LM12 decile portfolio, i.e. the most liquid decile. 10 (L) denotes the 
highest LM12 decile portfolio, i.e. the least liquid decile. L-H denotes a zero-investment portfolio 
consisting of long positions in the least liquid funds (Decile 10, L) and short positions in the most liquid 
funds (Decile 1, H). Panel A presents parameter estimate of the CAPM: 
, , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t i tR R R RD E H     , 
Panel B reports parameter estimates of the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F): 
, , , , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t i tR R R R SMB HMLD E E E H       , 
Panel C shows parameter estimates of the Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom): 
, , , , , , , , ,
( ) 1i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t p i t i tR R R R SMB HML PR YRD E E E E H        , 
Panel D stands for parameter estimates of the Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS): 
, , , , , , , , ,
( ) _i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t l i t i tR R R R SMB HML LIQ VD E E E E H        , 
Panel E reports parameter estimates of the Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM): 
, , , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t l i t i tR R R R LIQD E E H      , 
where 
, ,i t f tR R  is the excess return on fund i in period t, , ,m t f tR R  is the excess return on the market 
proxy portfolio in period t (
,i tR  is the return on fund i, ,f tR  is the risk-free rate, in this research we 
define it as one month T-bill rate, 
,m tR  is the return on market portfolio, which is the value-weighted 
return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks); SMB, HML, PR1YR, LIQ_V, and LIQ are the 
small-minus-big size portfolio return, high-minus-low book-to-market portfolio return, high-minus-low 
prior 1-year return portfolio return, high-minus-low value-weighted liquidity risk portfolio return, and 
illiquid-minus-liquid portfolio return in period t, respectively; and iD  and iE  DUH WKH UHJUHVVLRQ¶V
intercept and slope coefficients for explanatory factors. 
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Table 6.3 - Continued 
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
Į -0.294% -0.107% -0.071% -0.077% -0.071% -0.057% -0.017% 0.031% 0.034% 0.063% 0.357%
t Į -1.71 -1.33 -1.45 -1.81 -1.34 -0.80 -0.21 0.35 0.34 0.57 1.90
ȕBPNW 1.274 1.037 0.961 0.990 0.988 0.991 0.981 1.036 1.041 0.970 -0.304
t ȕBPNW 33.44 58.04 88.24 105.23 83.39 62.65 55.42 54.03 47.42 39.45 -7.30
R^2 0.791 0.919 0.963 0.974 0.959 0.930 0.912 0.908 0.884 0.840 0.150
Į -0.074% -0.067% -0.092% -0.101% -0.094% -0.080% -0.051% 0.093% 0.050% -0.055% 0.018%
t Į -0.62 -0.93 -1.89 -2.39 -1.76 -1.11 -0.64 1.44 0.83 -0.90 0.12
ȕBPNW 1.080 0.989 0.969 1.005 1.005 1.011 1.006 0.964 0.979 0.982 -0.097
t ȕBPNW 37.07 56.82 81.40 97.69 77.39 58.06 51.71 61.43 66.34 65.63 -2.64
ȕBVPE 0.428 0.178 0.049 0.006 -0.022 -0.038 -0.024 0.264 0.418 0.520 0.092
t ȕBVPE 11.00 7.65 3.10 0.42 -1.24 -1.61 -0.91 12.58 21.20 25.99 1.87
ȕBKPO -0.444 -0.072 0.049 0.054 0.048 0.046 0.071 -0.115 -0.003 0.298 0.742
t ȕBKPO -9.74 -2.65 2.65 3.34 2.34 1.68 2.35 -4.68 -0.12 12.72 12.88
R^2 0.9010 0.9379 0.9646 0.9748 0.9603 0.9313 0.9141 0.9502 0.9574 0.9520 0.4630
Į -0.128% -0.129% -0.099% -0.102% -0.071% -0.054% -0.015% 0.034% 0.018% -0.014% 0.115%
t Į -1.05 -1.79 -1.97 -2.33 -1.30 -0.74 -0.18 0.52 0.30 -0.22 0.74
ȕBPNW 1.091 1.002 0.970 1.005 1.001 1.005 0.998 0.976 0.985 0.974 -0.117
t ȕBPNW 36.92 57.70 79.91 95.71 75.89 56.81 50.61 62.56 65.95 64.64 -3.14
ȕBVPE 0.424 0.173 0.049 0.006 -0.020 -0.036 -0.021 0.259 0.416 0.523 0.099
t ȕBVPE 10.93 7.60 3.06 0.41 -1.14 -1.53 -0.81 12.66 21.18 26.43 2.03
ȕBKPO -0.432 -0.059 0.051 0.054 0.043 0.041 0.064 -0.102 0.004 0.289 0.721
t ȕBKPO -9.44 -2.19 2.71 3.31 2.09 1.48 2.08 -4.22 0.18 12.38 12.55
ȕBSU\U 0.053 0.060 0.007 0.000 -0.022 -0.024 -0.035 0.058 0.031 -0.040 -0.093
t ȕBSU\U 1.93 3.73 0.61 0.03 -1.81 -1.48 -1.92 3.98 2.21 -2.87 -2.70
R^2 0.9019 0.9405 0.9645 0.9747 0.9606 0.9316 0.9149 0.9526 0.9580 0.9532 0.4743
Į -0.108% -0.092% -0.113% -0.094% -0.077% -0.046% -0.018% 0.123% 0.086% -0.037% 0.071%
t Į -0.90 -1.30 -2.35 -2.21 -1.46 -0.66 -0.23 1.96 1.48 -0.61 0.47
ȕBPNW 1.070 0.982 0.963 1.008 1.010 1.020 1.015 0.972 0.989 0.988 -0.082
t ȕBPNW 36.81 56.91 82.23 97.36 78.13 59.96 53.03 63.42 70.00 66.19 -2.25
ȕBVPE 0.430 0.180 0.051 0.005 -0.023 -0.040 -0.026 0.262 0.416 0.519 0.089
t ȕBVPE 11.17 7.85 3.26 0.38 -1.32 -1.76 -1.02 12.88 22.19 26.23 1.83
ȕBKPO -0.457 -0.082 0.041 0.057 0.054 0.059 0.085 -0.103 0.012 0.305 0.763
t ȕBKPO -10.08 -3.06 2.25 3.51 2.69 2.23 2.83 -4.29 0.53 13.10 13.38
ȕBOLTBY 0.090 0.067 0.054 -0.019 -0.044 -0.087 -0.087 -0.079 -0.094 -0.048 -0.138
t ȕBOLTBY 2.66 3.36 3.97 -1.61 -2.94 -4.43 -3.92 -4.46 -5.73 -2.79 -3.26
R^2 0.9030 0.9400 0.9663 0.9749 0.9613 0.9354 0.9181 0.9532 0.9616 0.9531 0.4801
Į 0.239% 0.047% -0.021% -0.050% -0.055% -0.047% -0.019% 0.220% 0.248% 0.100% -0.138%
t Į 1.50 0.57 -0.40 -1.12 -0.96 -0.62 -0.22 2.55 2.50 0.85 -0.76
ȕBPNW 0.920 0.935 0.928 0.973 0.977 0.985 0.982 0.910 0.899 0.945 0.025
t ȕBPNW 18.58 36.81 57.88 69.66 55.37 41.75 37.21 33.94 29.22 25.82 0.45
ȕBOLT -0.535 -0.154 -0.051 -0.026 -0.017 -0.010 0.002 -0.191 -0.215 -0.037 0.498
t ȕBOLT -9.66 -5.42 -2.84 -1.69 -0.84 -0.36 0.06 -6.35 -6.25 -0.91 7.88
R^2 0.8405 0.9263 0.9642 0.9741 0.9591 0.9296 0.9118 0.9187 0.8969 0.8400 0.2961
Panel E: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel C: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel D: FF+PS-adjusted performance
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6.2.2. RtoV12-Sorted Fund Portfolios 
Along with Liu¶s trading discontinuity measure (LM12), Amihud¶s price impact 
ratio (RtoV12) is one of the most significant proxies for liquidity, among all FLMs. 
For robustness, it remains possible to examine the fund liquidity premium again after 
sorting funds based on their RtoV12.  
Similar to sorting funds into decile based on LM12, we sort all equity funds into 
ten portfolios (deciles) by RtoV12 for each month. At the same time, we also construct 
a zero-investment portfolio L-H consisting of long positions in the least liquid funds 
and short positions in the most liquid funds. We report results of basic characteristics 
in Table 6.4 for RtoV12-sorted fund portfolios. Panel A presents WKH IXQG¶VVL]e, the 
proportion and number of stock-holdings of fund in each decile. Similar to sorting by 
LM12, we also find that the least liquid portfolio is the smallest fund portfolio 
($294.61 million) with the highest number of stock-holdings (141 stocks). It is 
reasonable that the small funds hold many more stocks than large funds due to the 
illiquidity of their stock-holdings. In Panel B, it can be seen that the fund portfolio 
with the least liquid stock-holdings has the biggest log cash inflow (FLOW1), the 
highest Liu¶s trading discontinuity (LM12), the highest Hasbrouck¶s effective cost 
(EC), the smallest capitalization of stock-holdings (MV), and the highest B/M ratio. In 
a word, RtoV12, as LM12, also captures the fund liquidity well. Panel C discloses that 
there is no significant fund liquidity premium. Although the portfolio L-H 
demonstrates liquidity premium 0.174% for HPR1M and 2.851% for HPR12M, both 
are not significant (their t-statistics are only 1.10 and 1.02, respectively). This result is 
consistent with our expectation and confirms the result of sorting by LM12. 
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Table 6.4 
Characteristics of the RtoV12-Sorted Fund Portfolios 
The table reports the characteristics of fund portfolios sorted by the RtoV12 in our sample. At the 
beginning of each month, eligible equity funds are sorted in ascending order based on their RtoV12. 
Based on this sort, funds are grouped into ten equally weighted portfolios. 1 (H) denotes the lowest 
RtoV12 decile portfolio, i.e. the most liquid decile. 10 (L) denotes the highest RtoV12 decile portfolio, 
i.e. the least liquid decile. L-H denotes a zero-investment portfolio consisting of long positions in the 
least liquid funds (Decile 10, L) and short positions in the most liquid funds (Decile 1, H). HPR1M 
shows the mean return of a fund portfolio over one month holding period, and similarly for HPR12M. 
Panel A shows the characteristics of fund size and stock-holdings for each fund portfolio. Panel B stands 
for the results of fund liquidity measures and fund stock-holdings characteristics. Panel C represents the 
performance of the RtoV12-sorted fund portfolios. 
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
TNA 1495.26 1320.09 1116.11 1169.12 896.36 695.12 525.55 396.58 330.98 294.61 -1200.65
STKPCT 87.18% 85.77% 85.27% 84.93% 84.24% 84.10% 83.66% 83.98% 83.47% 82.82% -4.36%
STKNUM 65 77 80 81 78 80 80 91 108 141 76
FLOW1 0.00541 0.00526 0.00522 0.00507 0.00537 0.00625 0.00696 0.00765 0.00714 0.00930 0.00391
FLOW2 8.5375 3.2452 5.6403 6.4473 8.6672 7.2570 4.4985 3.6253 3.1302 2.8875 -5.5606
LM12 0.0082 0.0108 0.0182 0.0373 0.0803 0.1697 0.3135 0.5981 1.1046 4.3556 4.3474
TO12 0.4878 0.5188 0.5238 0.5547 0.6541 0.7099 0.7243 0.7634 0.7055 0.6109 0.1231
RTOV12 0.00081 0.00166 0.00274 0.00438 0.00775 0.01399 0.02444 0.04428 0.08644 0.39546 0.39464
EC 0.00258 0.00274 0.00282 0.00297 0.00322 0.00351 0.00382 0.00432 0.00484 0.00663 0.00405
MV 54416.7 43545.6 37957.2 31700.8 20626.3 14135.4 12388.4 7165.0 4633.9 3061.0 -51355.7
B/M 0.4152 0.4266 0.4510 0.4525 0.4436 0.4239 0.4208 0.4143 0.4536 0.5375 0.1223
HPR1M 0.734% 0.725% 0.734% 0.746% 0.831% 0.859% 0.915% 0.903% 0.910% 0.908% 0.174%
t-statistics 2.89 2.83 2.92 2.94 3.05 3.04 3.12 2.89 2.96 3.09 1.10
HPR12M 9.462% 9.230% 9.784% 10.374% 11.018% 11.207% 11.709% 11.922% 11.751% 12.313% 2.851%
t-statistics 2.40 2.45 2.62 2.86 2.82 2.93 2.93 2.87 2.99 3.06 1.02
Panel A: Fund Size and Stock Holdings
Panel B: Liquidity Measures
Panel C: Holding Period Returns
 
Furthermore, we also test fund liquidity premium through risk-adjusted 
performance. Similar to the procedure of sorting by LM12, we sort all equity funds in 
each month on the decile rankings of their RtoV12 of the previous month. In addition, 
we also form a zero-investment portfolio L-H and then calculate the alpha and betas to 
the various factors for this zero-investment portfolio. Results from Panels A to E in 
Table 6.5 again reveal that fund liquidity premium does not exist after controlling for 
risks. In fact, the FF3F and FF+PS performance of the least liquid portfolio are even 
worse than the performance of the most liquid portfolio, which leads to the negative 
liquidity premium. The FF+Mom performance is poor at each decile; all are negative. 
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The liquidity premiums of CAPM and Liu LCAPM are positive at 0.140% and 0.167% 
per month, but their t-statistics are only 0.88 and 0.99, which indicates that the 
liquidity premium is insignificant. The absence of fund liquidity premium is proved 
again by sorting funds based on RtoV12. 
 
Table 6.5 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of the RtoV12-Sorted Fund Portfolios 
The table reports the risk-adjusted performance in various asset pricing models for fund portfolios 
classified by RtoV12. In each month, all eligible equity funds are sorted in ascending order based on 
their RtoV12 of the previous month. Based on this sort, funds are grouped into equally weighted decile 
portfolio. 1 (H) denotes the lowest RtoV12 decile portfolio, i.e. the most liquid decile. 10 (L) denotes 
the highest RtoV12 decile portfolio, i.e. the least liquid decile. L-H denotes a zero-investment portfolio 
consisting of long positions in the least liquid funds (Decile 10, L) and short positions in the most liquid 
funds (Decile 1, H). Panel A presents parameter estimate of the CAPM: 
, , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t i tR R R RD E H     , 
Panel B reports parameter estimates of the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F): 
, , , , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t i tR R R R SMB HMLD E E E H       , 
Panel C shows parameter estimates of the Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom): 
, , , , , , , , ,
( ) 1i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t p i t i tR R R R SMB HML PR YRD E E E E H        , 
Panel D stands for parameter estimates of the Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS): 
, , , , , , , , ,
( ) _i t f t i m i m t f t s i t h i t l i t i tR R R R SMB HML LIQ VD E E E E H        , 
Panel E reports parameter estimates of the Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM): 
, , , , , , ,
( )i t f t i m i m t f t l i t i tR R R R LIQD E E H      , 
where 
, ,i t f tR R  is the excess return on fund i in period t, , ,m t f tR R  is the excess return on the market 
proxy portfolio in period t (
,i tR  is the return on fund i, ,f tR  is the risk-free rate, in this research we 
define it as one month T-bill rate, 
,m tR  is the return on market portfolio, which is the value-weighted 
return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks); SMB, HML, PR1YR, LIQ_V, and LIQ are the 
small-minus-big size portfolio return, high-minus-low book-to-market portfolio return, high-minus-low 
prior 1-year return portfolio return, high-minus-low value-weighted liquidity risk portfolio return, and 
illiquid-minus-liquid portfolio return in period t, respectively; and iD  and iE  DUH WKH UHJUHVVLRQ¶V
intercept and slope coefficients for explanatory factors. 
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Table 6.5 - Continued 
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
Į -0.115% -0.133% -0.115% -0.108% -0.053% -0.039% 0.004% -0.026% -0.011% 0.025% 0.140%
t Į -2.40 -4.07 -4.07 -3.39 -1.12 -0.60 0.05 -0.24 -0.10 0.20 0.88
ȕBPNW 0.955 0.974 0.956 0.965 1.028 1.057 1.084 1.121 1.105 1.026 0.072
t ȕBPNW 89.84 133.92 152.44 136.59 97.57 73.52 62.45 45.77 45.14 37.24 2.04
R^2 0.965 0.984 0.987 0.984 0.970 0.948 0.929 0.876 0.873 0.824 0.011
Į -0.037% -0.095% -0.114% -0.112% -0.041% -0.026% 0.019% 0.024% -0.021% -0.070% -0.033%
t Į -1.05 -3.42 -4.54 -3.54 -0.94 -0.48 0.32 0.38 -0.36 -1.07 -0.38
ȕBPNW 0.923 0.961 0.964 0.972 1.008 1.026 1.041 1.032 1.048 1.014 0.091
t ȕBPNW 106.46 142.69 157.55 125.85 93.79 76.67 71.00 68.23 74.19 63.31 4.32
ȕBVPE -0.150 -0.092 -0.074 -0.031 0.095 0.185 0.267 0.463 0.517 0.600 0.750
t ȕBVPE -12.94 -10.17 -9.10 -3.04 6.62 10.37 13.63 22.91 27.39 28.05 26.78
ȕBKPO -0.180 -0.091 -0.007 0.007 -0.018 -0.012 -0.012 -0.071 0.062 0.253 0.433
t ȕBKPO -13.25 -8.61 -0.77 0.57 -1.08 -0.58 -0.53 -3.00 2.82 10.11 13.20
R^2 0.9809 0.9887 0.9903 0.9849 0.9746 0.9636 0.9592 0.9618 0.9658 0.9519 0.7157
Į -0.038% -0.096% -0.101% -0.104% -0.050% -0.049% -0.013% -0.047% -0.044% -0.021% 0.017%
t Į -1.04 -3.37 -3.93 -3.19 -1.10 -0.87 -0.22 -0.77 -0.73 -0.32 0.19
ȕBPNW 0.923 0.961 0.962 0.970 1.010 1.031 1.047 1.047 1.053 1.004 0.081
t ȕBPNW 104.31 139.84 155.25 123.32 92.15 75.84 70.62 70.57 73.33 62.47 3.80
ȕBVPE -0.150 -0.092 -0.073 -0.031 0.094 0.184 0.265 0.458 0.515 0.604 0.754
t ȕBVPE -12.91 -10.15 -9.02 -2.98 6.56 10.30 13.59 23.51 27.34 28.62 27.10
ȕBKPO -0.180 -0.090 -0.010 0.005 -0.016 -0.007 -0.005 -0.056 0.067 0.243 0.422
t ȕBKPO -13.10 -8.49 -1.06 0.42 -0.96 -0.34 -0.23 -2.43 3.02 9.75 12.87
ȕBSU\U 0.001 0.001 -0.013 -0.008 0.008 0.022 0.031 0.068 0.022 -0.047 -0.048
t ȕBSU\U 0.10 0.21 -2.25 -1.07 0.83 1.74 2.29 4.97 1.65 -3.18 -2.45
R^2 0.9809 0.9887 0.9904 0.9849 0.9745 0.9638 0.9598 0.9646 0.9660 0.9534 0.7205
Į -0.033% -0.093% -0.110% -0.108% -0.041% -0.019% 0.031% 0.038% 0.001% -0.046% -0.013%
t Į -0.92 -3.35 -4.35 -3.39 -0.93 -0.34 0.52 0.60 0.02 -0.71 -0.15
ȕBPNW 0.924 0.961 0.966 0.973 1.008 1.028 1.044 1.037 1.054 1.021 0.096
t ȕBPNW 105.82 141.40 156.97 125.05 92.86 76.29 70.97 68.34 75.51 64.39 4.58
ȕBVPE -0.150 -0.092 -0.075 -0.032 0.095 0.185 0.266 0.462 0.516 0.599 0.749
t ȕBVPE -12.98 -10.17 -9.16 -3.07 6.60 10.35 13.65 22.99 27.86 28.49 26.88
ȕBKPO -0.178 -0.090 -0.005 0.009 -0.018 -0.009 -0.007 -0.065 0.071 0.263 0.441
t ȕBKPO -13.04 -8.49 -0.57 0.70 -1.08 -0.43 -0.32 -2.76 3.26 10.62 13.43
ȕBOLTBY -0.012 -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 0.000 -0.020 -0.032 -0.037 -0.058 -0.063 -0.051
t ȕBOLTBY -1.20 -0.48 -1.69 -1.18 0.01 -1.27 -1.88 -2.10 -3.58 -3.46 -2.11
R^2 0.9810 0.9887 0.9904 0.9849 0.9745 0.9637 0.9596 0.9622 0.9671 0.9537 0.7190
Į -0.045% -0.096% -0.104% -0.077% 0.060% 0.116% 0.193% 0.271% 0.218% 0.122% 0.167%
t Į -0.90 -2.80 -3.45 -2.31 1.27 1.82 2.51 2.54 1.96 0.93 0.99
ȕBPNW 0.908 0.950 0.948 0.945 0.953 0.954 0.958 0.924 0.953 0.962 0.054
t ȕBPNW 58.91 88.97 101.64 90.72 65.47 48.07 40.07 27.95 27.63 23.58 1.02
ȕBOLT -0.071 -0.037 -0.011 -0.031 -0.114 -0.156 -0.190 -0.298 -0.230 -0.098 -0.027
t ȕBOLT -4.09 -3.10 -1.07 -2.63 -6.97 -7.01 -7.11 -8.06 -5.96 -2.14 -0.47
R^2 0.9664 0.9842 0.9874 0.9847 0.9740 0.9553 0.9396 0.8982 0.8864 0.8261 0.0079
Panel E: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel C: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel D: FF+PS-adjusted performance
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In summary, fund liquidity premium is a different story with stock liquidity 
premium. There is an absence of liquidity premium at fund level, no matter which 
FLMs are used for sorting (Liu¶s trading discontinuity measure, LM12 or Amihud¶s 
price impact ratio, RtoV12), and no matter which fund performance are examined 
(holding period returns or risk-adjusted performance). The truth behind the 
phenomenon appears to be that almost all actively managed equity funds in effect pay 
much attention to liquidity and, thus, it might not be feasible to find significant 
liquidity premium within these highly liquid fund portfolios. 
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CHAPTER 7: FUND PERFORMANCE 
 
7.1. Performance of Portfolio of Funds 
As described in the Methodology Chapter, we have conducted a simple time 
series regression for each fund to obtain the estimated alpha and factor loadings for 
various asset pricing models (including conventional models and liquidity-based 
models). Then we calculated the mean of these estimated alpha and factor loadings of 
the fund sample for each model. However, this is unable to achieve the significance of 
the estimated alpha and factor loadings through averaging the t-statistics for all fund 
data. In addition, funds have diverse survival time period and different risk-taking 
preference. Thus, we examine fund performance as a whole, by constructing a 
portfolio of funds in each month and run time-series regression for the cross-section of 
the fund portfolio¶s net returns. 
We use two methods (value weighting and equal weighting) to construct a 
portfolio of equity mutual funds in each month. In the value-weighted portfolio of 
funds (VWPOF), all eligible equity funds are weighted by fund scale (total net assets, 
TNA) at the beginning of each month. In the equally-weighted portfolio of funds 
(EWPOF), equity funds are weighted equally each month. After constructing these two 
kinds of portfolio of funds, we run time-series regression of various asset pricing 
models to estimate the performance (i.e. the intercepts in these models, or monthly 
alphas) of VWPOF and EWPOF, respectively. In addition, we provide and analyze the 
results from the conventional models (CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model - FF3F, 
and Carhart four-factor model - FF+Mom) and liquidity-based models 
(Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model - FF+PS, and Liu liquidity-augmented 
two-factor model - LCAPM): 
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, ,i t i i t i tr MKTRFD E H   , (CAPM) 
, , , , ,i t i m i t s i t h i t i tr MKTRF SMB HMLD E E E H     , (FF3F) 
, , , , , ,
1i t i m i t s i t h i t p i t i tr MKTRF SMB HML PR YRD E E E E H      , (FF+Mom) 
, , , , , ,
_i t i m i t s i t h i t l i t i tr MKTRF SMB HML LIQ VD E E E E H      , (FF+PS) 
, , , ,i t i m i t l i t i tr MKTRF LIQD E E H    . (LCAPM) 
In this research, we prefer the results from the net returns of VWPOF, because the 
performance of VWPOF informs us whether the aggregate wealth invested in funds 
can add value, which is of most concern to mass investors. Hence, we primarily report 
the results of the intercepts in various model regressions for VWPOF at net return 
level. 
Table 7.1 presents the annualized intercepts46, t-statistics, and p-values for the 
intercepts for various models estimated on value-weighted (VW) and equally-weighted 
(EW) net returns on the portfolio of actively managed equity funds. Also, this table 
shows the regression slopes (ȕBPNW, ȕBsmb, ȕBhml, ȕBpr1yr, ȕBliq_v, and ȕBliq, for 
MKTRF, SMB, HML, PR1YR, LIQ_V, and LIQ factor, respectively), t-statistics, and 
p-values for the slopes, and the regression 2R . 
In Panel A of Table 7.1, the intercepts summarize the performance of aggregate 
wealth invested in funds (VWPOF) relative to passive benchmarks. At first glance, the 
fund performance is poor. The annualized intercepts of the first four models are all 
negative, ranging from -0.721% to -1.057% per year, with t-statistics from -2.37 to 
-3.23. These results are in line with pervious work47 and are especially consistent with 
the results of Fama and French (2010). These significant negative alphas tell us that, 
                                                        
46
 The annualized intercepts are approximately obtained by multiplying monthly alpha (i.e. the original intercept) 
by 12. 
47
 Such as Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), and Gruber (1996). 
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on average, actively managed equity funds do not have the ability to generate 
sufficient returns to cover the costs and expenses. However, the result from Liu 
LCAPM is a different story. Not only is the model¶s intercept negative nearly zero 
(-0.116% per year), but also its t-statistic is insignificant (only -0.34). The fund 
performance being insignificantly different from zero indicates that the aggregate 
portfolio of funds mimics the performance of benchmarks. Furthermore, for EWPOF 
(in Panel B), the annualized intercepts of conventional models are still negative, but 
the LCAPM¶s yearly alpha becomes positive at 0.768% with t-statistic of 1.35. 
The market slopes (ȕBPNW) in Table 7.1 are close to 1.0, ranging from 0.942 to 
1.023. That is not surprising since our sample is actively managed equity funds that 
invest primarily in U.S. stocks. The SMB slopes (ȕBsmb) for VWPOF are around at 
0.06, which is smaller than that in EWPOF (around 0.18). Fama and French (2010) 
also discover a similar phenomenon. It can be inferred that the smaller funds show 
more tilt toward small stocks, but total dollars invested in actively managed equity 
funds (i.e. captured by returns of VWPOF) have little tilt to small stocks. In Panel A, 
the slopes of HML and PR1YR are significant negative and positive, respectively, 
which indicates that actively managed equity funds prefer to invest in growth stocks 
and prior 1-year winner stocks. As to the liquidity risk factor (LIQ_V in FF+PS) and 
liquidity factor (LIQ in the LCAPM), the slope of liquidity risk (ȕBliq_v) is negative at 
-0.011 insignificantly, whereas the slope of liquidity factor (ȕBliq) is also negative at 
-0.079, but with significant (t-statistic is -7.93). Apparently, actively managed equity 
funds are likely to invest in stocks with less liquid risk, as well as more liquid stocks. 
Furthermore, we discover that Liu¶s liquidity factor (LIQ) not only grasps the liquidity 
risk but also has much significant than liquidity risk factor (LIQ_V). Therefore, in this 
thesis, we focus the relation between fund excess return and Liu¶s liquidity factors 
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(LIQ) through the estimated coefficients on liquidity factor. 
All facts above tell us two different stories. The first is, based on the first four 
models, actively managed equity funds as a whole underperforms the benchmarks. In 
contrast, based on the Liu LCAPM, equity funds in aggregate hold a portfolio mimics 
the performance of benchmarks. These results echo our expectations. The 
underperformance of funds in the first story is, we suggest, due to the liquidity factor 
not having been properly considered in the earlier models.48 In contrast, the funds¶ 
mimicking the performance of benchmarks in the second story is attributed to having 
considered the fund liquidity requirements in Liu LCAPM. 
Earlier academic research based on conventional asset pricing models gave less 
consideration to the impact of a liquidity factor on fund performance. In research on 
mutual funds, we have to accept that fund managers need to hold a large quantity of 
highly liquid stocks for providing liquidity to investors and handling possible share 
redemptions. We have revealed that the estimated coefficients on liquidity risk factor 
in FF+PS and liquidity factor in Liu LCAPM are both negative. Thus, the less liquidity 
risk or the more liquid for a portfolio of funds, the less excess returns. To a large extent, 
the fund performance is affected adversely by fund liquidity requirements.  
                                                        
48
 Although the Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS) considers the liquidity risk factor, the effect of 
liquidity risk is much weak. Its slope is only -0.011 with t-statistics -1.57 in our research. 
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Table 7.1 
Intercepts and Slopes in Asset Pricing Models for Portfolio of Funds 
The table reports the annualized intercepts (monthly alphah12), t-statistics and p-values for the 
intercepts for various models (CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model - FF3F, Carhart four-factor 
model - FF+Mom, Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model - FF+PS, and Liu liquidity-augmented 
two-factor model - LCAPM) estimated on value-weighted (VW) and equally-weighted (EW) net returns 
on the portfolios of actively managed equity funds in our sample. Also this table shows the regression 
slopes (ȕBPNW, ȕBsmb, ȕBhml, ȕB pr1yr, ȕBliq_v, and ȕBliq, for MKTRF, SMB, HML, PR1YR, LIQ_V, 
and LIQ, respectively), t-statistics and p-value for the slopes, and the regression 2R . Panel A presents 
the intercepts and slopes in various asset pricing models for value-weighted portfolio of actively 
managed equity funds. Panel B shows the intercepts and slopes in various asset pricing models for 
equally-weighted portfolios of actively managed equity funds. 
Model Į\HDUO\ ȕBPNW ȕBVPE ȕBKPO ȕBSU\U ȕBOLTBY ȕBOLT R^2
coef -1.057% 0.997 0.987 
t -statistic -2.98 152.07
p-value 0.0031 <0.0001
coef -0.773% 0.974 0.062 -0.047 0.991 
t -statistic -2.54 158.2 7.54 -4.83
p-value 0.0115 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
coef -0.995% 0.978 0.061 -0.043 0.018 0.991 
t -statistic -3.23 158.14 7.47 -4.44 3.12
p-value 0.0014 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.002
coef -0.721% 0.976 0.062 -0.045 -0.011 0.991 
t -statistic -2.37 157.51 7.53 -4.63 -1.57
p-value 0.0186 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1167
coef -0.116% 0.945 -0.079 0.990 
t -statistic -0.34 106.49 -7.93 
p-value 0.7362 <0.0001 <0.0001
coef -0.694% 1.023 0.969 
t -statistic -1.2 95.34
p-value 0.2324 <0.0001
coef -0.580% 0.995 0.179 -0.006 0.984 
t -statistic -1.38 117.13 15.75 -0.48
p-value 0.1673 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.6291
coef -0.697% 0.997 0.178 -0.004 0.009 0.984 
t -statistic -1.62 115.24 15.67 -0.32 1.17 
p-value 0.1065 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.746 0.2414
coef -0.471% 0.997 0.178 -0.003 -0.024 0.984 
t -statistic -1.13 117.45 15.82 -0.21 -2.43
p-value 0.2605 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.8353 0.0155
coef 0.768% 0.942 -0.122 0.973 
t -statistic 1.35 64.2 -7.45
p-value 0.1768 <0.0001 <0.0001
Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor 
model (FF+PS)
Liu liquidity-augmented two-
factor model (LCAPM)
Panel A: Value-Weigted Portfolios of Funds (VWPOF)
CAPM
Fama-French three-factor 
modelǂ(FF3F)
Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom)
Panel B: Equal-Weigted Portfolios of Funds (EWPOF)
Liu liquidity-augmented two-
factor model (LCAPM)
CAPM
Fama-French three-factor 
modelǂ(FF3F)
Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom)
Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor 
model (FF+PS)
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7.2. Bootstrap Evaluation of Fund Performance 
7.2.1. Normality of Individual Funds 
Before conducting our bootstrap evaluation, we analyze the distribution of 
individual funds residuals generated by the five asset pricing models (CAPM, FF3F, 
FF+Mom, FF+PS, and LCAPM) respectively: 
, ,i t i i t i tr MKTRFD E H   , (CAPM) 
, , , , ,i t i m i t s i t h i t i tr MKTRF SMB HMLD E E E H     , (FF3F) 
, , , , , ,
1i t i m i t s i t h i t p i t i tr MKTRF SMB HML PR YRD E E E E H      , (FF+Mom) 
, , , , , ,
_i t i m i t s i t h i t l i t i tr MKTRF SMB HML LIQ VD E E E E H      , (FF+PS) 
, , , ,i t i m i t l i t i tr MKTRF LIQD E E H    . (LCAPM) 
In the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality,49 the p-value of W test is based on the 
assumption that the distribution is normal. In this study, if the p-value is less than 0.05 
(i.e. at 5% significance level), we reject the null hypothesis that the residual is 
normally distributed. Kosowski et al. (2006) find that normality is rejected for 48% of 
funds when using Carhart four-factor model. In our tests, the normality is rejected for 
59.3%, 48.7%, 43.5%, 47.6%, and 55.4% of funds when using five models above, 
respectively. 
Also we find that residuals from funds in the extreme tails (best funds and worst 
funds) tend to exhibit higher variance and a greater degree of non-normality than 
residuals from funds closer to the centre of the performance distribution. This is 
exceptionally evident in Figures 7.1 to 7.5 which show the bootstrap histograms and 
kernel density estimate of t-statistics of alpha, t(alpha), at selected points of the 
performance distribution. These figures vividly illustrates that, although funds in the 
                                                        
49
 Although Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramer-von Mises, and Anderson-Darling tests are provided, Shapiro-Wilk 
W test will be appropriate for our research, since the number of observations of each fund at most is 300, which is 
considerably less than 2000. 
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centre (top or bottom 10% and 20% funds) of the performance distribution may exhibit 
near normal idiosyncratic risks, those in each of the tails (top or bottom 1, 1%, and 5% 
funds) are not normally distributed. This strong finding of non-normal residuals (i.e. 
roughly half of funds have alphas are drawn from a distinctly non-normal distribution) 
challenges the validity of earlier research that relies on normality assumptions. 
Accordingly, this phenomenon strongly indicates the need to bootstrap simulation, 
especially in the tails, to determine whether significant performance is due to fund 
manager¶s ability or to luck alone. 
7.2.2. Bootstrap 1 ± Residual-Only Resampling 
By applying the residual-only resampling method, we analyze the significance of 
actively managed equity fund performance, especially the t-statistics of alpha, t(alpha). 
We rank all equity funds in our sample on their ex-post t(alpha), and report the main 
findings through a residual-only resampling bootstrap evaluation procedure. Panels A 
to E of Table 7.2 show the results for actively managed equity funds for each of these 
five asset pricing models. The first row in each panel reports the ex-post, actual, 
t(alpha) for various points and percentiles of performance distribution, ranking from 
worst fund (bottom) to best fund (top). The second row presents the associated alpha 
for these t-statistics. Row three and row four report the parametric (standard) p-values 
and bootstrapped p-values of the t-statistics based on 1000 bootstrap resamples.  
It is important to note that our bootstrap results reported in Table 7.2 are based on 
the t-statistic of the estimated alpha, which is a measure of fund performance better 
than the estimated alpha itself. The t-statistic can scale alpha by its standard error, 
which tends to be larger for shorter-lived funds and for funds that take higher levels of 
risk. Hence, the distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics in the tails is likely to reveal 
better properties than the distribution of bootstrapped alpha. Moreover, for each ranked 
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fund we compare bootstrapped p-values (p-boot) with parametric standard p-values 
(p-value) that correspond to the t-statistics of these individual ranked funds. 
Overall, the results in Panel A of Table 7.2 show that funds with t(alpha) ranked 
in the top 10th percentile and above generally exhibit significant bootstrapped p-values 
using CAPM. For FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS (in Panels B, C, and D), only the top 
5th percentile and above present significant outperformance. Once again, the Liu 
LCAPM provides a contrast: in Panel E, using LCAPM, the funds with significant 
outperformance are extended to top 20th percentile and above. In this study, whether a 
fund achieves significant performance is estimated at a 10% significance level. That 
indicates the funds with bootstrapped p-values less than 0.100 have significant 
outperformance in right tails. Since these funds¶ bootstrapped p-values are so small 
that the null hypothesis (underperform the benchmarks) is rejected, we can conclude 
these fund managers achieve outperformance through true stock-picking skill, rather 
than luck alone. 
Another important point is that the inference from our cross-section bootstrap 
(bootstrapped p-value) differs from the standard normal assumption (parametric 
standard p-value). Our top funds have bootstrapped p-values that are lower than their 
parametric p-values for all five models. Let us use the top 20th percentile fund in the 
LCAPM as an example, at a 10% significance level, using parametric standard p-value 
(of 0.163) we cannot reject the null hypothesis for this fund, whereas we can reject it if 
using bootstrapped p-value (of 0.082). Apparently, under the earlier method, this fund 
underperforms the benchmark, whilst it does possess stock-picking skill under 
bootstrap analysis. 
When examining funds below the median, using a null hypothesis that these funds 
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do not underperform their benchmarks,50 we do not find all bootstrapped p-values 
strongly reject this null as Kosowski et al. (2006) claim. As can be seen in Panel A of 
Table 7.2, using the LCAPM, no funds between the top 30th and bottom 30th 
percentiles exhibit t-statistics sufficient to beat their benchmark, and bottom 20th 
percentile and below have significantly negative t-statistics, which indicates that these 
funds may very well be inferior to their benchmark. Using the other models, we obtain 
the similar results, that is, around bottom 30th or 20th percentile and below are truly 
unskilled, which means these funds¶ inferior performance is not due to the bad luck. 
Although the results of these asset pricing models are similar in left tails (bottom 
funds), the results in right tails (top funds) differ markedly and deserve further 
discussion. When using the FF3F and FF+Mom, only top 5th percentile and above 
exhibit outperformance, which is similar to the findings of Kosowski et al. (2006). 
However, using the LCAPM, the top 20th percentile and above exhibit significant 
outperformance. Roughly, 15% of sample funds, around 360 funds, move to skilled 
from lucky if we use the LCAPM instead of FF3F or FF+Mom. Apparently, after 
considering the liquidity factor, the performances of equity funds are improved 
markedly. That echoes our expectation again. For whatever reason, fund managers 
holding a great amount of highly liquid stocks will adversely impact fund performance. 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that liquidity is an important and non-negligible 
determinant in the evaluation of fund performance. 
                                                        
50
 The null hypothesis is different for the top funds and the bottom funds. For the former, the null hypothesis is 
0 : 0, : 0i A iH HD Dd ! ; and for the latter, the null hypothesis is 0 : 0, : 0i A iH HD Dt  . 
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Table 7.2 
Residual-Only Resampling Bootstrap Results of Entire Actively Managed Equity Fund Sample 
The table reports the statistics for actively managed equity funds during 1984 to 2008 for various asset pricing models. Panels A, B, C, D, and E show statistics 
from the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS), and Liu 
liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM), respectively. The first row in each panel reports the ex-post t-statistics of alpha, t(alpha), for various points and 
percentiles of performance distribution, ranking from worst fund (bottom) to best fund (top). The second row presents the associated alpha for these t-statistics. The 
third and fourth rows report the parametric (standard) p-values and bootstrapped p-values of the t-statistics based on 1000 bootstrap residual-only resamples. 
bottom 3 5 1% 3% 5% 10% 20% 30% 40% mdian 40% 30% 20% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5 3 top
t (alpha) -6.424 -4.364 -4.264 -3.656 -3.009 -2.536 -2.015 -1.365 -0.946 -0.568 -0.219 0.137 0.446 0.786 1.297 1.776 2.110 2.705 3.865 3.969 6.289
alpha -0.04% -0.64% -1.44% -1.96% -0.27% -0.27% -1.11% -0.16% -0.17% -0.09% -0.07% 0.05% 0.11% 0.64% 0.28% 0.44% 0.23% 0.48% 1.45% 0.63% 4.36%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.013 0.048 0.176 0.345 0.573 0.827 0.892 0.656 0.435 0.197 0.078 0.038 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
p- boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.016 0.092 0.197 0.276 0.412 0.438 0.350 0.217 0.083 0.039 0.018 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
t (alpha) -6.269 -4.719 -4.464 -3.684 -3.031 -2.798 -2.205 -1.650 -1.225 -0.882 -0.561 -0.215 0.117 0.557 1.058 1.597 1.923 2.564 3.775 3.980 7.035
alpha -0.04% -0.31% -0.75% -0.40% -0.60% -1.15% -0.31% -0.33% -0.19% -0.18% -0.08% -0.04% 0.02% 0.09% 0.33% 0.26% 0.09% 0.54% 0.60% 2.41% 4.04%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.029 0.101 0.225 0.379 0.575 0.830 0.907 0.578 0.292 0.112 0.055 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
p- boot 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.047 0.099 0.178 0.314 0.417 0.432 0.278 0.138 0.062 0.033 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000
t (alpha) -6.181 -4.596 -4.318 -3.489 -2.925 -2.715 -2.167 -1.630 -1.240 -0.914 -0.608 -0.297 0.065 0.457 1.035 1.514 1.823 2.504 3.369 3.508 6.746
alpha -0.04% -0.89% -0.35% -0.64% -1.24% -0.24% -0.68% -0.47% -0.09% -0.23% -0.21% -0.12% 0.01% 0.15% 0.67% 0.17% 0.47% 0.20% 0.71% 3.38% 3.91%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.032 0.113 0.216 0.364 0.546 0.767 0.948 0.649 0.304 0.134 0.071 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.000
p- boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.054 0.094 0.187 0.286 0.408 0.471 0.295 0.124 0.065 0.024 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
t (alpha) -5.894 -4.523 -4.434 -3.591 -2.947 -2.693 -2.142 -1.593 -1.173 -0.828 -0.498 -0.185 0.179 0.569 1.178 1.697 1.995 2.675 3.700 4.306 7.257
alpha -0.04% -0.30% -0.19% -0.29% -0.60% -0.52% -0.55% -0.36% -0.07% -0.60% -0.26% -0.05% 0.09% 0.11% 0.28% 0.34% 0.66% 0.38% 3.76% 2.61% 4.28%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.035 0.118 0.242 0.413 0.621 0.853 0.859 0.571 0.241 0.093 0.048 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000
p- boot 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.014 0.056 0.108 0.237 0.300 0.396 0.447 0.282 0.100 0.047 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
t (alpha) -6.649 -4.617 -4.280 -3.507 -2.928 -2.605 -2.095 -1.440 -0.924 -0.441 0.029 0.452 0.905 1.400 2.034 2.517 2.840 3.483 4.317 4.425 6.190
alpha -0.04% -0.29% -0.56% -0.48% -0.55% -0.51% -0.30% -0.81% -0.13% -0.11% 0.01% 0.42% 0.75% 0.42% 0.56% 0.63% 1.09% 0.46% 1.17% 1.13% 4.50%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.040 0.159 0.357 0.661 0.977 0.654 0.369 0.163 0.044 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
p- boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.019 0.074 0.185 0.327 0.482 0.308 0.180 0.082 0.024 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel E: Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor Model (LCAPM)
Panel A: CAPM
Panel B: Fama-French three-factor Model (FF3F)
Panel C: Carhart four-factor Model (FF+Mom)
Panel D: Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor Model (FF+PS)
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Figure 7.1  
Estimated t vs. Boostrapped t Distributions using CAPM 
This figure plots histograms and kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha 
(under H0: alpha=0) at various points in the upper end (Panels A1 - A4) and lower end (Panels B1 - B4) 
of the performance distribution using CAPM. The x-axis shows the t-statistics of alpha, and the y-axis 
shows the frequency of histogram. The ex-post (actual) t-statistics are indicated by the black solid 
vertical line (the number is in parentheses), and the kernel density estimate is indicated by the red curve 
line. Panels A1 - A4 show marginal fund in the right tail of the distribution. Panels B1 - B4 show 
marginal funds in the left tail of the distribution.  
           Panel A1: Top Fund  (6.29)                            Panel B1: Bottom Fund  (-6.42) 
                
Panel A2: Top 1% Fund  (2.70)                        Panel B2: Bottom 1% Fund  (-3.66) 
               
Panel A3: Top 5% Fund  (1.78)                        Panel B3: Bottom 5% Fund  (-2.54) 
                
Panel A4: Top 10% Fund  (1.30)                       Panel B4: Bottom 10% Fund  (-2.01) 
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Figure 7.2  
Estimated t vs. Boostrapped t Distributions using FF3F 
    This figure plots histograms and kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha 
(under H0: alpha=0) at various points in the upper end (Panels A1 - A4) and lower end (Panels B1 - B4) 
of the performance distribution using Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F). The x-axis shows the 
t-statistics of alpha, and the y-axis shows the frequency of histogram. The ex-post (actual) t-statistics are 
indicated by the black solid vertical line (the number is in parentheses), and the kernel density estimate 
is indicated by the red curve line. Panels A1 - A4 show marginal fund in the right tail of the distribution. 
Panels B1 - B4 show marginal funds in the left tail of the distribution. 
            Panel A1: Top Fund  (7.04)                          Panel B1: Bottom Fund  (-6.27) 
                
Panel A2: Top 1% Fund  (2.56)                       Panel B2: Bottom 1% Fund  (-3.68) 
                 
Panel A3: Top 5% Fund  (1.60)                       Panel B3: Bottom 5% Fund  (-2.80) 
                 
Panel A4: Top 10% Fund  (1.06)                       Panel B4: Bottom 10% Fund  (-2.21) 
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Figure 7.3  
Estimated t vs. Boostrapped t Distributions using FF+Mom 
    This figure plots histograms and kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha 
(under H0: alpha=0) at various points in the upper end (Panels A1 - A4) and lower end (Panels B1 - B4) 
of the performance distribution using Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom). The x-axis shows the 
t-statistics of alpha, and the y-axis shows the frequency of histogram. The ex-post (actual) t-statistics are 
indicated by the vertical black solid vertical line (the number is in parentheses), and the kernel density 
estimate is indicated by the red curve line. Panels A1 - A4 show marginal fund in the right tail of the 
distribution. Panels B1 - B4 show marginal funds in the left tail of the distribution.  
            Panel A1: Top Fund  (6.75)                            Panel B1: Bottom Fund  (-6.18) 
               
Panel A2: Top 1% Fund  (2.50)                        Panel B2: Bottom 1% Fund  (-3.49) 
                
Panel A3: Top 5% Fund  (1.51)                        Panel B3: Bottom 5% Fund  (-2.71) 
                 
Panel A4: Top 10% Fund  (1.03)                       Panel B4: Bottom 10% Fund  (-2.17) 
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Figure 7.4  
Estimated t vs. Boostrapped t Distributions using FF+PS 
    This figure plots histograms and kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha 
(under H0: alpha=0) at various points in the upper end (Panels A1 - A4) and lower end (Panels B1 - B4) 
of the performance distribution using Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS). The x-axis shows 
the t-statistics of alpha, and the y-axis shows the frequency of histogram. The ex-post (actual) t-statistics 
are indicated by the black solid vertical line (the number is in parentheses), and the kernel density 
estimate is indicated by the red curve line. Panels A1 - A4 show marginal fund in the right tail of the 
distribution. Panels B1 - B4 show marginal funds in the left tail of the distribution.  
             Panel A1: Top Fund  (7.26)                          Panel B1: Bottom Fund  (-5.89) 
                 
Panel A2: Top 1% Fund  (2.67)                       Panel B2: Bottom 1% Fund  (-3.59) 
                 
Panel A3: Top 5% Fund  (1.70)                       Panel B3: Bottom 5% Fund  (-2.69) 
                
Panel A4: Top 10% Fund  (1.18)                      Panel B4: Bottom 10% Fund  (-2.14) 
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Figure 7.5  
Estimated t vs. Boostrapped t Distributions using LCAPM 
    This figure plots histograms and kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha 
(under H0: alpha=0) at various points in the upper end (Panels A1 - A4) and lower end (Panels B1 - B4) 
of the performance distribution using Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM). The x-axis 
shows the t-statistics of alpha, and the y-axis shows the frequency of histogram. The ex-post (actual) 
t-statistics are indicated by the black solid vertical line (the number is in parentheses), and the kernel 
density estimate is indicated by the red curve line. Panels A1 - A4 show marginal fund in the right tail of 
the distribution. Panels B1 - B4 show marginal funds in the left tail of the distribution.  
            Panel A1: Top Fund  (6.19)                            Panel B1: Bottom Fund  (-6.65) 
                   
Panel A2: Top 1% Fund  (3.48)                        Panel B2: Bottom 1% Fund  (-3.51) 
                 
Panel A3: Top 10% Fund  (2.03)                       Panel B3: Bottom 10% Fund  (-2.09) 
                 
Panel A4: Top 20% Fund  (1.40)                        Panel B4: Bottom 20% Fund  (-1.44) 
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7.2.3. Bootstrap 2 ± Entire Cases Resampling 
In the context of model misspecification, the entire cases resampling (joint 
resampling) bootstrap method provides better estimates of the variability in the 
regression parameters. To develop perspective on the joint resampling, we follow the 
methods of Fama and French (2010): (i) compare the percentiles of the cross-section of 
t(alpha) estimates from actual fund returns and the average values of the percentiles 
from the simulations; (ii) turn to likelihood statements about whether the cross-section 
of t(alpha) estimates for actual fund returns points to the existence of skill. 
After estimating a benchmark model on the net returns of each fund, we attain a 
cross-section of t(alpha) estimates that can be ordered into a cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of t(alpha) estimates for actual fund returns. A joint resampling 
bootstrap simulation run for the same benchmark model also produce a cross-section 
of t(alpha) estimates and its CDF for a world where true alpha is zero. In our initial 
examination of the simulations, we compare the value t(alpha) at selected percentiles 
of the CDF of the t(alpha) estimates from actual fund returns and the averages across 
the 1000 simulations runs of the t(alpha) estimates at the same percentiles. To be 
specific, taking the 1st percentile, bottom 1%, in CAPM (Panel A of Table 7.3) as an 
example, the 1st percentile of the CAPM t(alpha) estimates for actual net returns is 
-3.66 (ACT). Whereas, the average 1st percentile from the 1000 simulation runs is 
-2.37 (SIM), after ranking funds by their simulated t(alpha) in each simulation run. 
Table 7.3 reports the CDF of t(alpha) at selected percentiles (PCT) of the 
distribution of t(alpha) estimates for actual (ACT) net fund returns and the average of 
the 1000 simulation CDFs (SIM). It can be seen that the average simulation CDFs are 
similar for various models (SIM are around -2.37 to -2.59 for 1st percentile and around 
2.33 to 2.55 for 99th percentile in various models). This is not surprising, since true 
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alpha is set to zero in the simulations. Moreover, the left tail percentile of the t(alpha) 
estimates from actual net fund returns are far below the corresponding average values 
from the simulations. For instance, the 10th percentiles of the actual t(alpha) estimates, 
-2.01, -2.21, -2.17, -2.14, and -2.09 for various models, are much more extreme than 
the average estimates from the simulation, -1.29, -1.30, -1.31, -1.30, and -1.38, 
whereas the right tails of the t(alpha) suggest the presence of skill sufficient to cover 
costs. In the tests that use the CAPM, the t(alpha) estimates from the actual net returns 
are above the average values from the simulations for all above 90th percentile. Using 
the FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS, only the 97th, 99th and 95th percentiles for actual net 
returns are above (slightly) the average simulation 97th, 99th, and 95th percentiles in 
each model. The evidence for skill sufficient to cover costs is even weaker with an 
adjustment for momentum exposure. In the tests that use FF+Mom, the percentiles of 
the t(alpha) estimates for actual net returns are nearly below the average values from 
the simulations. In other words, the averages of the percentile values of FF+Mom 
t(alpha) from the simulations of net returns, to a large extent, beat the corresponding 
percentiles of t(alpha) for the actual net returns. However, when we use the LCAPM, 
there is a glimmer of hope for investors in the tests on the net returns. The results from 
this model suggest widespread skill sufficient to cover costs after considering the 
adjustment for liquidity exposure. In the Panel E of Table 7.3, the 50th percentile for 
actual net return is above the average simulation 50th percentile. This indicates that half 
of fund managers have enough skill to produce expected benchmark adjusted net 
returns that cover costs if the liquidity factor is taken into account. 
Figure 7.6 plots kernel density estimate of the cumulative density function (CDF) 
of the distribution for these models. Red line and black line represent the actual and 
simulated cross-sectional distribution of the t-statistic of mutual fund alpha 
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respectively. In Panels B, C, and D, the percentiles of FF3F t(alpha), FF+Mom t(alpha), 
and FF+PS t(alpha) for actual net fund returns (red line) are almost all below the 
averages from the simulations (black line). However, in Panel E, only half of the 
percentiles of LCAPM t(alpha) for actual net fund returns are below the averages from 
the simulation, and the other half of the percentiles of LCAPM t(alpha) for actual net 
fund returns are above the averages from the simulation. The pictures of the actual and 
average simulated CDFs do confirm that almost half of mutual fund managers have 
genuine skill rather than luck if the liquidity factor is considered. 
Comparing the percentiles of t(alpha) estimates for actual fund returns with the 
simulation averages gives hints about whether fund manager skill affects expected 
returns in qualitative terms. In Table 7.3, we also offer likelihoods (%<ACT), that is 
specifically, the proportions of the 1000 simulation runs that produce lower values of 
t(alpha) than actual fund returns at selected percentiles. Fama and French (2010) claim 
that these likelihoods can judge more properly ³whether the tails of the cross-section of 
t(alpha) estimates for actual fund returns are extreme relative to what they observe 
when true alpha is zero´. 
The basic logic is that we can infer that some fund managers do lack skill 
sufficient to cover costs if a low proportion of the simulation runs produce left tail 
percentiles of t(alpha) below those from actual net fund returns. Similarly, we also 
infer that some fund managers do possess selection skill to yield benchmark-adjusted 
expected returns beyond costs if a large proportion of the simulation runs produce right 
tail percentiles of t(alpha) below those from actual fund returns. Nevertheless, there are 
two problems in drawing inferences from the likelihood: multiple comparisons issues 
and correlated likelihood for different percentiles. One approach to these problems is 
to focus on a given percentile of each tail of t(alpha), thus we focus on the extreme 
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tails, where performance is most likely to be identified.  
The likelihoods (%<ACT) in Panels A to D of Table 7.3 confirm that skill is rare 
in the right tail. Taking the FF3F as an example, the 90th percentile of the cross-section 
of t(alpha) estimates is 1.05, and the likelihood is 0.00%. That indicates nil of the 1000 
simulation runs for the 90th percentile t(alpha) estimates below 1.05. For the other 
three models: CAPM, FF+Mom, and FF+PS, the likelihood results are similar to those 
with the FF3F. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that most fund managers do not 
have sufficient skill to produce benchmark-adjusted net returns to cover costs if 
assessed in this way. The likelihoods for the most extreme right tail percentiles for 
these four models also confirm our earlier result that a few managers do have sufficient 
skill to cover costs. The 90th, 97th, 98th, and 95th percentiles of the cross section of 
t(alpha) estimates from actual net returns for these models are close to or above the 
average values of t(alpha) estimates from the simulations. In addition, 54.4% to 80.9% 
of the t(alpha) estimates from the 1000 simulation runs are below those from the actual 
net returns. However, the likelihoods (%<ACT) in Panel E provide us with a different 
result. Using the Liu LCAPM, the 50th percentile of the cross-section of t(alpha) 
estimates is 0.03, and the likelihood is 80.9%. This means almost four-fifths of the 
1000 simulation runs for the 50th percentile t(alpha) estimates below 0.03. Obviously, 
after considering the liquidity factor, we can conclude that roughly half of fund 
managers do have enough skill to produce benchmark-adjusted net returns to cover 
costs. The 90th percentile of the cross section of t(alpha) estimates from actual net 
returns is 2.03, which is far above the average values of t(alpha) estimates from the 
simulations 1.39. And 100% of the t(alpha) estimates from the 1000 simulation runs 
are below those from the actual net returns.  
The entire cases resampling (joint resampling) bootstrap simulation not only 
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relieves some problems of residual-only resampling,51 but also re-confirms the effect 
of a liquidity factor on fund performance. All in all, no matter which bootstrap 
simulation method is used, we find that few funds have enough skill to cover costs 
before the liquidity factor is taken into account, and the proportion of skilled funds 
increases strikingly after considering the liquidity exposure. Therefore, when 
evaluating the mutual fund performance, we propose that a liquidity-based model 
(such as LCAPM) could be used. 
 
                                                        
51
 Such as: the residual-only resampling simulation takes no account of the correlation of alpha estimates for 
different funds that arises because a benchmark model does not capture all common variation in fund returns. Also, 
it misses any effects of correlated movement in the volatilities of factor explanatory returns and residuals, as Fama 
and French (2010) declare. 
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Table 7.3 
Joint Resampling Bootstrap Results of Entire Actively Managed Equity Fund Sample 
The table reports the values of t(alpha) at selected percentiles (PCT) of the distribution of t(alpha) estimates for actual (ACT) net fund returns. The table also 
shows the percent of the 1000 simulation runs that produce lower values of t(alpha) at the selected percentiles than those observed for actual fund returns (%<ACT). 
SIM is the average value of t(alpha) at the selected percentiles from the simulation after ranking the funds by their simulated t(alpha) in each run. The time period is 
January 1984 to December 2008, and Panels A, B, C, D, and E show results for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom), Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS), and Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM), respectively.  
bottom 1% bottom 10% median top 10% top 1%
PCT 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 85% 90% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99%
SIM -2.37 -2.09 -1.90 -1.77 -1.66 -1.29 -1.04 -0.85 -0.53 -0.26 0.00 0.25 0.52 0.84 1.03 1.27 1.64 1.74 1.87 2.05 2.33
ACT -3.66 -3.26 -3.01 -2.78 -2.54 -2.01 -1.63 -1.36 -0.95 -0.57 -0.22 0.13 0.44 0.79 0.99 1.30 1.77 1.93 2.10 2.26 2.65
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 4.20 13.70 72.70 99.90 100.00 100.00 99.90 100.00
SIM -2.40 -2.11 -1.92 -1.78 -1.67 -1.30 -1.05 -0.85 -0.53 -0.26 -0.01 0.25 0.52 0.84 1.03 1.28 1.65 1.76 1.89 2.08 2.36
ACT -3.68 -3.29 -3.03 -2.91 -2.80 -2.21 -1.91 -1.65 -1.23 -0.88 -0.56 -0.22 0.11 0.56 0.78 1.05 1.59 1.73 1.92 2.12 2.50
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.10 26.70 66.30 76.80 95.40
SIM -2.44 -2.14 -1.94 -1.81 -1.69 -1.31 -1.06 -0.86 -0.53 -0.26 0.00 0.26 0.54 0.87 1.06 1.31 1.69 1.80 1.94 2.13 2.42
ACT -3.49 -3.23 -2.93 -2.82 -2.71 -2.17 -1.88 -1.63 -1.24 -0.91 -0.61 -0.30 0.06 0.46 0.68 1.03 1.50 1.66 1.82 2.13 2.48
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 54.40 78.70
SIM -2.41 -2.11 -1.92 -1.79 -1.68 -1.30 -1.05 -0.86 -0.53 -0.26 0.00 0.25 0.52 0.85 1.04 1.28 1.66 1.76 1.90 2.08 2.37
ACT -3.59 -3.18 -2.95 -2.80 -2.69 -2.14 -1.82 -1.59 -1.17 -0.83 -0.50 -0.19 0.18 0.57 0.85 1.18 1.70 1.84 1.99 2.20 2.66
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 80.90 95.20 96.10 97.60 100.00
SIM -2.59 -2.26 -2.06 -1.91 -1.79 -1.38 -1.11 -0.90 -0.56 -0.27 0.01 0.28 0.57 0.91 1.12 1.39 1.79 1.90 2.05 2.24 2.55
ACT -3.51 -3.12 -2.93 -2.73 -2.60 -2.09 -1.71 -1.44 -0.92 -0.44 0.03 0.45 0.90 1.41 1.64 2.03 2.52 2.66 2.82 3.05 3.46
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel E: Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM)
Panel A: CAPM
Panel B: Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F)
Panel C: Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom)
Panel D: Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS)
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Figure 7.6 
Simulated and Actual Cumulative Density Function of t(alpha) 
The figure plots kernel density estimate of the cumulative density function (CDF) of the 
distribution. Red line and black line show the actual and simulated cross-sectional distributions of the 
t-statistic of mutual fund alphas respectively. The alpha estimates are based on the CAPM, Fama-French 
three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model 
(FF+PS) and Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM) respectively, applied to the U.S. 
actively managed equity funds during 1984 to 2008 period.  
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Panel C: FF+Mom 
 t(alpha) 
 
Panel D: FF+PS 
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Panel E: LCAPM 
 t(alpha) 
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CHAPTER 8: ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
In this chapter, we report a series of sensitivity analyses to test whether our results 
are robust to changes of mutual fund sample (such as limiting funds that reach a given 
number $million in assets in order to lessen the effect of incubation, or changing a 
minimum fund return requirement from 36 to 60 months), or to the subperiods of 
research time period (such as separating the 25-year time period into two subperiods). 
In general, we demonstrate that our main findings in pervious chapters are robust to 
these changes in fund sample. 
 
8.1. Subsample Analysis 
  8.1.1 Fund Size Filter 
Commonly, fund management companies provide seed money to new funds to 
develop a return history. As Fama and French (2010) claim, the incubation bias arises 
because funds typically open to the public only if the returns turn out to be attractive, 
so that their pre-release returns are included in mutual fund databases. To alleviate the 
incubation bias, Fama and French (2010) limit their tests to funds that reach $5 million 
in assets, since the total net asset (TNA) is likely to be low during the pre-release 
period. Evans (2010) also applies a fund size filter to lessen the effects of incubation 
bias. He proposes filtering out incubated funds through removing funds below a 
certain size (typically $25 million), because the TNA filter of $25 million can remove 
nearly half of incubated funds. Thus, in this robustness test, we also require funds that 
reach $25 million in TNA. That is, a fund is included in all subsequent tests once it 
passes the TNA minimum ($25 million). This change provides us with a smaller 
sample of 2175 funds (as opposed to 2417 funds for original fund sample). 
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Accordingly, our new sample is the 2175 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds 
with at least $25 million in assets between 1984 and 2008 (hereafter, subsample 1). 
First of all, we examine the existence of liquidity premium at fund level in this 
subsample. Same as baseline tests, we sort funds into ten portfolios based on their 
FLMs (Liu¶s LM12 or Amihud¶s RtoV12). At the same time, we form a 
zero-investment portfolio L-H, consisting of long positions in the least liquid funds 
(Decile 10, L) and short positions in the most liquid funds (Decile 1, H). Panel A1 and 
Panel B1 of Table 8.1 reveal that there are not significant fund liquidity premium over 
the 1-month or 12-month holding periods, no matter fund portfolios are sorted by 
LM12 or RtoV12. As can be seen in Panel A1 (sorted by LM12), although the 
portfolio L-H discloses liquidity premium 0.179% per month for HPR1M and 3.003% 
per year for HPR12M, both are not significant (their t-statistics are only 0.91 and 1.08, 
respectively). The same results are shown in Panel B1 (sorted by RtoV12). Moreover, 
we also test fund liquidity premium by controlling for risk using various asset pricing 
models. Using the fund portfolios sorted by LM12 as an example, results in Panels A2 
to A6 of Table 8.1 all reveal that the liquidity premium at fund level is little to none 
after controlling for risks. As we can see, only the CAPM, FF+Mom, and FF+PS result 
in a liquidity premium (positive alpha for L-H). However, their t-statistics are very low, 
which indicates the liquidity premium is not significant. There are even negative alpha 
for portfolio L-H in the FF3F and LCAPM, which means no liquidity premium at all. 
Therefore, consistent with our previous baseline results, in this subsample, there is an 
absence of liquidity premium at fund level, no matter what fund liquidity measures are 
used for sorting, no matter what fund performances are examined (holding period 
returns or risk-adjusted performance). Our results for fund liquidity premium are 
robust to the change of mutual fund sample. 
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Second, we test the performance of portfolio of funds in the subsample 1. Here 
we only use value weighting to construct portfolio of equity mutual funds in each 
month, because the performance of value-weighed portfolio informs us whether the 
aggregate wealth invested in funds can add value. Table 8.2 presents the annualized 
intercepts, t-statistics, and p-values for the intercepts for various models estimated on 
value-weighted net returns on the portfolio of equity funds in this subsample. The 
intercepts (yearly alpha) in Table 8.2 summarize the performance of aggregate wealth 
invested in funds (value-weighed returns of portfolio of funds) relative to passive 
benchmarks. From the angle of the CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS, we find fund 
performance is poor. These models¶ annualized intercepts are negative, ranging from 
-0.722% to -1.058% per year, with t-statistics from -2.37 to -3.24. These significant 
negative alphas tell us on average actively managed equity funds have not the ability to 
generate sufficient returns to cover the costs and expenses. However the result from 
the LCAPM is totally different. Although the model¶s annualized intercept is negative 
at -0.118% per year, its t-statistic is only -0.34. That means the fund performance is 
insignificantly different with zero. In other words, the aggregate portfolio of funds is 
close to the benchmarks. Looking at the liquidity factors (LIQ in LCAPM), its slope 
(ȕBliq) is negative at -0.0788 with significant (t-statistic is -7.93). It is apparent that 
actively managed equity funds would like to invest in stocks with more liquidity. 
These results from our new subsample are almost identical to our previous findings. 
Thus, our results about performance of portfolio of funds are robust to the change of 
mutual fund sample. 
Third, by applying the residual-only resampling bootstrap method, we analyze the 
significance of actively managed equity fund performance (especially the t-statistics of 
alpha). In this subsample, we rank them on their ex-post t-statistics of alpha, and report 
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the main findings through residual-only resampling bootstrap evaluation procedure. 
Table 8.3 shows the results for actively managed equity funds in this subsample for 
each of three typical asset pricing models.52 Since top funds¶ bootstrapped p-values 
are so small as to reject the null hypothesis (do not outperform the benchmarks), we 
can conclude these fund managers achieve outperformance through true stock-picking 
skill, rather than luck alone. Moreover, the results in Panels A and B show that funds 
with t-statistic of alpha ranked in the top 5th percentile and above generally exhibit 
significant bootstrapped p-values using FF3F and FF+Mom. Using the LCAPM (in 
Panel C), the funds with significant outperformance are extended to top 20th percentile 
and above. Obviously, the results in right tails (top funds) still are much different for 
different models, which deserve further discussion. Approximately, there are 15% of 
sample funds move to skilled from lucky if we use LCAPM instead of FF3F and 
FF+Mom. Apparently, after considering liquidity factor, the performances of equity 
funds are improved markedly. These results also are identical to our baseline results. 
Finally, we evaluate the fund performance through resampling entire cases (joint 
resampling) in this subsample. Table 8.4 reports the CDF of t(alpha) at selected 
percentiles (PCT) of the distribution of t(alpha) estimates for actual (ACT) net fund 
returns and the average of the 1000 simulation CDF (SIM). In the tests that use the 
FF3F (in Panel A), the t(alpha) estimates from the actual net returns are above the 
average values from the simulations for only above 99th percentile. Using the FF+Mom 
(in Panel B), the percentile of the t(alpha) estimates for actual net fund returns are 
always below the average values from the simulations. In other words, the average of 
the percentile values of FF+Mom t(alpha) from the simulations always beats the 
corresponding percentiles of t(alpha) for actual. Thus, the evidence of skill sufficient to 
                                                        
52
 In this section, we just use the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), 
and Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM) as typical models, for brevity. 
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cover costs is even weaker with an adjustment for momentum exposure. However, the 
results with the LCAPM suggest widespread skill sufficient to cover costs after 
considering the adjustment for liquidity exposure. In Panel C of Table 8.4, the 50th 
percentile for actual net return is above the average simulation 50th percentile. This 
indicates that half of fund managers have enough skill to produce expected benchmark 
adjusted net returns that cover costs if the liquidity factor is considered. Lastly, 
comparing the percentiles of t(alpha) estimates for actual fund returns with the 
simulation averages gives hints about whether fund manager skill affects expected 
returns in qualitative terms. In Table 8.4, the %<ACT of the FF3F and FF+Mom 
confirm that skill is rare in the right tail, because only the %<ACT of the 99th 
percentile of the cross-section of t(alpha) estimates in Panel A is more than 50%. It 
seems safe to conclude that the majority of fund managers do not have enough skill to 
produce returns to cover costs. However, in Panel C, using the LCAPM, the %<ACT is 
53.10% for the 50th percentile of the cross-section of t(alpha) estimates. This means 
more than half of the 1000 simulation runs for the 50th percentile t(alpha) estimates 
below the actual fund returns. Obviously, after considering the liquidity factor, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that roughly half of fund managers do have enough skill 
to produce benchmark-adjusted net returns to cover costs. Using this joint resampling 
bootstrap in this subsample, the result is also same to our previous baseline findings.  
For this subsample, we examine the existence of fund liquidity premium and test 
the performance of portfolio of funds. To sum up, the results for fund liquidity 
premium and fund performance of the subsample are almost identical to our baseline 
results. It is demonstrated that our main findings are robust to the change of the fund 
size requirement. 
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Table 8.1 
Liquidity Premium of Fund Portfolios Sorted by LM12 (RtoV12) in the Subsample 1 
The table reports the results for our 2175 actively managed U.S. equity funds with at least $25 
million during the period 1984 to 2008. Panel A shows the holding period returns and risk-adjusted 
performance of the LM12-sorted fund portfolios; Panel B represents the holding period returns and 
risk-adjusted performance of the RtoV12-sorted fund portfolios. 1 (H) denotes the lowest LM12 
(RtoV12) decile portfolio, i.e. the most liquid decile. 10 (L) denotes the highest LM12 (RtoV12) decile 
portfolio, i.e. the least liquid decile. L-H denotes the difference between L and H deciles. 
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
HPR1M 0.704% 0.787% 0.787% 0.782% 0.786% 0.808% 0.806% 0.889% 0.923% 0.882% 0.179%
t-statistics 1.88 2.77 3.05 2.99 2.99 3.00 3.03 3.15 3.14 3.19 0.91
HPR12M 8.755% 10.379% 10.964% 10.425% 10.587% 10.847% 11.162% 10.818% 11.411% 11.759% 3.003%
t-statistics 1.82 2.62 2.95 2.79 2.93 2.95 3.01 2.89 3.00 3.13 1.08
Į -0.299% -0.104% -0.069% -0.084% -0.078% -0.060% -0.053% 0.002% 0.025% 0.023% 0.322%
t-statistics -1.74 -1.27 -1.42 -2.00 -1.46 -0.85 -0.68 0.03 0.24 0.21 1.77
Į -0.082% -0.063% -0.087% -0.112% -0.102% -0.082% -0.088% 0.063% 0.059% -0.085% -0.003%
t-statistics -0.68 -0.87 -1.80 -2.71 -1.91 -1.16 -1.13 0.99 0.95 -1.44 -0.02
Į -0.142% -0.135% -0.099% -0.115% -0.084% -0.061% -0.045% 0.009% 0.009% -0.050% 0.092%
t-statistics -1.15 -1.85 -1.99 -2.68 -1.53 -0.83 -0.56 0.15 0.14 -0.83 0.61
Į -0.115% -0.090% -0.105% -0.104% -0.083% -0.050% -0.058% 0.092% 0.095% -0.069% 0.046%
t-statistics -0.96 -1.25 -2.19 -2.51 -1.58 -0.72 -0.75 1.49 1.59 -1.17 0.31
Į 0.222% 0.052% -0.019% -0.066% -0.068% -0.053% -0.059% 0.186% 0.258% 0.076% -0.146%
t-statistics 1.38 0.62 -0.37 -1.49 -1.19 -0.71 -0.71 2.24 2.50 0.65 -0.82
HPR1M 0.745% 0.731% 0.754% 0.737% 0.805% 0.863% 0.872% 0.892% 0.870% 0.885% 0.141%
t-statistics 2.92 2.84 3.00 2.90 2.96 3.04 2.98 2.84 2.81 2.98 0.88
HPR12M 9.586% 9.321% 9.791% 10.295% 10.893% 11.222% 11.079% 11.862% 11.224% 11.784% 2.198%
t-statistics 2.43 2.46 2.62 2.85 2.80 2.96 2.81 2.91 2.88 2.99 0.80
Į -0.105% -0.129% -0.095% -0.117% -0.080% -0.036% -0.038% -0.040% -0.054% -0.002% 0.103%
t-statistics -2.20 -3.88 -3.26 -3.74 -1.79 -0.55 -0.50 -0.36 -0.49 -0.02 0.65
Į -0.027% -0.091% -0.097% -0.126% -0.072% -0.019% -0.021% 0.011% -0.051% -0.088% -0.061%
t-statistics -0.78 -3.29 -3.69 -4.09 -1.66 -0.35 -0.35 0.17 -0.86 -1.41 -0.73
Į -0.032% -0.090% -0.087% -0.114% -0.082% -0.047% -0.057% -0.067% -0.077% -0.055% -0.023%
t-statistics -0.90 -3.17 -3.24 -3.61 -1.85 -0.84 -0.95 -1.08 -1.28 -0.87 -0.27
Į -0.023% -0.088% -0.092% -0.121% -0.069% -0.012% -0.008% 0.023% -0.030% -0.067% -0.044%
t-statistics -0.66 -3.15 -3.50 -3.91 -1.59 -0.22 -0.14 0.36 -0.51 -1.08 -0.53
Į -0.036% -0.096% -0.091% -0.101% 0.014% 0.122% 0.152% 0.256% 0.197% 0.111% 0.147%
t-statistics -0.73 -2.73 -2.92 -3.04 0.30 1.89 2.02 2.37 1.78 0.84 0.87
Panel A: Sorted by LM12                                   Panel A1: Holding Period Returns
Panel A2: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel A4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel B5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel B6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel A6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B: Sorted by RtoV12                                 Panel B1: Holding Period Returns
Panel B2: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel B4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
 
Chapter 8                                                          Robustness Tests 
 131 
Table 8.2 
Performance of Portfolio of Funds in the Subsample 1 
The table reports the annualized intercepts (monthly alphah12), t-statistics and p-values for the 
intercepts for a series of models estimated on value-weighted (VW) net returns on the portfolios in the 
subsample (actively managed U.S. equity funds with at least $25 million during the period 1984 to 
2008).  
Model Į\HDUO\ ȕBPNW ȕBVPE ȕBKPO ȕBSU\U ȕBOLTBY ȕBOLT R^2
coef -1.058% 0.9928 0.987 
t -statistic -2.99 152.17
p-value 0.003 <0.0001
coef -0.773% 0.9744 0.0618 -0.0465 0.991 
t -statistic -2.54 158.17 7.51 -4.83
p-value 0.0115 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
coef -0.996% 0.9781 0.0604 -0.0426 0.0179 0.991 
t -statistic -3.24 158.12 7.44 -4.44 3.13
p-value 0.0014 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.002
coef -0.722% 0.9756 0.0615 -0.0448 -0.0112 0.991 
t -statistic -2.37 157.47 7.49 -4.63 -1.57
p-value 0.0185 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1186
coef -0.118% 0.9452 -0.0788 0.990 
t -statistic -0.34 106.56 -7.93 
p-value 0.7319 <0.0001 <0.0001
Liu liquidity-augmented two-
factor model (LCAPM)
CAPM
Fama-French three-factor 
model (FF3F)
Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom)
Pastor-Stambaugh four-
factor model (FF+PS)
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Table 8.3 
Residual-Only Resampling Bootstrap Results of the Subsample 1 
The table reports the statistics for actively managed equity mutual funds with at least $25 million in assets during 1984 to 2008 for each of three typical asset 
pricing models. Panels A, B, and C show statistics from the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), and Liu 
liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM), respectively. The first row in each panel reports the ex-post t-statistics of alpha for various points and 
percentiles of performance distribution, ranking from worst fund (bottom) to best fund (top). The second row presents the associated alpha for these t-statistics. 
The third and fourth rows report the parametric (standard) p-values and bootstrapped p-values of the t-statistics based on 1000 bootstrap residual-only resamples. 
bottom 3 5 1% 3% 5% 10% 20% 30% 40% mdian 40% 30% 20% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5 3 top
t -stat -4.915 -4.464 -4.211 -3.667 -3.079 -2.782 -2.205 -1.628 -1.218 -0.867 -0.539 -0.222 0.112 0.539 1.009 1.542 1.768 2.474 3.623 3.775 4.658
alpha -0.20% -0.75% -1.09% -0.36% -0.94% -0.74% -0.31% -0.26% -0.21% -0.15% -0.09% -0.18% 0.02% 0.11% 0.16% 0.32% 0.20% 0.43% 1.85% 0.60% 2.48%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.029 0.108 0.224 0.388 0.592 0.828 0.911 0.591 0.315 0.124 0.081 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.000
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.019 0.040 0.113 0.215 0.308 0.449 0.441 0.294 0.174 0.058 0.042 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
t -stat -4.944 -4.587 -4.246 -3.545 -2.955 -2.676 -2.194 -1.630 -1.233 -0.913 -0.613 -0.299 0.055 0.414 0.984 1.452 1.751 2.310 3.006 3.369 4.537
alpha -0.20% -1.08% -1.88% -0.19% -0.52% -0.46% -0.24% -0.13% -0.19% -0.26% -0.17% -0.15% 0.01% 0.07% 0.21% 0.29% 0.55% 1.14% 0.82% 0.71% 3.81%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.029 0.104 0.219 0.366 0.543 0.766 0.956 0.681 0.328 0.150 0.081 0.037 0.003 0.001 0.000
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.016 0.040 0.103 0.174 0.268 0.388 0.463 0.343 0.187 0.065 0.046 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000
t -stat -4.765 -4.320 -4.143 -3.457 -2.941 -2.625 -2.092 -1.445 -0.927 -0.486 0.006 0.425 0.817 1.312 1.985 2.460 2.753 3.301 4.352 4.747 12.065
alpha -0.38% -0.79% -0.35% -0.45% -0.71% -1.10% -0.20% -0.16% -0.41% -0.10% 0.00% 0.07% 0.36% 0.39% 0.59% 0.58% 0.44% 1.08% 0.83% 1.07% 5.71%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.037 0.151 0.363 0.628 0.995 0.672 0.415 0.193 0.050 0.015 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.053
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.022 0.089 0.167 0.295 0.503 0.340 0.208 0.087 0.022 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
Panel A: FF3F
Panel B: FF+Mom
Panel C: LCAPM
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Table 8.4  
Joint Resampling Bootstrap Results of the Subsample 1 
The table reports the values of t(alpha) at selected percentiles (PCT) of the distribution of t(alpha) estimates for actual (ACT) net fund returns. The table also 
shows the percent of the 1000 simulation runs that produce lower values of t(alpha) at the selected percentiles than those observed for actual fund returns (%<ACT). 
SIM is the average value of t(alpha) at the selected percentiles from the simulation after ranking the funds by their simulated t(alpha) in each run. Panels A, B, and C 
show results for the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), and Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM), 
respectively. The subsample 1 is these 2175 actively managed equity mutual funds with at least $25 million in assets during January 1984 to December 2008. 
bottom 1% bottom 10% median top 10% top 1%
PCT 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 85% 90% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99%
SIM -2.43 -2.12 -1.93 -1.79 -1.68 -1.30 -1.05 -0.85 -0.53 -0.26 -0.01 0.24 0.52 0.84 1.03 1.28 1.65 1.76 1.90 2.08 2.35
ACT -3.67 -3.28 -3.08 -2.93 -2.78 -2.20 -1.89 -1.63 -1.22 -0.87 -0.54 -0.22 0.11 0.54 0.76 1.03 1.54 1.65 1.79 2.03 2.49
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.20 2.40 23.00 95.70
SIM -2.51 -2.17 -1.97 -1.83 -1.71 -1.32 -1.06 -0.86 -0.54 -0.26 0.00 0.26 0.53 0.86 1.06 1.31 1.69 1.80 1.94 2.13 2.41
ACT -3.56 -3.23 -2.96 -2.82 -2.68 -2.19 -1.88 -1.63 -1.23 -0.91 -0.61 -0.29 0.06 0.42 0.69 0.99 1.46 1.62 1.77 1.97 2.37
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 34.10
SIM -2.48 -2.15 -1.96 -1.81 -1.70 -1.31 -1.06 -0.86 -0.54 -0.26 -0.01 0.25 0.52 0.84 1.04 1.29 1.66 1.76 1.90 2.08 2.36
ACT -3.46 -3.12 -2.95 -2.76 -2.63 -2.09 -1.71 -1.44 -0.93 -0.49 0.01 0.42 0.82 1.31 1.57 1.99 2.46 2.60 2.75 2.97 3.30
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.10 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel C: LCAPM
Panel A: FF3F
Panel B: FF+Mom
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8.1.2 Fund Return Observations Requirement 
In our baseline measurement of mutual fund performance, a sample of funds 
which have at least 36 monthly return observations is used. Barras et al. (2010) show 
that there is no material impact on their main result, no matter which monthly return 
observation requirement is applied, 60 or 36 months. To check the robustness of our 
result, we repeat our analysis after adjusting the minimum fund return requirement 
from 36 to 60 months. We believe that any biases introduced from the 60-month 
requirement are minimal. This change provides us with a somewhat smaller sample of 
2013 funds, as opposed to 2417 funds for the original fund population. Thus, our new 
fund sample is the 2013 actively managed U.S. equity funds existing for at least 60 
months between 1984 and 2008 (hereafter, subsample 2). 
First, we examine the existence of fund liquidity premium in this subsample by 
sorting funds into ten portfolios based on their LM12 and RtoV12 respectively. Panel 
A1 and Panel B1 of Table 8.5 report the holding period returns (for 1 month and 12 
months) of each decile, and reveal that there are no significant liquidity premium over 
the 1-month or 12-month holding periods, no matter whether fund portfolios are sorted 
by LM12 or RtoV12. As we can see in Panel A1 (sorted by LM12), although the 
portfolio L-H discloses liquidity premium 0.218% per month for HPR1M and 3.669% 
per year for HPR12M, both of these are not significant (their t-statistics are only 1.11 
and 1.29, respectively). The same outcome is shown in Panel B1 (sorted by RtoV12). 
In addition, we also test fund liquidity premium by controlling for risk using various 
models. Among all results in Panels A2 to A6 (sorted by LM12) and Panels B2 to B6 
(sorted by RtoV12), almost all reveal that fund liquidity premium is little to none after 
controlling for risks, except for CAPM sorted by LM12 (in Panel A2). Although the 
CAPM alpha sorted by LM12 is significant positive (0.363% with t-statistic of 2.00), 
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the alphas in other models are around zero (from -0.114% to 0.172%) with very low 
t-statistics, which indicates the liquidity premium is not significant. Consistent with 
our previous baseline results, in the subsample 2 there is absence of fund liquidity 
premium.  
Second, we test the portfolio of funds performance in the subsample 2. Table 8.6 
presents the annualized intercepts, t-statistics, and p-values for the intercepts for 
various models estimated on value-weighted net returns on the portfolios of actively 
managed equity funds in this subsample. According to the annualized intercepts of the 
CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS, the fund performance is poor. In Table 8.6, they 
are negative, ranging from -0.771% to -1.051% per year, with significant t-statistics 
from -2.36 to -3.22, which tells us that, on average, actively managed equity funds lack 
the ability to generate sufficient returns to cover the costs and expenses. However the 
result from the LCAPM tells us a different story. Although the model¶s annualized 
intercepts are negative at -0.120% per year, its t-statistic is only -0.35. That means the 
fund performance is insignificantly different with zero. In other words, the aggregate 
portfolio of funds mimics the performance of benchmarks. These results from 
subsample 2 are almost the same to our previous findings, so we can say our results 
concerning performance of portfolio of funds are robust to the change of mutual fund¶s 
monthly return observation requirement. 
Third, we analyze the significance of actively managed equity fund performance 
(especially the t-statistics of alpha) by applying the residual-only resampling bootstrap 
method. Table 8.7 shows the results for actively managed equity funds in this 
subsample for FF3F, FF+Mom, and LCAPM respectively. Since the top funds¶ 
bootstrapped p-values are so small that reject the null hypothesis, we can conclude 
these fund managers achieve outperformance through true stock-picking skill rather 
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than luck alone. The results in Panels A and B show that funds with t-statistic of alpha 
ranked in the top 5th percentile and above generally exhibit significant bootstrapped 
p-values using the FF3F and FF+Mom. Using the LCAPM (in Panel C), the funds with 
significant outperformance are extended to top 20th percentile and above. There are 
around 15% of funds shifted from lucky to skilled if we use LCAPM instead of FF3F 
or FF+Mom. Apparently, after considering a liquidity factor, the performances of 
equity funds are markedly better. These results also are identical to our baseline 
results.  
Lastly, using the joint resampling bootstrap method for subsample 2, we compare 
the percentiles of the cross-section of t(alpha) estimates from actual fund returns and 
the average values of the percentiles from the simulations. Table 8.8 reports the CDF 
of t(alpha) at selected percentiles of the distribution of t(alpha) estimates for actual 
(ACT) net fund returns and the average of the 1000 simulation CDF (SIM); also, it 
offers likelihoods (%<ACT). In the tests that use the FF3F (in Panel A), the t(alpha) 
estimates from the actual net returns are above the average values from the simulations 
for only above 98th percentile; and the %<ACT of the 98th percentile of the 
cross-section of t(alpha) estimates is more than 50%. Using the FF+Mom (in Panel B), 
the percentile of the t(alpha) estimates for actual net fund returns are always below the 
average values from the simulations. Thus, the evidence of skill sufficient to cover 
costs is extremely weak with an adjustment for momentum exposure. However, the 
results from the LCAPM suggest widespread skill sufficient to cover costs after 
considering the adjustment for liquidity exposure. In the Panel C, the 50th percentile 
for actual net return is above the average simulation 50th percentile. In addition, the 
likelihood is 99.9% for the 50th percentile of the cross-section of t(alpha) estimates. It 
means almost all of the 1000 simulation runs for the 50th percentile t(alpha) estimates 
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fall below the ACT. This indicates that half of fund managers have skill if the liquidity 
factor is considered. Using this joint resampling bootstrap in this subsample, the result 
is still the same as our previous baseline findings. 
After examining for the existence of a fund liquidity premium and testing the 
performance of fund portfolios for this subsample, we are able to declare that there is 
no material impact on our main results no matter which monthly return observation 
requirement is applied, 36 or 60 months. In other words, our results are robust to the 
change of the fund return observation requirement. 
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Table 8.5 
Liquidity Premium of Fund Portfolios Sorted by LM12 (RtoV12) in the Subsample 2 
The table reports the results for our 2013 actively managed U.S. equity funds existing for at least 
60 months during the period 1984 to 2008. Panel A shows the holding period returns and risk-adjusted 
performance of the LM12-sorted fund portfolios; Panel B represents the holding period returns and 
risk-adjusted performance of the RtoV12-sorted fund portfolios. 
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
HPR1M 0.712% 0.797% 0.786% 0.791% 0.792% 0.814% 0.858% 0.917% 0.940% 0.930% 0.218%
t-statistics 1.93 2.85 3.07 3.03 3.02 3.03 3.21 3.26 3.27 3.39 1.11
HPR12M 8.872% 10.449% 10.948% 10.411% 10.757% 11.125% 11.294% 11.519% 11.808% 12.540% 3.669%
t-statistics 1.85 2.68 2.98 2.80 2.96 3.02 3.03 2.99 3.07 3.28 1.29
Į -0.287% -0.087% -0.067% -0.073% -0.070% -0.052% -0.002% 0.032% 0.052% 0.076% 0.363%
t-statistics -1.73 -1.13 -1.35 -1.68 -1.30 -0.71 -0.02 0.38 0.53 0.69 2.00
Į -0.077% -0.054% -0.085% -0.102% -0.095% -0.076% -0.033% 0.095% 0.063% -0.043% 0.033%
t-statistics -0.65 -0.78 -1.74 -2.36 -1.75 -1.04 -0.42 1.51 1.03 -0.71 0.23
Į -0.136% -0.119% -0.094% -0.101% -0.071% -0.053% 0.003% 0.038% 0.028% -0.002% 0.134%
t-statistics -1.14 -1.71 -1.85 -2.26 -1.29 -0.71 0.03 0.60 0.44 -0.03 0.90
Į -0.110% -0.080% -0.105% -0.094% -0.078% -0.043% -0.001% 0.124% 0.098% -0.026% 0.084%
t-statistics -0.95 -1.16 -2.18 -2.17 -1.45 -0.59 -0.01 2.02 1.66 -0.43 0.58
Į 0.225% 0.056% -0.015% -0.053% -0.059% -0.048% -0.005% 0.224% 0.255% 0.112% -0.114%
t-statistics 1.46 0.71 -0.28 -1.15 -1.02 -0.61 -0.06 2.65 2.58 0.95 -0.64
HPR1M 0.733% 0.732% 0.741% 0.752% 0.834% 0.873% 0.910% 0.910% 0.932% 0.916% 0.183%
t-statistics 2.88 2.85 2.95 2.98 3.08 3.11 3.12 2.93 3.05 3.12 1.16
HPR12M 9.472% 9.380% 9.717% 10.580% 10.898% 11.245% 11.930% 12.086% 11.975% 12.404% 2.932%
t-statistics 2.40 2.48 2.61 2.92 2.81 2.96 2.96 2.94 3.06 3.08 1.05
Į -0.116% -0.127% -0.107% -0.099% -0.047% -0.021% 0.001% -0.017% 0.016% 0.035% 0.151%
t-statistics -2.40 -3.86 -3.73 -3.09 -1.00 -0.33 0.02 -0.16 0.14 0.28 0.95
Į -0.037% -0.089% -0.107% -0.107% -0.039% -0.013% 0.013% 0.029% 0.001% -0.063% -0.026%
t-statistics -1.03 -3.18 -4.18 -3.36 -0.87 -0.23 0.21 0.46 0.02 -0.98 -0.31
Į -0.037% -0.090% -0.094% -0.103% -0.051% -0.040% -0.018% -0.041% -0.021% -0.016% 0.021%
t-statistics -1.00 -3.13 -3.59 -3.15 -1.10 -0.72 -0.29 -0.67 -0.34 -0.25 0.24
Į -0.033% -0.087% -0.103% -0.104% -0.037% -0.006% 0.026% 0.042% 0.023% -0.041% -0.008%
t-statistics -0.91 -3.10 -4.01 -3.24 -0.82 -0.11 0.42 0.69 0.39 -0.64 -0.09
Į -0.044% -0.090% -0.096% -0.077% 0.055% 0.127% 0.181% 0.266% 0.238% 0.128% 0.172%
t-statistics -0.87 -2.61 -3.14 -2.25 1.16 1.98 2.36 2.53 2.18 0.98 1.02
Panel B3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel B4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel A: Sorted by LM12                                   Panel A1: Holding Period Returns
Panel A2: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel A4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel B5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel B6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel A6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B: Sorted by RtoV12                                 Panel B1: Holding Period Returns
Panel B2: CAPM-adjusted performance
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Table 8.6 
Performance of Portfolio of Funds in the Subsample 2 
The table reports the annualized intercepts (monthly alphah12), t-statistics and p-values for the 
intercepts for a series of models estimated on value-weighted (VW) net returns on the portfolios in the 
subsample (actively managed U.S. equity funds existing for at least 60 months during the period 1984 to 
2008).  
Model Į\HDUO\ ȕBPNW ȕBVPE ȕBKPO ȕBSU\U ȕBOLTBY ȕBOLT R^2
coef -1.051% 0.9972 0.988 
t -statistic -2.98 152.72
p-value 0.0031 <0.0001
coef -0.771% 0.9747 0.0611 -0.0457 0.991 
t -statistic -2.53 158.12 7.41 -4.73
p-value 0.0118 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
coef -0.992% 0.9784 0.0597 -0.0417 0.0178 0.991 
t -statistic -3.22 158.03 7.34 -4.35 3.1
p-value 0.0014 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0021
coef -0.722% 0.9759 0.0608 -0.0440 -0.0109 0.991 
t -statistic -2.36 157.37 7.4 -4.54 -1.52
p-value 0.0187 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1306
coef -0.120% 0.9457 -0.0779 0.990 
t -statistic -0.35 106.84 -7.86 
p-value 0.7256 <0.0001 <0.0001
Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor 
model (FF+PS)
Liu liquidity-augmented two-
factor model (LCAPM)
CAPM
Fama-French three-factor 
model (FF3F)
Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom)
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Table 8.7 
Residual-Only Resampling Bootstrap Results of the Subsample 2 
The table reports the statistics for actively managed equity mutual funds existing for at least 60 months during 1984 to 2008 for three typical asset pricing 
models. Panels A, B, and C show statistics from the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), and Liu liquidity-augmented 
two-factor model (LCAPM), respectively. The first row in each panel reports the ex-post t-statistics of alpha for various points and percentiles of performance 
distribution, ranking from worst fund (bottom) to best fund (top). The second row presents the associated alpha for these t-statistics. The third and fourth rows 
report the parametric (standard) p-values and bootstrapped p-values of the t-statistics based on 1000 bootstrap residual-only resamples. 
bottom 3 5 1% 3% 5% 10% 20% 30% 40% mdian 40% 30% 20% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5 3 top
t -stat -4.719 -4.438 -4.194 -3.585 -2.992 -2.750 -2.183 -1.612 -1.192 -0.859 -0.532 -0.206 0.137 0.567 1.067 1.592 1.901 2.426 2.972 3.707 7.035
alpha -0.31% -0.43% -1.79% -0.38% -0.27% -0.20% -0.41% -0.15% -0.10% -0.09% -0.09% -0.04% 0.03% 0.15% 0.23% 0.36% 0.34% 1.04% 0.52% 0.58% 4.04%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.032 0.109 0.234 0.392 0.596 0.837 0.891 0.572 0.288 0.114 0.058 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.000
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.069 0.121 0.211 0.292 0.433 0.424 0.311 0.137 0.054 0.022 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000
t -stat -4.596 -4.246 -4.210 -3.431 -2.918 -2.689 -2.147 -1.621 -1.220 -0.904 -0.587 -0.267 0.090 0.464 1.000 1.489 1.795 2.401 3.125 3.369 6.746
alpha -0.89% -1.88% -0.68% -0.37% -0.24% -0.62% -1.02% -0.42% -0.19% -0.09% -0.22% -0.02% 0.02% 0.09% 0.15% 0.42% 0.24% 0.46% 0.83% 0.71% 3.91%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.034 0.108 0.224 0.368 0.559 0.790 0.928 0.643 0.318 0.139 0.074 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.000
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.039 0.121 0.186 0.270 0.398 0.447 0.297 0.187 0.057 0.044 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000
t -stat -4.765 -4.320 -4.215 -3.463 -2.928 -2.588 -2.086 -1.417 -0.888 -0.388 0.111 0.539 0.989 1.477 2.104 2.599 2.881 3.460 4.317 4.425 6.190
alpha -0.38% -0.79% -2.42% -0.35% -0.55% -0.77% -0.58% -0.26% -0.19% -0.04% 0.02% 0.10% 0.29% 1.03% 0.54% 0.99% 0.47% 1.03% 1.17% 1.13% 4.50%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.039 0.159 0.378 0.699 0.912 0.590 0.326 0.143 0.037 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.023 0.080 0.194 0.352 0.440 0.302 0.159 0.073 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel A: FF3F
Panel B: FF+Mom
Panel C: LCAPM
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Table 8.8  
Joint Resampling Bootstrap Results of the Subsample 2 
The table reports the values of t(alpha) at selected percentiles (PCT) of the distribution of t(alpha) estimates for actual (ACT) net fund returns. The table also 
shows the percent of the 1000 simulation runs that produce lower values of t(alpha) at the selected percentiles than those observed for actual fund returns (%<ACT). 
SIM is the average value of t(alpha) at the selected percentiles from the simulation after ranking the funds by their simulated t(alpha) in each run. Panels A, B, and C 
show results for the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model (FF+Mom), and Liu liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM), 
respectively. The subsample 2 is these 2013 actively managed equity mutual funds existing for at least 60 months between 1984 and 2008. 
bottom 1% bottom 10% median top 10% top 1%
PCT 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 85% 90% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99%
SIM -2.42 -2.12 -1.94 -1.79 -1.68 -1.31 -1.06 -0.86 -0.53 -0.26 0.00 0.25 0.52 0.84 1.04 1.29 1.66 1.76 1.90 2.08 2.36
ACT -3.62 -3.21 -3.00 -2.88 -2.76 -2.19 -1.87 -1.61 -1.19 -0.86 -0.53 -0.21 0.14 0.56 0.78 1.06 1.58 1.69 1.89 2.09 2.42
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.90 6.30 39.40 57.20 76.00
SIM -2.45 -2.15 -1.96 -1.81 -1.70 -1.32 -1.06 -0.86 -0.53 -0.26 0.00 0.26 0.54 0.87 1.07 1.32 1.70 1.81 1.95 2.14 2.42
ACT -3.46 -3.19 -2.92 -2.81 -2.69 -2.15 -1.87 -1.62 -1.22 -0.90 -0.59 -0.27 0.09 0.46 0.69 1.00 1.48 1.61 1.79 2.02 2.39
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 3.20 35.50
SIM -2.61 -2.28 -2.08 -1.93 -1.80 -1.40 -1.12 -0.91 -0.56 -0.27 0.01 0.28 0.58 0.92 1.13 1.40 1.80 1.92 2.07 2.26 2.57
ACT -3.49 -3.09 -2.93 -2.71 -2.60 -2.09 -1.69 -1.42 -0.89 -0.39 0.11 0.54 0.99 1.47 1.75 2.10 2.59 2.69 2.88 3.08 3.45
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel C: LCAPM
Panel A: FF3F
Panel B: FF+Mom
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8.2. Subperiod Analysis 
Most people will be troubled by a question: with mutual fund industry growing so 
fast in recent decades, is mutual fund performance better than before? Barras et al. 
(2010) provide at least partial answer: many mutual fund managers with good track 
records left to manage hedge funds, whereas a large number of new managers simply 
have inadequate skills. For instance, they observe that the proportion of skilled funds 
sharply decreases from 1990 to 2006 (14.4% to 0.6%), while the proportion of 
unskilled funds increases considerably (9.2% to 24.0%) during the time period. Thus, 
it becomes necessary to check for changes in mutual fund performance and the effect 
of liquidity over our sample period. To ensure that our previous results are not 
time-dependent, we examine two subperiods of roughly equal lengths (1984 to 1995, 
subperiod 1, and 1996 to 2008, subperiod 2). 
First of all, by sorting funds into ten portfolios based on their LM12 (or RtoV12), 
we examine the existence of fund liquidity premium for both subperiods. Tables 8.9 
and 8.10 report the holding period returns (for 1 month and 12 months) and 
risk-adjusted performance of each decile for subperiod 1 and subperiod 2, respectively. 
Both tables reveal that there are not significant liquidity premium over the 1-month or 
12-month holding periods, no matter whether fund portfolios are sorted by LM12 or 
RtoV12. Also, we test fund liquidity premium by controlling for risk using various 
models. Among the results from Panels A2 to A6 (sorted by LM12) and Panels B2 to 
B6 (sorted by RtoV12) in both tables, almost all reveal that the liquidity premium at 
fund level is little to none after controlling for risks, except for the FF+Mom sorted by 
LM12 (in Panel A44 of Table 8.9, subperiod 1). Consistent with our previous baseline 
results, in both subperiods, there is no liquidity premium at fund level. Thus, our 
results about fund liquidity premium are robust, and evidence on the no liquidity 
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premium at fund level is not due to any particular subperiod. 
Then, we test the performance of portfolio of funds for both subperiods. Table 
8.11 presents the annualized intercepts, t-statistics, and p-values for the intercepts for 
various models estimated on value-weighted net returns on the portfolios of actively 
managed equity funds for each subperiod. In Panel A of Table 8.11, all t-statistics of 
alpha of each model are insignificant no matter they are positive or negative, which 
means the fund performance just mimics the benchmarks in the first subperiod. In the 
second subperiod (Panel B of Table 8.11), the CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS 
offering significant negative alphas tell us that, on average, actively managed equity 
funds have no ability to generate sufficient returns to cover the expenses. However, the 
result from the LCAPM is insignificantly different with zero. In other words, the 
aggregate portfolio of funds is close to the benchmarks if we consider the liquidity 
factor. Thus, if we use the first four models, we would find that the performance in the 
first subperiod is better than the second subperiod; whereas, using the LCAPM, the 
fund performance is same in both subperiods (i.e. the aggregate portfolio of funds 
mimics the benchmarks). We can likely provide another answer to the question at the 
beginning of this section. If we consider the liquidity factor when examining the fund 
performance, the results of performance does not change due to any particular 
subperiod. 
Next, we analyze the significance of actively managed equity fund performance 
(the t-statistics of alpha) by applying the residual-only resampling bootstrap method. 
Table 8.12 shows the results for equity funds for both subperiods in Panel A and Panel 
B, respectively. The results in both panels show that funds with t-statistic of alpha 
ranked in the top 10th percentile and above generally exhibit significant bootstrapped 
p-values using the FF3F and FF+Mom in the first subperiod. Using the LCAPM (in 
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Panel A3), the funds with significant outperformance are extended to top 20th 
percentile and above. In the second subperiod, we also find that the same results as that 
in the first subperiod. Apparently, in both subperiods, there are roughly 10% to 15% of 
sample funds that move to skilled from lucky, if we use the LCAPM instead of FF3F 
or FF+Mom. Apparently, after considering the liquidity factor, the performances of 
equity funds are clearly improved. 
Finally, using the joint resampling bootstrap method for both subperiods, we 
compare the percentiles of the cross-section of t(alpha) estimates from actual fund 
returns and the average values of the percentiles from the simulations, and then turn to 
likelihood statements about whether the cross-section of t(alpha) estimates for actual 
fund returns points to the existence of skill. Table 8.13 reports the CDF of t(alpha) at 
selected percentiles of the distribution of t(alpha) estimates for actual (ACT) net fund 
returns and the average of the 1000 simulation CDF (SIM). At the same time, we also 
offer likelihoods (%<ACT) in Table 8.13. In the first subperiod (Panels A1, A2, and 
A3) using the FF3F, FF+Mom, and LCAPM, the t(alpha) estimates from the actual net 
returns are above the average values from the simulations for above 60th percentile, 
70th percentile, and 30th percentile; and the %<ACT of the 60th, 70th, and 30th percentile 
of the cross-section of t(alpha) estimates is more than 50%. As to the results from the 
second subperiod (Panels B1, B2, and B3), they are similar to the results of our 
baseline tests. We might say that the performance of the first subperiod is better than 
that of the second subperiod, because of more skilled funds. However, after 
considering the liquidity factor, there is only little difference between the performance 
of the first subperiod and the second subperiod. 
In general, we are able to declare that the change of research period has no effect 
on the result about the absence of fund liquidity premium. Although the fund 
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performance in the first subperiod is a little better than the second subperiod when 
using the other asset pricing models, there is little difference with our baseline results 
if LCAPM is used. This confirms again the importance of considering the liquidity 
factor in examining the mutual fund performance.  
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Table 8.9 
Liquidity Premium of Fund Portfolios Sorted by LM12 (RtoV12) in the Subperiod 1 
The table reports the results for actively managed U.S. equity funds during the period 1984 to 1995 
(Subperiod 1). Panel A shows the holding period returns and risk-adjusted performance of the 
LM12-sorted fund portfolios; Panel B represents the holding period returns and risk-adjusted 
performance of the RtoV12-sorted fund portfolios.  
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
HPR1M 1.107% 1.181% 1.130% 1.172% 1.214% 1.270% 1.285% 1.287% 1.253% 1.129% 0.023%
t-statistics 3.00 3.60 3.63 3.30 3.29 3.22 3.26 3.21 3.12 2.97 0.18
HPR12M 15.046% 15.191% 14.879% 14.966% 15.978% 16.374% 16.229% 16.566% 16.388% 16.031% 0.985%
t-statistics 3.68 4.18 4.23 3.89 4.01 4.01 3.91 3.66 3.72 3.36 0.49
Į -0.177% -0.031% -0.045% -0.091% -0.071% -0.058% -0.041% -0.046% -0.077% -0.137% 0.040%
t-statistics -2.28 -0.88 -0.96 -1.74 -1.01 -0.63 -0.45 -0.43 -0.69 -1.03 0.31
Į -0.065% -0.037% -0.061% -0.020% 0.048% 0.115% 0.128% 0.157% 0.114% 0.036% 0.101%
t-statistics -0.98 -1.21 -1.60 -0.42 0.90 1.89 2.41 2.76 2.09 0.70 1.20
Į -0.133% -0.071% -0.064% -0.051% 0.028% 0.075% 0.089% 0.100% 0.115% 0.049% 0.182%
t-statistics -2.03 -2.38 -1.62 -1.08 0.51 1.21 1.66 1.79 2.04 0.93 2.20
Į -0.055% -0.038% -0.058% -0.003% 0.059% 0.136% 0.136% 0.169% 0.126% 0.045% 0.101%
t-statistics -0.84 -1.22 -1.53 -0.08 1.14 2.36 2.57 3.02 2.37 0.89 1.19
Į -0.025% -0.009% -0.007% 0.032% 0.099% 0.169% 0.144% 0.157% 0.094% -0.103% -0.079%
t-statistics -0.31 -0.24 -0.14 0.62 1.43 1.90 1.58 1.42 0.80 -0.71 -0.56
HPR1M 1.182% 1.170% 1.156% 1.151% 1.228% 1.214% 1.263% 1.282% 1.235% 1.137% -0.045%
t-statistics 3.72 3.52 3.44 3.36 3.39 3.16 3.13 3.17 2.99 2.79 -0.24
HPR12M 15.112% 15.165% 15.133% 15.360% 15.850% 16.041% 16.055% 16.675% 16.548% 15.748% 0.637%
t-statistics 4.01 4.14 3.88 4.21 3.93 3.99 3.72 3.87 3.60 3.21 0.22
Į -0.007% -0.051% -0.075% -0.089% -0.047% -0.098% -0.077% -0.051% -0.113% -0.178% -0.171%
t-statistics -0.17 -1.37 -2.21 -2.01 -0.74 -1.15 -0.76 -0.45 -0.92 -1.17 -0.95
Į -0.017% -0.033% -0.042% -0.035% 0.045% 0.052% 0.121% 0.168% 0.097% 0.047% 0.064%
t-statistics -0.53 -0.97 -1.32 -0.87 0.84 0.89 2.12 2.66 1.77 0.77 0.89
Į -0.037% -0.078% -0.066% -0.076% -0.003% 0.040% 0.063% 0.128% 0.075% 0.083% 0.120%
t-statistics -1.13 -2.46 -2.10 -1.93 -0.06 0.66 1.13 2.01 1.33 1.35 1.67
Į -0.011% -0.030% -0.038% -0.028% 0.054% 0.069% 0.132% 0.179% 0.111% 0.065% 0.076%
t-statistics -0.36 -0.87 -1.20 -0.69 1.01 1.23 2.36 2.88 2.09 1.12 1.07
Į 0.048% -0.002% 0.009% 0.019% 0.085% 0.114% 0.134% 0.183% 0.056% -0.109% -0.158%
t-statistics 1.05 -0.04 0.28 0.45 1.34 1.40 1.32 1.58 0.43 -0.66 -0.80
Panel A: Sorted by LM12                                   Panel A1: Holding Period Returns
Panel A2: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel A4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel B5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel B6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel A6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B: Sorted by RtoV12                                 Panel B1: Holding Period Returns
Panel B2: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel B4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
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Table 8.10 
Liquidity Premium of Fund Portfolios Sorted by LM12 (RtoV12) in the Subperiod 2 
The table reports the results for actively managed U.S. equity funds during the period 1996 to 2008 
(Subperiod 2). Panel A shows the holding period returns and risk-adjusted performance of the 
LM12-sorted fund portfolios; Panel B represents the holding period returns and risk-adjusted 
performance of the RtoV12-sorted fund portfolios.  
1 (H) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (L) L-H
HPR1M 0.343% 0.415% 0.460% 0.438% 0.408% 0.388% 0.441% 0.582% 0.622% 0.727% 0.383%
t-statistics 0.54 0.93 1.16 1.15 1.09 1.06 1.21 1.45 1.51 1.83 1.04
HPR12M 2.961% 5.173% 7.037% 5.660% 5.453% 5.610% 6.350% 6.004% 6.770% 8.850% 5.889%
t-statistics 0.34 0.76 1.08 0.91 0.92 0.95 1.06 0.99 1.10 1.48 1.08
Į -0.254% -0.113% -0.048% -0.062% -0.087% -0.099% -0.042% 0.079% 0.119% 0.235% 0.489%
t-statistics -0.84 -0.79 -0.65 -0.95 -1.12 -1.00 -0.35 0.60 0.75 1.36 1.55
Į -0.136% -0.147% -0.127% -0.121% -0.123% -0.136% -0.085% 0.070% 0.008% -0.055% 0.080%
t-statistics -0.72 -1.28 -1.92 -2.06 -1.85 -1.60 -0.80 0.69 0.09 -0.67 0.37
Į -0.200% -0.221% -0.148% -0.122% -0.101% -0.101% -0.034% 0.015% -0.027% -0.015% 0.185%
t-statistics -1.05 -1.96 -2.20 -2.03 -1.50 -1.17 -0.32 0.14 -0.28 -0.19 0.86
Į -0.156% -0.157% -0.128% -0.117% -0.113% -0.119% -0.059% 0.101% 0.065% -0.028% 0.128%
t-statistics -0.82 -1.35 -1.91 -1.96 -1.68 -1.38 -0.55 0.99 0.70 -0.34 0.59
Į 0.356% 0.062% -0.019% -0.082% -0.133% -0.165% -0.104% 0.266% 0.352% 0.274% -0.081%
t-statistics 1.33 0.44 -0.24 -1.19 -1.65 -1.61 -0.83 2.09 2.31 1.52 -0.28
HPR1M 0.323% 0.317% 0.347% 0.375% 0.466% 0.534% 0.595% 0.555% 0.613% 0.698% 0.375%
t-statistics 0.83 0.83 0.94 1.01 1.16 1.30 1.41 1.18 1.35 1.65 1.51
HPR12M 3.813% 3.294% 4.436% 5.388% 6.186% 6.373% 7.364% 7.168% 6.953% 8.878% 5.066%
t-statistics 0.57 0.53 0.72 0.89 0.94 1.00 1.10 1.02 1.11 1.37 1.03
Į -0.180% -0.187% -0.148% -0.121% -0.045% 0.020% 0.078% 0.024% 0.090% 0.196% 0.376%
t-statistics -2.30 -3.71 -3.33 -2.64 -0.64 0.21 0.66 0.13 0.50 1.02 1.50
Į -0.048% -0.123% -0.139% -0.130% -0.078% -0.044% -0.013% -0.086% -0.091% -0.099% -0.051%
t-statistics -0.92 -3.08 -4.15 -3.15 -1.19 -0.53 -0.14 -0.88 -1.03 -1.17 -0.47
Į -0.052% -0.119% -0.123% -0.116% -0.082% -0.080% -0.043% -0.169% -0.115% -0.055% -0.002%
t-statistics -0.98 -2.92 -3.65 -2.77 -1.22 -0.95 -0.47 -1.80 -1.29 -0.65 -0.02
Į -0.025% -0.113% -0.127% -0.130% -0.084% -0.049% -0.003% -0.056% -0.055% -0.071% -0.046%
t-statistics -0.49 -2.80 -3.80 -3.09 -1.26 -0.58 -0.03 -0.57 -0.62 -0.84 -0.41
Į -0.122% -0.167% -0.172% -0.129% 0.048% 0.139% 0.249% 0.324% 0.332% 0.307% 0.428%
t-statistics -1.51 -3.18 -3.73 -2.68 0.69 1.45 2.19 1.87 1.90 1.54 1.63
Panel B3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel B4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel A: Sorted by LM12                                   Panel A1: Holding Period Returns
Panel A2: CAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A3: FF3F-adjusted performance
Panel A4: FF+Mom-adjusted performance
Panel B5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel B6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel A5: FF+PS-adjusted performance
Panel A6: LCAPM-adjusted performance
Panel B: Sorted by RtoV12                                 Panel B1: Holding Period Returns
Panel B2: CAPM-adjusted performance
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Table 8.11 
Performance of Portfolios of Funds for Subperiods 
The table reports the annualized intercepts (monthly alphah12), t-statistics and p-values for the 
intercepts for a series of models estimated on value-weighted (VW) net returns on the portfolios for two 
subperiods. Panel A stands for the period 1984 to 1995 (Subperiod 1); Panel B is for the period 1996 to 
2008 (Subperiod 2).  
Model Į\HDUO\ ȕBPNW ȕBVPE ȕBKPO ȕBSU\U ȕBOLTBY ȕBOLT R^2
coef -0.497% 0.9834 0.986 
t -statistic -0.99 100.72
p-value 0.3237 <0.0001
coef 0.175% 0.9565 0.0875 -0.0767 0.991 
t -statistic 0.41 104.73 5.58 -4.54
p-value 0.6836 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
coef 0.000% 0.9550 0.0919 -0.0755 0.0193 0.991 
t -statistic 0 104.52 5.79 -4.49 1.56
p-value 0.9993 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1212
coef 0.263% 0.9503 0.0769 -0.0797 -0.0291 0.991 
t -statistic 0.62 102.27 4.81 -4.8 -2.53
p-value 0.5345 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0125
coef 0.646% 0.9294 -0.0956 0.989 
t -statistic 1.31 72.01 -5.72 
p-value 0.1937 <0.0001 <0.0001
coef -1.416% 1.0071 0.988 
t -statistic -2.85 114.17
p-value 0.005 <0.0001
coef -1.368% 0.9843 0.0573 -0.0349 0.992 
t -statistic -3.25 120.07 5.88 -2.99
p-value 0.0014 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0033
coef -1.668% 0.9941 0.0531 -0.0280 0.0241 0.993 
t -statistic -4.04 119.47 5.62 -2.46 3.67
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.015 0.0003
coef -1.356% 0.9856 0.0576 -0.0338 -0.0035 0.992 
t -statistic -3.15 108.66 5.87 -2.77 -0.34
p-value 0.002 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0064 0.7342
coef -0.671% 0.9568 -0.0682 0.990 
t -statistic -1.4 76.94 -5.34 
p-value 0.1639 <0.0001 <0.0001
Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor 
model (FF+PS)
Liu liquidity-augmented two-
factro model (LCAPM)
Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor 
model (FF+PS)
Liu liquidity-augmented two-
factro model (LCAPM)
Panel B: Subperiod 2 (1996-2008)
CAPM
Panel A: Subperiod 1 (1984-1995)
CAPM
Fama-French three-factor 
model (FF3F)
Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom)
Fama-French three-factor 
model (FF3F)
Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom)
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Table 8.12 
Residual-Only Resampling Bootstrap Results of the Subperiods 
The table reports the residual-only resampling bootstrap results of actively managed equity mutual funds during 1984 to 2008 for two subperiods. Panels A 
and B present the results for the subperiod 1 (1984-1995) and subperiod 2 (1996-2008), respectively. 
bottom 3 5 1% 3% 5% 10% 20% 30% 40% mdian 40% 30% 20% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5 3 top
t-stat -6.061 -3.423 -3.341 -3.059 -2.567 -2.284 -1.717 -1.175 -0.728 -0.352 -0.057 0.319 0.733 1.264 1.916 2.556 2.888 3.750 4.439 7.313 18.784
alpha -1.38% -0.60% -0.75% -0.21% -0.71% -0.38% -0.33% -0.22% -0.13% -0.23% -0.05% 0.05% 0.12% 0.81% 1.33% 0.34% 0.30% 1.15% 1.40% 0.51% 1.98%
p-value 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.018 0.027 0.092 0.253 0.469 0.731 0.958 0.750 0.465 0.222 0.088 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.000
p -boot 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.035 0.118 0.220 0.388 0.485 0.402 0.245 0.111 0.029 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000
t-stat -4.867 -4.382 -3.749 -3.408 -2.667 -2.352 -1.772 -1.148 -0.778 -0.466 -0.137 0.197 0.575 1.013 1.804 2.291 2.529 3.054 3.539 3.783 6.559
alpha -2.74% -4.47% -1.58% -1.23% -0.30% -0.47% -0.52% -0.11% -0.23% -0.10% -0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.42% 0.25% 0.51% 0.26% 0.90% 1.01% 1.05% 1.71%
p-value 0.129 0.048 0.064 0.001 0.009 0.022 0.082 0.253 0.444 0.643 0.892 0.846 0.567 0.315 0.074 0.029 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.022
p -boot 0.073 0.030 0.023 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.038 0.101 0.197 0.344 0.429 0.443 0.294 0.151 0.032 0.020 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.010
t-stat -4.215 -3.202 -3.034 -2.740 -2.319 -1.915 -1.466 -0.882 -0.419 -0.079 0.242 0.627 0.982 1.410 1.985 2.542 2.930 3.452 3.761 3.958 4.157
alpha -2.42% -0.59% -0.25% -0.34% -2.60% -0.28% -0.35% -0.43% -0.17% -0.01% 0.08% 0.80% 3.01% 0.57% 0.21% 0.82% 0.23% 1.91% 2.91% 1.32% 0.62%
p-value 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.259 0.061 0.146 0.388 0.679 0.937 0.810 0.545 0.382 0.162 0.050 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
p -boot 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.254 0.026 0.072 0.183 0.362 0.466 0.420 0.261 0.238 0.061 0.023 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
t-stat -6.269 -4.954 -4.547 -3.617 -3.068 -2.771 -2.204 -1.632 -1.216 -0.875 -0.566 -0.249 0.089 0.476 0.987 1.434 1.768 2.433 3.783 5.077 7.035
alpha -0.04% -0.99% -0.19% -0.43% -0.57% -1.01% -0.46% -0.17% -0.54% -0.05% -0.23% -0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.36% 0.21% 0.20% 0.57% 3.75% 2.37% 4.04%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.030 0.105 0.228 0.383 0.572 0.804 0.929 0.635 0.379 0.154 0.081 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.000
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.053 0.124 0.199 0.267 0.413 0.462 0.342 0.179 0.085 0.045 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-stat -15.965 -5.056 -4.658 -3.594 -2.951 -2.690 -2.232 -1.631 -1.244 -0.943 -0.620 -0.296 0.033 0.441 0.983 1.452 1.749 2.421 3.496 4.216 6.746
alpha -0.27% -0.47% -0.96% -0.44% -0.60% -0.47% -0.21% -0.56% -0.15% -0.18% -0.07% -0.07% 0.00% 0.06% 0.52% 0.56% 0.34% 0.82% 0.74% 1.11% 3.91%
p-value 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.027 0.109 0.215 0.348 0.537 0.768 0.973 0.661 0.329 0.154 0.089 0.021 0.001 0.148 0.000
p -boot 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.012 0.052 0.095 0.170 0.274 0.382 0.506 0.335 0.163 0.063 0.042 0.006 0.000 0.106 0.000
t-stat -6.649 -4.988 -4.535 -3.595 -2.947 -2.569 -2.034 -1.384 -0.909 -0.441 0.029 0.439 0.849 1.286 1.846 2.357 2.646 3.344 4.184 4.996 7.173
alpha -0.04% -0.56% -0.49% -1.01% -0.33% -0.44% -0.60% -0.20% -0.14% -0.11% 0.01% 0.16% 0.29% 0.30% 0.53% 0.61% 0.68% 0.42% 0.83% 1.13% 0.98%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.046 0.169 0.365 0.661 0.977 0.662 0.399 0.200 0.068 0.020 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.002
p -boot 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.028 0.091 0.171 0.340 0.487 0.349 0.202 0.097 0.026 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.001
Panel B2: FF+Mom
Panel B3: LCAPM
Panel A: Subperiod 1 (1984-1995)                                                                                  Panel A1: FF3F
Panel B: Subperiod 2 (1996-2008)                                                                                 Panel B1: FF3F
Panel A2: FF+Mom
Panel A3: LCAPM
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Table 8.13  
Joint Resampling Bootstrap Results of the Subperiods 
The table reports the entire cases (joint) resampling bootstrap results of actively managed equity mutual funds during 1984 to 2008 for two subperiods. Panels A 
and B present the results for the subperiod 1 (1984-1995) and subperiod 2 (1996-2008), respectively. 
bottom 1% bottom 10% median top 10% top 1%
PCT 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 85% 90% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99%
SIM -2.37 -2.06 -1.87 -1.74 -1.63 -1.25 -1.00 -0.81 -0.51 -0.25 -0.01 0.23 0.49 0.80 0.99 1.24 1.60 1.71 1.83 2.01 2.28
ACT -3.07 -2.79 -2.58 -2.38 -2.29 -1.72 -1.43 -1.18 -0.73 -0.35 -0.06 0.31 0.73 1.25 1.50 1.91 2.53 2.65 2.85 3.15 3.59
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 7.70 98.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SIM -2.52 -2.16 -1.94 -1.81 -1.68 -1.28 -1.02 -0.83 -0.52 -0.25 -0.01 0.23 0.49 0.80 0.99 1.24 1.62 1.73 1.86 2.04 2.32
ACT -3.46 -2.93 -2.69 -2.49 -2.38 -1.78 -1.43 -1.15 -0.78 -0.47 -0.14 0.20 0.57 1.00 1.38 1.80 2.28 2.40 2.50 2.76 3.05
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.60 98.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SIM -2.37 -2.06 -1.86 -1.72 -1.61 -1.22 -0.98 -0.79 -0.48 -0.22 0.02 0.25 0.51 0.82 1.02 1.26 1.65 1.76 1.91 2.10 2.41
ACT -2.78 -2.45 -2.33 -2.08 -1.92 -1.47 -1.12 -0.89 -0.42 -0.08 0.24 0.63 0.98 1.41 1.65 1.98 2.52 2.61 2.91 3.08 3.44
%<ACT 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00 93.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SIM -2.46 -2.14 -1.95 -1.81 -1.69 -1.31 -1.06 -0.86 -0.54 -0.27 -0.01 0.24 0.52 0.83 1.03 1.28 1.65 1.76 1.89 2.07 2.36
ACT -3.68 -3.25 -3.08 -2.90 -2.78 -2.21 -1.89 -1.63 -1.22 -0.88 -0.57 -0.25 0.09 0.47 0.70 0.98 1.43 1.58 1.77 2.03 2.43
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.70 28.20 81.20
SIM -2.49 -2.16 -1.97 -1.83 -1.71 -1.32 -1.07 -0.86 -0.54 -0.26 0.00 0.26 0.54 0.86 1.06 1.31 1.69 1.81 1.94 2.12 2.42
ACT -3.72 -3.22 -2.96 -2.82 -2.70 -2.23 -1.91 -1.63 -1.25 -0.95 -0.62 -0.30 0.03 0.44 0.68 0.98 1.45 1.55 1.75 2.01 2.42
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 49.30
SIM -2.63 -2.28 -2.08 -1.92 -1.80 -1.39 -1.12 -0.90 -0.56 -0.27 0.01 0.28 0.57 0.91 1.12 1.38 1.78 1.90 2.04 2.23 2.54
ACT -3.65 -3.16 -2.95 -2.80 -2.57 -2.04 -1.68 -1.39 -0.91 -0.45 0.03 0.44 0.85 1.29 1.56 1.85 2.35 2.51 2.64 2.82 3.31
%<ACT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 79.70 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel B2: FF+Mom
Panel B3: LCAPM
Panel A3: LCAPM
Panel A: Subperiod 1 (1984-1995)                                                                               Panel A1: FF3F
Panel A2: FF+Mom
Panel B: Subperiod 2 (1996-2008)                                                                               Panel B1: FF3F
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1. Summary 
Based on two incentives: (i) to examine whether the mutual fund industry as a 
whole has stock-picking skill; (ii) to verify the efficient-market hypothesis, in this 
thesis, we study mutual fund performance from a new insight: liquidity effect on the 
performance of fund. Although a great deal of research has been published about 
mutual fund performance, little has been documented as to the relation between fund 
liquidity and performance. Our research, to fill this gap, not only constructs new fund 
liquidity measures and analyzes the liquidity characteristics of actively managed equity 
funds, but also verifies the liquidity premium at fund level, as well as the effect of fund 
liquidity on performance. 
This study takes a new look at returns of 2417 diverse U.S. equity mutual funds 
during the period of 1984 to 2008 and utilizes a new data sample that includes the 
liquidity measures of stocks held by funds in each month over the 25-year period. 
Besides using the classification of Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum, we apply the 
proportion of the stock-holdings in a fund to identify the equity funds. At the same 
time, we also construct fund liquidity measures (FLMs) based on value-weighted 
average of the liquidity measure of individual stocks held by a fund. Among all FLMs, 
Liu¶s trading discontinuity measure (LM12) and Amihud¶s price impact ratio (RtoV12) 
are the most representative proxies for fund liquidity. Moreover, from the changing 
trend of FLMs, we discover that the equity funds have recently greatly favoured highly 
liquid stocks. Specifically, the stocks held by a typical equity fund have the following 
trends on liquidity properties: fewer no-trading days, higher trading turnover ratio, 
lower price-impact ratio, and slightly lower effective cost of trading. Additionally, we 
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notice a steep increase in market capitalization and obvious fall of B/M ratio, which 
indicates equity funds prefer to hold big companies and growth companies. Further, we 
use the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model (FF3F), Carhart four-factor model 
(FF+Mom), Pastor-Stambaugh four-factor model (FF+PS), and Liu 
liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM) to evaluate risk-adjusted fund 
performance and check the effect of liquidity factor on fund performance. 
In conclusion, we test whether there is any liquidity premium at fund level; test 
whether the actively managed equity funds as a whole can outperform the benchmarks; 
and test whether the ³star´ equity funds are due solely to luck or to genuine selection 
skills. After sorting funds into ten portfolios based on their LM12 or RtoV12, we find 
no significant fund liquidity premium over the 1-month or 12-month holding periods. 
Additionally, we reveal that fund liquidity premium is little to none after controlling 
for risks. Apparently, fund liquidity premium is a different story from stock liquidity 
premium. To test the aggregate fund performance, we construct the portfolio of funds 
in each month and run time-series regression for the cross-section of these portfolios¶ 
net returns. Under the CAPM, FF3F, FF+Mom, and FF+PS, the significant negative 
alphas tell us on average actively managed equity funds do not have the ability to 
generate sufficient returns to cover the costs. However, the result from the LCAPM is 
totally different: we find the actively managed equity funds in aggregate mimics the 
performance of benchmarks. Thus, we attribute the underperformance of funds mooted 
in earlier work to failure to consider liquidity. Moreover, we also distinguish skilled 
from lucky for individual funds via two different bootstrap simulation methods 
(residual-only resampling and entire cases resampling). We find that the performance 
of a few best funds cannot be explained solely by sampling variability, which means 
these fund managers¶ performances are not due to luck alone. Moreover, we find that 
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more funds can be called skilled funds when using LCAPM model than using the 
earlier models. Apparently, after considering a liquidity factor, the measured 
performances of equity funds are improved markedly. Fund managers¶ holding of large 
amounts of highly liquid stocks results in adverse impact on the fund performance. 
 
9.2. Suggestions 
Overall, our research provides empirical evidence for considering liquidity as a 
risk factor in mutual fund returns. Liquidity is a non-negligible determinant in the 
evaluation of mutual fund performance. The results of our study have a number of 
important implications for future research in the mutual fund area. 
First of all, liquidity as a vital factor has effectively been paid a great deal of 
attention by mutual fund managers in making investment decisions. From the liquidity 
characteristics of stock-holdings of funds, we reveal that a typical equity fund favours 
highly liquid stocks, such as those stocks, on average, have few no-trading days, high 
trading turnover ratio, and low price-impact ratio. Moreover, our result, absence of 
fund liquidity premium, confirms again the significance of liquidity in mutual fund 
industry. That is, most actively managed equity funds hold a great deal of liquid stocks 
and, as a result, it is impossible to find significant liquidity premium within these 
highly liquid portfolios. 
Next, since the liquidity is a vital factor for mutual funds, our research, from a 
liquidity-considered standpoint, applies the Liu LCAPM to evaluating the fund 
performance. By testing the performance of portfolio of funds, we find that U.S. 
actively managed equity funds as a group mimics the performance of the benchmarks. 
It is safe to conclude that the previous research results of underperformance of mutual 
fund are mainly due to lack of consideration of the liquidity factor in the earlier models. 
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Thus, the difference in performance is supposed to be attributed to whether a liquidity 
factor is considered. Here, we strongly propose employing a liquidity-considered asset 
pricing model (such as Liu LCAPM) to examine mutual fund performance. 
Our research shows that the hypothesis of normal distribution of residual is not 
tenable. This strong finding of non-normal residuals (i.e. roughly half of funds have 
alphas are drawn from a distinctly non-normal distribution) challenges the validity of 
earlier research that relies on the normality assumptions. Accordingly, this 
phenomenon indicates the need to bootstrap, especially in the tails, to determine 
whether significant performance is due to fund manager¶s stock-picking ability or to 
luck alone. Based on residual-only resampling and entire cases resampling, the results 
of earlier models exhibit few funds having genuine skills. However, using Liu LCAPM, 
many more funds show significant outperformance. Hence, after considering the 
liquidity factor, more equity funds are classified to skilled funds from lucky funds. 
That echoes our previous suggestions. For whatever reason, fund managers holding of 
a great amount of liquid stocks adversely impacts fund performance.  
Last but not least, we also recommend using the t-statistic of the estimated alpha 
as a measure of fund performance, rather than the estimated alpha itself. The t-statistic 
can scale alpha by its standard error, which tends to be larger for shorter-lived funds 
and for funds that take higher levels of risk. Hence, the distribution of bootstrapped 
t-statistics of alpha in the tails is likely to reveal better properties than the distribution 
of bootstrapped alpha. Moreover, for each ranked fund we compare bootstrapped 
p-values with parametric standard p-values that correspond to the t-statistics of these 
individual ranked funds.  
Overall, our research provides empirical evidence for the importance of liquidity 
as a risk factor in mutual fund returns, i.e. liquidity is a vital determinant in the 
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evaluation of a mutual fund¶s performance. Thus, we strongly propose employing a 
liquidity-based asset pricing model when examining the performance of mutual funds 
in the future. At the very least, our research provides this sensible advice: the 
performance of equity fund may be not only because of alpha (risk-adjusted returns, 
management skills), but also due to some beta (systematic liquidity risk factor). 
 
9.3. Future Work 
As mentioned earlier, all models we used in this paper, no matter conventional 
models or liquidity-based models, are unconditional models. However, an active fund 
manager may employ dynamic strategies to change portfolio holdings and weights 
depending on publicly available information. So these unconditional models may 
generate unreliable results. Although Ferson and Schadt (1996), Christopherson et al. 
(1998), and Christopherson et al. (1999) advocate using time-varying conditional 
models (introduce time-variation in alpha and use conditional betas) to examine 
whether managerial performance is indeed constant or if it varies over time as a 
function of information, capturing time variation in the regression slopes and intercept 
poses thorny problems, and so we leave this potentially important issue for future 
research. 53  In future work, we might look at conditional fund performance 
measurement. First, we could use time-varying conditional expected returns and 
conditional betas instead of the usual, unconditional betas: 
'
, ,0 1i t i i tB ZE E   . 
Thus, the unconditional LCAPM will have a conditional version: 
' '
, ,0 , , 1 , ,0 , 1 ,i t i m m t m i t m t l t l i t t i tr r B Z r LIQ B Z LIQD E E H       . 
                                                        
53
 Recently, Barras et al. (2010) documents that using unconditional or conditional models has no material 
impact on their results about fund performance.  
Chapter 9                                                              Conclusions  
 156 
Next, we could assume that alpha depends linearly on 1tZ  , so that: 
'
, ,0 1i t i i tAZD D   . 
Then the LCAPM can be transformed further to the following equation: 
' ' '
, 0 1 ,0 , , 1 , ,0 , 1 ,i t i t m m t m i t m t l t l i t t i tr AZ r B Z r LIQ B Z LIQD E E H         . 
Applying these two conditional versions of LCAPM, we might verify whether liquidity 
factor still has material effect on mutual fund performance. 
In the whole research, we always assess the performance of fund manages on 
fund net returns (i.e. whether they have enough picking-stock ability to cover costs and 
expenses). Although fund performance on net returns is the most crucial issue to mass 
investors, it is possible that the fruits of skill do not show up more generally on net 
returns because they are absorbed by expenses. As Fama and French (2010) note, the 
issue in the tests on net returns is whether fund managers have sufficient skill to 
produce expected returns that cover their costs, while the issue in the tests on gross 
returns is whether they have skill that causes expected returns to differ from those of 
comparable passive benchmarks. Thus, we could evaluate fund performance on gross 
returns in future research. For this purpose, we would like to use fund returns 
measured before all costs and expenses, which means the regressions could focus on 
fund manager skill. Because the fund return values from CRSP-MF database are based 
on net returns, fund gross returns pose much more difficult measurement issues. Our 
fund gross returns, following the method in Fama and French (2010), are before the 
cost in expense ratios (including management fees), but they are net of other costs, 
primarily trading costs54. This is a simple and approximate approach to define the 
gross returns (only net returns plus the costs in expense ratios): 
                                                        
54
 Funds do not report trading costs, however, and estimates are subject to large error. In addition, the trading 
costs vary through time. 
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> @  ( .  )   (  )Gross RET Net RET Expenses inc Management Fees Other Costs Trading Costs  ǂ . 
Equivalently, the tests based on gross returns say that a fund management has skill 
only if it is sufficient to cover the missing costs (primarily trading costs). It seems like 
a reasonable definition of skill since an efficiently managed passive fund can 
apparently avoid these costs. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Total Net Assets in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry and, Total Net Assets 
of Mutual Funds for Each Investment Objective (Billions of U.S. Dollars, 1984-2009) 
 
Sources: 2010 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company Institute  
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Appendix 2: Asset Proportion by Type of Fund in the U.S. Mutual Fund Market, the 
World¶s Largest Fund Market (at the end of 2007, 2008, and 2009) 
  
Year-End 2007 
 
Year-End 2008 
    
Year-End 2009 
Sources: Investment Company Institute, European Fund and Asset Management Association, and other 
national mutual fund associations 
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 Appendix 3: The Structure of a Typical Mutual Fund 
 
Sources: 2010 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company Institute 
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Appendix 4: Trend of Fees and Expenses Incurred by Equity Fund Investors (%, 1990, 
1995, 2000-2009) 
 
Sources: Investment Company Institute and Lipper 
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Appendix 5: Net Cash Flow to Mutual Funds by Load Structures (Billions of U.S. 
Dollars, 2003-2009) 
 
Sources: Investment Company Institute and Lipper 
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Appendix 6: Expenses Ratios for Selected Investment Objectives (%, 2009) 
 
Sources: Investment Company Institute and Lipper 
